A prospective analysis of Brazilian biofuel economy: land use, infrastructure development and fuel pricing policies by Nunez Amortegui, Hector Mauricio
 
 
 
 
 
A PROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS OF BRAZILIAN BIOFUEL ECONOMY: 
LAND USE, INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT AND FUEL PRICING POLICIES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY 
 
HECTOR MAURICIO NUNEZ AMORTEGUI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISSERTATION 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Agricultural and Applied Economics 
in the Graduate College of the 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2012 
 
 
 
Urbana, Illinois 
 
Doctoral Committee: 
Professor Hayri Önal, Chair and Director of Research 
Professor Madhu Khanna 
Associate Professor Peter Goldsmith 
Professor Geoffrey J.D. Hewings 
Associate Professor Yanfeng Ouyang 
 
 
 
ii 
 
ABSTRACT 
Being the two largest ethanol producers in the world, transportation fuel policies in Brazil 
and the U.S. affect not only their domestic markets but also the global food and biofuel 
economy. Hence, the complex biofuel policy climate in these countries leaves the public with 
unclear conclusions about the prospects for supply and trade of agricultural commodities and 
biofuels. In this dissertation I develop a price endogenous mathematical programming 
model to simulate and analyze the impacts of biofuel policies in Brazil and the U.S. on land 
use in these countries, agricultural commodity and transportation fuel markets, trade, and 
global environment. The model maximizes the social surplus represented by the sum of 
producers' and consumers' surpluses, including selected agricultural commodity markets 
and fuel markets in the U.S., Brazil, Argentina, China, and the Rest-of-the-World (ROW), 
subject to resource limitations, material balances, technical constraints, and policy 
restrictions. Consumers’ surplus is derived from consumption of agricultural commodities 
and transportation fuels by vehicles that generate vehicle-kilometers-traveled (VKT). 
While in the other regional components aggregate supply and demand functions are 
assumed for the commodities included in the analysis, the agricultural supply component is 
regionally disaggregated for Brazil and the U.S., and the transportation fuel sector is 
regionally disaggregated for Brazil. The U.S. agricultural supply component includes 
production of fourteen major food/feed crops, including soybeans, corn and wheat, and 
cellulosic biofuel feedstocks. The Brazil component includes eight major annual crops, 
including soybeans, corn, wheat, and rice, and sugarcane as the energy crop. A particular 
emphasis is given to the beef-cattle production in Brazil and the potential for livestock 
semi-intensification in Brazilian pasture grazing systems as a prospective pathway for 
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releasing new croplands.  In the fuel sector of both country components, ethanol and 
gasoline are assumed to be perfect substitutes and combined in accordance with the 
specified blending regulations to generate VKT. For gasoline, an upward sloping supply 
function is assumed for the U.S., while in the case of Brazil a perfectly elastic supply 
function is used reflecting the pricing policy implemented in recent years. Consumers’ 
driving behavior and fuel choice are determined by the model in accordance with the 
composition of the vehicle fleets in both countries. The model also simulates the economic 
impacts of transportation infrastructure developments in Brazil, specifically the recently 
launched ethanol pipeline project which is expected to affect not only the price, production, 
consumption and trade of ethanol but also the land use changes in the country. All these 
factors are combined to assess the impacts on economic surplus and total direct 
Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions in the U.S. and Brazil.  
The model is calibrated for 2007 and markets conditions are projected to 2022 
under different policy scenarios. Empirical results show that a free ethanol trade regime in 
the U.S. would reduce the domestic ethanol production, including both corn and cellulosic 
ethanol. The U.S. biofuel production would be consumed completely in the domestic 
market and part of the demand is met by imports. Brazil, on the other hand, would meet its 
domestic ethanol demand and export about half of its production to the U.S., China and the 
ROW to meet the biofuel mandates in those countries. With regards to the land use, the 
model results show that intensifying the current livestock systems in Brazil would release a 
significant amount of land for corn and soybean production, and sugarcane acreage would 
expand in the denominated “region of expansion”. The livestock semi-intensification in 
Brazil, driven by the high world ethanol demand and considered as the only alternative to 
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expand sugarcane area in this study, would reduce the aggregate GHG emissions. The 
ethanol transportation infrastructure development in Brazil, namely the three pipelines 
which will connect the ethanol supply regions to major consumption areas, would further 
increase the Brazilian total ethanol supply. Finally, the model results highlight how the fuel 
policy in Brazil is a sensitive issue. Given the flexibility of Brazilian fuel consumers to 
switch between gasohol and E100, decreasing the ethanol blending rates under an ethanol 
supply shortfall would harm the light-duty vehicle users. This increases the consumption of 
ethanol by flex fuel vehicles, due to price effect, and the consumption of gasoline by 
conventional vehicles due to a larger share of gasoline in the fuel mix. In contrast, reducing 
the gasoline tax rate would make drivers better off, due to the increased consumption of 
gasohol and VKT, but this would increase GHG emissions significantly making a very costly 
trade-off for society and global environment. 
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
Biofuel use has been considered as part of the solution to mitigate global greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions and to achieve energy security in many fossil-fuel importer countries. The 
U.S. and Brazil are the world’s first and second largest biofuel producing countries, 
respectively. Historically Brazil has been the largest biofuel exporter until 2010, while the 
U.S. was the largest importer. In the past two years the U.S. exported a significant amount 
of corn ethanol to Brazil as a result of the excess domestic supply and shortage of net 
ethanol supply in Brazil. The supply shortfall in Brazil was driven primarily by the strong 
sugar markets and low domestic relative price of ethanol. The current situation in the 
international sugar and ethanol markets is likely to be temporal and Brazil may regain its 
leader role in supplying ethanol to the world markets in near future ethanol. 
The U.S. Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) was introduced as a fuel policy first in 2005 
and revised later by the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007. The RFS mandates 
blending 136 billion liters (billion lt) of biofuels by 2022, of which about 80 billion lt must 
be ‘advanced biofuels’, defined as biofuels with at least 50 percent greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emission reduction relative to the emissions from fossil fuels they replace. Furthermore, 
the RFS requires blending oil-based fuels with at least 61 billion lt of biofuels produced 
from cellulosic biomass (EPA, 2010). Sugarcane ethanol is considered as an advanced 
biofuel since it reduces the GHG emissions by 60% relative to gasoline. As part of the 
incentives to increase national production, until 2011 the U.S. government imposed tariffs 
on the sugarcane ethanol imported from Brazil and provided subsidies to ethanol blenders 
and cellulosic ethanol producers. However, the tariff and subsidy provided to corn ethanol 
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producers have been removed recently, which may make sugarcane ethanol an 
economically advantageous biofuel compared to corn ethanol. 
A third major player in the international ethanol markets is the European Union (EU). 
In 2008 the EU approved the Renewable Energy Directive (RED) along with a certification 
program to achieve a minimum 10 percent biofuel blending mandate by 2020. According to 
the OECD-FAO (2011) projections the EU may need to import more than 2.4 billion lt of 
ethanol annually by 2022. Sugarcane ethanol meets the EU’s standards with respect to GHG 
emission reduction (35 to 50 percent) and also complies with the sustainability criteria. 
Another important ethanol importer country is Canada which has a 5 percent 
blending mandate for gasoline. Currently Canada imports more than 1.1 billion lt of corn 
ethanol from the U.S. which makes this country the second largest destination (after Brazil) 
of the U.S. ethanol exports. 
Finally, China will play a significant role in the international biofuel markets when the 
country implements the 10 percent ethanol- gasoline blending mandate in the five most 
densely populated provinces and the 15 percent target for non-fossil energy consumption 
is achieved by 2020 in twenty seven cities in China (Bean et al., 2011). According to Araújo 
and Lu (2010), these policies may lead to a 7 billion lt deficit in 2020 which will make China 
the largest ethanol importer. 
Brazil has implemented a mandate for blending anhydrous ethanol into gasoline, 
called gasohol, in the past four decades. Both conventional and flex-fuel cars can use 
gasohol, but the latter category, which is currently the dominating passenger car type, can 
use any blend ratio up to 100 percent hydrous ethanol (hereafter referred as E100). 
Another crucial fuel policy in Brazil is the tax rate applied to gasoline and ethanol, which is 
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modified frequently to make E100 competitive with gasohol (Portal Brasil, 2011a). To 
complete the 'tool box' of Brazilian policy instruments, PETROBRAS, the main Brazilian oil 
refinery and domestic gasoline wholesaler (a semi-public company), has regulated the 
refinery price of gasoline during the past five years aiming to reduce the price volatility in 
the Brazil fuel markets (PETROBRAS, 2011). 
This complex policy climate leaves the public with unclear expectations about the 
prospects for biofuels; hence, several important questions are raised: If Brazil changes the 
fuel price schemes implemented currently, how would the domestic and international 
ethanol markets be affected? If the ethanol mandates in the U.S., EU and China are enforced 
by 2022 would Brazil be able to fill their demand together with its increasing domestic 
demand for ethanol? Will the removal of the U.S. trade and subsidy policies make 
sugarcane ethanol imported from Brazil a more economical alternative compared to corn 
ethanol? If the U.S. modifies the RFS mandates what would be the economically optimum 
transportation fuel mix? How would the increased demand for sugarcane ethanol affect 
consumers’ and producers’ economic surplus, land uses in Brazil and the U.S., and 
aggregate GHG emissions? Finally, if the current sugar market conditions and sugarcane 
productivity in Brazil continue, would the U.S. be able to substitute Brazil’s role in the 
international biofuel markets? 
Brazil has a vast amount of agricultural land most of which is used for beef cattle 
production using an extensive grazing system. It has been argued frequently that at a 
reasonable investment cost it is economically feasible to convert a substantial portion of 
those lands into cropland and expand the current sugarcane plantation to increase the 
ethanol production and meet the domestic and export demand for ethanol. Until now very 
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little intensification has been realized. However, several factors may stimulate conversion 
of some pasture lands to cropland including: i) the international biofuel mandates, ii) 
removal of the U.S. biofuel trade policies and subsidies provided to fuel blenders, iii) 
improvement in the Brazilian ethanol transportation infrastructure, in particular the 
recently launched pipeline projects, iv) the continued change in the Brazilian vehicle fleet 
structure, and v) modifications in the Brazilian domestic fuel pricing policies.  
In this dissertation, I develop a spatially explicit, multi-market, multi-product partial 
equilibrium framework to address the issues listed above. This framework includes three 
major components: 1) a regionally disaggregated price endogenous model for the 
agricultural and transportation fuel sectors of the U.S., 2) a similar model for the 
agricultural and transportation fuel sectors of Brazil, and 3) a regionally disaggregated 
model for the agricultural sector of Argentina. Currently Argentina is not a major player in 
world biofuel markets, but it is a major supplier of corn, soybeans and wheat and a 
competitor of the U.S. and Brazil in the global markets.  Because of the strong relationship 
between corn, beef, and biofuels supply, world markets are likely to be affected by the 
above biofuel policies, therefore the Argentina component is included in the integrated 
modeling system. The model also includes an aggregate component for the food/feed and 
fuel commodity markets in China and a similar component for the Rest of the World 
(ROW). Unlike the U.S., Brazil and Argentina modules, nonetheless, these additional model 
components include an aggregate demand and supply function for each of the major 
agricultural commodities and transportation fuels. The modeling system aims to analyze 
the role of trade policy distortions, the impact of biofuels blending mandates, and the 
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implications of the U.S. and Brazil biofuel policies on land use changes, economic quasi-
welfare and the total GHG emissions both at regional and aggregate level.  
A fast growing literature on the economics of biofuels discusses the extent of land use 
changes and policy distortions including various analyses using partial equilibrium models 
focusing mostly on the U.S., EU and Brazil. This study contributes to that literature in 
several ways: 1) there is little empirical research (e.g. Elobeid et al. 2011; Nassar et al. 
2009; Nassar et al. 2011) that investigated the potential for transition (intensification) in 
the livestock production practices in Brazil and the impacts of this on growth of the biofuel 
sector and agricultural land use. This study gives particular emphasis on the potential for 
livestock intensification in Brazil at meso-region level and conversion of the pasture lands 
to cropland in order to expand the production of sugarcane and other major crops while 
simultaneously taking into account the effects on the domestic and foreign beef markets; 2) 
previous studies have focused on the economic effects of the introduction of flex-fuel 
vehicles on the sugarcane industry and the Brazilian vehicle fleet structure (e.g. Pacini & 
Silveira, 2011; Schmitt, Szklo, & Schaeffer, 2011; de Freitas & Kaneko, 2011a, 2011b), but 
no published study analyzed the impacts of Brazilian fuel policies on consumers’ driving 
behavior, fuel choice, and total fuel consumption. The present study is the first attempt in 
that regard; 3) expanding the sugarcane and ethanol production beyond the traditional 
supply regions in Brazil requires long-distance transportation to deliver the fuel to major 
consumption regions. The regional comparative advantage and supply potential depend on 
the related transportation costs. Addressing these issues requires a spatially explicit 
transportation component. In this study, the supply and demand for transportation fuels 
are spatially disaggregated (at meso-region level and state level, respectively)  and in 
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addition to tax differences across states the transportation costs for delivering fuels 
between supply and demand regions are taken into account when simulating the 
consumers’ fuel choice and consumption behavior.  The recently launched pipelines are 
expected to reduce the transportation costs substantially compared to the traditional 
trucking-based transportation network in Brazil. This would alter the regional comparative 
advantage in sugarcane production vis-à-vis other crops, economics of ethanol production, 
and land use pattern across regions. The present research has an explicit model component 
to address these issues, which is one of the unique features delineating it from the existing 
studies in the literature.  
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CHAPTER 2: Background and Literature Review 
This chapter provides a background and review of the development history of biofuel 
industries in major producer and consumer countries and summarizes the specific 
transportation fuel policies that are already in place or targeted for implementation. It 
continues with a review of the existing literature on economic analysis of biofuels, impacts 
on land use, social welfare, and the environment with a focus on Brazil agriculture and 
biofuels sector. Finally, the research issues that motivated the present study are presented 
and the contribution of the study to the existing literature is summarized.  
2.1. Major Biofuel Economies and Policies 
2.1.1 Brazil 
The Brazil biofuel economy is a well-developed industry whose roots go back to the 
National Alcohol Program (Pró-Álcool) launched in 1975 by the Brazilian government with 
an aim to substitute part of the automobile fossil-fuel for sugarcane ethanol. Initially, the 
production was devoted to anhydrous ethanol to be blended with gasoline (ranging from 
4.5 percent to 25 percent), hereafter referred as gasohol; however, with the introduction of 
the first ethanol-dedicated vehicle in 1979 and the low price of sugar in the following years, 
hydrous ethanol (E100) boosted the ethanol production. In 1980 ethanol production was 
3.7 billion lt and ten years later it almost quadrupled and became 11.5 billion lt, with 
hydrous ethanol comprising more than 93 percent of the total production. The boom of the 
ethanol-dedicated light-duty vehicles occurred during the decade of the eighties, averaging 
80 percent of the total vehicles registered at that time. However, in 1989 there was an 
ethanol shortage as a consequence of the deregulation of ethanol prices due the low price 
of oil and the recovery of sugar prices. This drastically affected the sales of ethanol-
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dedicated cars. According to ANFAVEA (2011), the registration of new ethanol-dedicated 
cars dropped from 50 percent in 1990 to a negligible 0.1 percent in 1998.  
In 2003 the automotive industry introduced the flex-fuel light-duty vehicles, which 
run on any proportion of gasohol and E100. With the high relative gasoline prices of the 
previous decade, these vehicles became the preferred vehicle alternative by consumers and 
represented more than 70 percent of the total light-duty vehicle sales during the period 
2003-2010(ANFAVEA, 2011).Thus, ethanol production resumed its growth path of the 
eighties, reaching a historical level about 27 billion lt per year during the last three years, 
dominated by hydrous ethanol. As of 2010 the total ethanol represents about 15 percent of 
the transportation fuels consumed in the country in gasoline equivalent terms (UNICA, n.d.; 
BEN, 2010). The Brazil government mandates the anhydrous ethanol-gasoline blending 
rate within a specified range, which is currently 18-25 percent (MAPA, 2012).  
Another important fuel policy in Brazil is the tax rate applied to gasoline and ethanol, 
both varying at federal and state levels, which are often modified to make E100 competitive 
with gasohol and to avoid high volatility in the prices of gasohol (Portal Brasil, 2011b). 
Thus, lower federal tax rates (CIDE1, PIS/PASEP2 and COFINS3) are provided to E100 and 
anhydrous ethanol relative to gasoline.  Furthermore, some states impose a lower ad-
valorem tax rate (ICMS4) for ethanol (ANP, 2011). Table 2.1 displays the tax rates in 2011 
for ethanol and gasoline respectively. Typically, pure gasoline is taxed more than 100 
percent, while the tax burden on E100 and anhydrous ethanol is lower than 40 percent. To 
                                                        
1 Contribuição de Intervenção no Domínio Econômico (Compulsory contributions for the purpose of achieving 
economic stability). 
2 Programa de Integração Social (Social Integration Program) and Programa de Formação do Patrimônio do 
Servidor Público (Civil Service Asset Formation Program). 
3 Contribuição para o Financiamento da Seguridade Social (Contribution for the Financing of Social Security). 
4 Imposto sobre Circulação de Mercadorias e Prestação de Serviços (Tax on the Circulation of Goods and 
Services). 
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complete the 'tool box' of the government policy instruments, PETROBRAS, a semi-public 
and the largest Brazilian oil producer company, domestic oil refinery and gasoline 
wholesaler (Fecombustíveis, 2011), has regulated the refinery price of gasoline during the 
past decade aiming to protect Brazilian consumers against the international price volatility 
(PETROBRAS, 2011). Figure 2.1 illustrates this price control policy using weekly refinery 
prices of gasoline for Brazil (ANP, 2012a) and the New York Harbor Conventional Gasoline 
Regular Spot Price as a proxy to the international prices (EIA, 2012). As seen in the figure, 
PETROBRAS has kept the price constant since 2005 at about the middle of the international 
price range. Unlike gasoline, ethanol price is unregulated and change significantly over time 
depending on the market factors and producing costs.  
Figure 2.2 shows how the domestic price of hydrous ethanol and sugar move over 
time (CEPEA/ESALQ/USP, 2012). The two time series data highlight the fact that 
historically sugar has been the driving of sugarcane production in Brazil despite the 
importance of ethanol for the domestic sugarcane industry. Sugar production has increased 
hand in hand with ethanol expansion reaching 38 million tons in 2010(UNICA, n.d.), 
making Brazil the largest sugar producer and exporter in the world. The main difference 
between the two industries is the demand destination; while most of the sugar production 
goes to the international markets, most of ethanol production goes to the domestic market. 
Hence, Brazil ethanol market has been subordinated to the sugar price since it was 
deregulated at the end of the eighties and both prices move together (Serra et al., 2010). 
Although the amount of sugarcane ethanol produced in Brazil declined somewhat 
compared to the historical production levels, it still has a vast potential and will continue to 
have an important share in international markets since it is eligible for both the “advanced” 
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and conventional renewable fuel categories in the U.S. mandate, it is moving forward into 
the EU certification program, and it can fill other international mandates. 
Finally, it is important to mention that since ethanol and sugar production compete 
with each other, it may be thought that sugarcane mills can adjust their production lines 
and switch from one to another depending on the relative prices of sugar and ethanol. 
However, this is not entirely the case. Majority of the Brazil sugarcane mills (72 percent) 
are able to produce both sugar and ethanol and they can decrease or increase the 
production of one or the other, but they are designed to do this within a 60/40 proportion, 
not 100 percent; a significant portion of the remaining mills (26 percent) are designed to  
produce 100 percent ethanol only and don’t have any other alternative (MAPA, 2012). 
2.1.2 The United States 
The U.S. Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS), introduced in 2005 and revised in 2007, has 
established a goal of 136 billion lt (36 billion gallons) of biofuel production by 2022, of 
which 79.5 billion lt (21 billion gallons) must be “advanced biofuels” defined as biofuels 
with at least 50 percent GHG emission reduction relative to the emissions from fossil-fuels 
they replace. Furthermore, of which amount, 60.5 billion lt (16 billion gallons) must be 
produced from cellulosic biomass (EPA, 2010). As part of the incentives to increase 
national production, the U.S. government imposed a 2.5 percent ad valorem tariff on the 
imported biofuel until December 31, 2011. Also, a $0.119 per liter Volumetric Ethanol 
Excise Tax Credit (VEETC) was provided to blenders for blending pure ethanol (regardless 
of the feedstock) with gasoline while charging a $0.142 per liter tariff on imported ethanol 
until January 1, 2012. The policy also provides a $0.267 per liter tax credit to cellulosic 
ethanol producers, which will expire on December 31, 2012 unless it is  renewed (Energy 
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Policy Act, 2005; Energy Improvement and Extension Act, 2008; U.S. Farm Bill, 2008; U.S. 
International Trade Comission, 2011).  Import tariff has been exempted for 19 Central 
American and Caribbean countries through the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI). Under this 
agreement, ethanol "value added" in a CBI country is granted duty-free treatment into the 
U.S. (U.S. International Trade Comission, 2011). Thus, Brazilian hydrous ethanol 
dehydrated in a CBI country qualifies as such. Regardless of the routes, imported ethanol 
cannot exceed 7 percent of the total U.S. domestic consumption(EPA, 2010), which was 3.7 
billion lt in 2011(Renewable Fuels Association, 2012). However, CBI countries have never 
reached their volumetric "cap" of the duty free ethanol, in part because their capacity for 
ethanol dehydration is less than the cap (namely, 2.65 billion lt per year  distributed over 
nine plants, three in Jamaica, two in El Salvador, two in Trinidad and Tobago, one in Costa 
Rica and one in Saint Croix). 
2.1.3 The European Union and Other Countries 
A third player in the international ethanol markets is the European Union. The EU 
approved in 2009 the Renewable Energy Directive (RED)5 along with sustainability criteria 
that the transportation sector of each country member must achieve a minimum 10 
percent biofuel blending rate by 2020. On top of this, by 2020 the EU must meet a mandate 
which requires 20% of the final consumption of energy to come from renewable sources. 
The RED allows biofuels in the fuel mix if their GHG emission reduction relative to fossil-
fuel emissions is at least 35% for biofuels produced by plants that are already established; 
for new plants the minimum emission reduction is set as 50 percent. Additionally, the 
sustainability criteria require the biofuel feedstocks not to be grown on lands with high 
                                                        
5  See details in the DIRECTIVE 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and Council of the European 
Union(2009). 
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biodiversity value or with significant carbon stock. Thus, sugarcane grown in previously 
forested areas or endangered ecosystems such as the amazon region or parts of the 
“cerrado” would not be an eligible ethanol feedstock. According to the OECD-FAO (2011) 
projections, the EU will import more than 2.4 billion lt of ethanol by 2022. Sugarcane 
ethanol meets the first standard above and Brazil has advanced in meeting the second 
criterion by establishing the Agro-ecological Zoning for Sugarcane (ZAE-CANA) that aims to 
control the sugarcane expansion only on the most suitable areas for sugarcane production 
considering physical, biological, socioeconomic and institutional-regulatory conditions 
(Zacamoto, 2009). 
A fourth important player in the international ethanol markets is Canada, which 
currently is the second destination of the U.S. ethanol exports after Brazil with more than 
1.1 billion lt and has a blending mandate of 5 percent in gasoline. Finally, China will play a 
significant role in the market when the 10 percent ethanol-gasoline blending mandate is 
implemented in the densest 5 provinces and 27 cities. China also targets a non- fossil 
energy consumption of 15 percent by 2020 (Bean et al., 2011). According to Araújo and Lu 
(2010) this could lead to a 7 billion lt deficit in Chinese biofuel supply by 2020, thus 
translating into a high demand for imported ethanol, especially from Brazil. There are a 
variety of less stringent biofuel mandates around the world, some are targeted some are to 
be implemented in the next decade (see  Biofuels Digest (2011) for a complete listing). 
2.2 Economic Analysis of Biofuel Policies and Land Use Implications 
A fast growing literature on economic analysis of biofuels discusses the extent of land use 
changes and policy distortions. Rajagopal and Zilberman (2007)provide a review of the 
literature on biofuel policy analysis and modeling aspects. A more recent review of the 
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modeling literature can be found in Timilsina et al. (2010) and Khanna, Crago, and 
Black(2011). Following their discussions and according to the modeling approach used 
here, I narrow this literature review to partial equilibrium sector models. Several 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) models, such as GTAP, MIRAGE, and MIT IGSM, have 
also been implemented for economic analysis of biofuels (see for example Taheripour et al. 
2007; Keeney and Hertel 2008; T. W. Hertel, Tyner, and Birur 2008; Banse et al. 2008; 
Gohin 2008; Gurgel, Reilly, and Paltsev 2007). A common criticism about these modeling 
approaches is the extent of sector aggregations, unrealistic biofuel policy parameterization, 
and difficulty of handling heterogeneity for developing countries, which is due partly to the 
lack of detailed data and partly to computational difficulties.  
de Gorter and Just (2008) develop a general equilibrium model and use a stylized 
model for the U.S. corn-ethanol-gasoline markets to analyze the effects on fuel markets 
arising from ethanol import tariffs in the presence of biofuel mandates and tax credits. 
They find that ethanol exporters benefit mostly from the elimination of both the biofuel tax 
credit and the import tariff in the presence of a binding mandate, despite the result that a 
mandate reduces total fuel consumption.   
On the partial equilibrium models side, various studies have been conducted both at a 
global and national level. In the first category a typical example is the work by Rosegrant et 
al. (2008), who adopt the International Model for Policy Analysis of Agricultural 
Commodities and Trade (IMPACT) developed at International Food Policy Research 
Institute (IFPRI). The authors analyze two scenarios: a “biofuel expansion” and a “drastic 
biofuel expansion”. With respect to their 2020 baseline scenario, which maintains the 
biofuel demand at their levels in 2010, both scenarios show a high increase of agricultural 
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commodity prices. The U.S. becomes a net corn importer and Brazil significantly reduces its 
sugar exports, which distorts the trade patterns in the world markets. Brazil expands the 
area planted for sugarcane, mainly converting some of the rice acreage, and increasing the 
irrigated sugarcane plantation. As in most CGE models, Rosegrant et al. (2008) treat 
developing countries as one global region capturing only the land use changes at an 
aggregate level. Additionally, biofuel prices and feedstock prices are not determined 
endogenously by the model. 
Along the same line, Lampe (2006) uses the AGLINK/COSIMO/Sugar model to study 
the impact of both a biofuel policy-target and a higher oil price scenarios with respect to a 
scenario with constant biofuel growth beyond 2004, emphasizing particularly on land use 
and agricultural commodities prices in 2014. AGLINK-COSIMO model (COSIMO: 
Commodity Simulation Model) is a recursive, dynamic partial equilibrium model of the 
world agriculture. Lampe finds that a significant increase in crop prices and land used for 
biofuel feedstock production would occur. Some concerns (raised by the author) relate to 
the dependence of biofuel production only on the fossil fuel demand, restrictiveness of the 
analysis due to the limited disaggregated data for individual countries, and the exclusion of 
cellulosic biomass. 
More recently, Fonseca et al.(2010)use separately AGLINK/COSIMO, ESIM, and CAPRI  
models to analyze the impact of 8.5 percent biofuel share in the total transportation fuel in 
the EU by 2020 and keeping other biofuel policies in place (i.e. the import tariffs and50 
percent tax reduction) with respect to a counterfactual scenario with only the biofuel share 
but without the incentive policies. ESIM (European Simulation Model) is a static partial 
equilibrium model for the agricultural commodity sectors of the EU, Turkey and the U.S. In 
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the model, markets are driven by prices including the demand for biofuels. In particular the 
equilibrium quantity and price of biofuels are determined endogenously, while fossil fuels 
prices are exogenous. CAPRI (Common Agricultural Policy Regional Impact) is also a static 
partial equilibrium model for the EU agricultural sector, except that the quantity and price 
of biofuels are not endogenous but they are linked to the corresponding feedstock. General 
results of this study show that the EU policies will be required to incentivize domestic 
biofuel production. However, a significant portion of the ethanol targets need to be 
imported mainly from Brazil and the U.S. 
Apart from the global models discussed above, various partial equilibrium models 
have been developed for analyzing the impacts of biofuels at the national level for the U.S. 
where the Rest of the World is considered as an aggregate buyer or seller in the 
international trade component and foreign biofuel economy is not included.  English et al. 
(2006) apply the simulation model POLYSYS (Policy Analysis System) and the input-output 
model IMPLAN (Impact M for Planning) to study the effects of obtaining 25 percent of the 
projected U.S. energy consumption in 2025 from renewable energy sources. POLYSYS is a 
system of interdependent modules simulating regional crop supply, national crop demand 
and prices, national livestock supply and demand, and agricultural income (English et al., 
2006).The agricultural supply side of the model considers 305 Agricultural Statistical 
Districts defined by USDA as spatial units. The model includes several sources of biomass 
for cellulosic ethanol production (e.g. switchgrass and crop residues). Either switchgrass or 
other crops can expand over pasture as long as production of the latter is substituted by 
hay. The authors find that cellulosic ethanol could provide half of the biofuel demand 
implied by the RFS. The share of bioenergy crops in land use becomes significant; corn area 
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increases slightly while soybean and wheat areas decrease. Reaching the mandated biofuel 
targets leads to a price increase for all crops, but mainly for soybeans and wheat. As in the 
studies mentioned above, English et al. (2006) do not endogenize biofuel prices in their 
model. 
Ferris and Joshi (2010) use AGMOD (Agricultural Model), an econometric multi-
sector partial equilibrium model, to evaluate the implications of the RFS on crop prices and 
land use (pasture, crop lands and Conservation Reserve Program-CRP lands). They find 
that meeting the mandate in 2017 requires 2.5 million hectares (Ha) from the CRP lands 
and about 3.5 million Ha from hay, silage, and pasture lands. In their model, oil prices are 
not endogenous and cellulosic ethanol is not considered.  
Beach and McCarl (2010) use FASOM (Forest and Agricultural Sector Optimization 
Model) to evaluate the agricultural and environmental impacts of a domestic production of 
117 billion lt of ethanol-equivalent according to the revised RFS relative to a scenario with 
only 47.7 billion lt production. FASOM is a price endogenous, multi-sector, dynamic, 
nonlinear programming model developed for the U.S. agriculture. The model uses the 
social-surplus maximization approach (Takayama and Judge, 1971; McCarl and Spreen, 
1980; Norton and Schiefer, 1980) to determine the simultaneous equilibrium in commodity 
markets while disaggregating the agricultural sector into several major production regions. 
FASOM covers major agricultural crops produced in the U.S., the forestry sector including 
short-rotation woody biomass, various land categories including CRP lands, and includes 
conventional, advanced and, cellulosic biomass production from various feedstocks. The 
authors find a 1.46 million Ha increase in the corn acreage while soybean acreage would 
decrease by 0.56 million Ha. Corn and soybean prices would go up by 8.4% and 10.4% 
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respectively. Consequently, the exports of corn, soybean, and soybean oil would decline, by 
8.2%, 13.6%, and 51.2%, respectively, while soybean meal export would increase by 2.8%. 
Cellulosic ethanol would be produced mainly from switchgrass (30 billion lt) and corn 
stover (18.4 billion lt). FASOM assumes that gasoline and ethanol are perfectly 
substitutable fuels. 
Chen et al. (2011) develop BEPAM (Biofuel and Environmental Policy Analysis Model) 
to assess the change on land use, food and fuel prices of U.S biofuel policies with respect to 
a scenario without any policy intervention. BEPAM is a price endogenous, multi-sector, 
dynamic, nonlinear programming model that also uses the surplus maximization approach. 
The model is regional disaggregated in 295 Crop Reporting Districts (CRD). Unlike the 
previous models mentioned above, the model fully endogenizes food and fuel prices6. The 
results of the study show that cellulosic ethanol subsidy is necessary for its large scale 
production to meet the cellulosic biofuel mandate, but this leads to a reduced competition 
for land among other crops, and diminishing the price effect, but imposing a significant cost 
on tax payers compared to a scenario without tax credits. 
In between the global and national models, there are partial equilibrium models that 
go beyond the U.S. and EU markets and consider international trade with the Rest of the 
World, including foreign biofuel markets, especially the Brazilian market. Elobeid and 
Tokgoz (2008) employ FAPRI-CARD (Farm and Agricultural Policy Research Institute 
model) to analyze the effects of removing distortions in the U.S. ethanol sector that arise 
from ethanol trade restrictions and domestic subsidies. FAPRI-CARD is a partial-
                                                        
6
 FASOM and BEPAM are very similar in terms of their modeling approaches.  Unlike BEPAM, FASOM does not 
consider a transportation fuel sector and endogenous fuel prices. The prices of biofuels are determined endogenously 
as the shadow prices of biofuel mandates. 
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equilibrium econometric model including major agricultural and fuel commodities and 
cross effects between multiple commodity markets so that a variation in one commodity 
market will impact the other markets. The study by Elobeid and Tokgoz finds that 
removing the VEETC and the U.S. import tariffs on ethanol reduces domestic ethanol 
production and increases domestic ethanol consumption accompanied with a sharp decline 
in the domestic price of fuel. Trade liberalization between the U.S. and Brazil would 
increase the ethanol production in Brazil and exports to the U.S. The authors claim that the 
effect of a binding biofuels mandate in the U.S. works as a deficiency payment to the cereal 
market supplying biofuel feedstock, while internationally the world price would increase 
due to reduced exports. Additionally, combining the mandate with a subsidy (VEETC) 
would increase the total demand for biofuels, and therefore the feedstock crops, with 
reduced domestic consumption and a sharp decline in exports, raising the world prices 
further. 
More recently, Fabiosa et al. (2010) use the international FAPRI model to quantify the 
effects of two ethanol shocks: first, an exogenous increase in the U.S. ethanol demand, and 
second an exogenous increase in the world demand for ethanol. The authors find that the 
increased U.S. demand for biofuel would be supplied mainly by domestic production, which 
has a considerable effect on coarse grains prices resulting from a reduction of domestic 
wheat and soybean acreage and a significant change in the rest of the world land allocation. 
Both Elobeid and Tokgoz (2008) and Fabiosa et al. (2010) capture only the land use 
changes at an aggregate level, which does not provide much insight in terms of the regional 
land allocations within Brazil and the U.S. Additionally, like the other partial equilibrium 
models these studies assume the price of gasoline as exogenous. 
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The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA, 2010) uses both FASOM and FAPRI-
CARD models to evaluate the economic and environmental impacts of the revised RFS 
relative to a business as usual scenario. The EPA bases its conclusions on the most robust 
results of each of the models. FASOM offers a better simulation capability for the impacts 
on the domestic agricultural and forestry sectors while FAPRI-CARD does better on the 
effects on international markets. The EPA projects a significant amount of ethanol to be 
imported from Brazil (about 6 billion lt), an increase in more than three million hectares in 
the total domestic cropland mainly devoted to switchgrass cultivation, and about one 
million hectares of additional cropland in Brazil, of which about half is dedicated to 
sugarcane.  
Nassar et al. (2009, 2011) and Elobeid et al. (2011) integrate FAPRI-CARD and BLUM 
(Brazilian Land Use Model) to simulate land use changes in Brazil. BLUM has a similar 
structure to that of FAPRI-CARD, but additionally allows for new land expansion in Brazil 
through pasture intensification and deforestation. Nassar et al. (2009, 2011) assess the 
effect of additional 9 billion lt of ethanol exported relative to the baseline scenario, which 
keeps the historical level of 2 billion lt ethanol exports. The authors find that the sugarcane 
area would increase by 1 million Ha mostly coming from pasture areas, about 750 
thousand Ha resulting from livestock intensification. Crop and livestock prices in Brazil 
would increase slightly while the production of all crops other than sugarcane would 
remain unchanged. Elobeid et al.(2011) evaluate the impact of a 25 percent increase in 
global ethanol consumption relative to the FAPRI baseline scenario that reflects the current 
policies (consumption of 28 billion lt, of which 50 percent is produced by Brazil). The 
authors find a 1.3 million Ha increase in the sugarcane area in Brazil whereas pasture area 
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would decrease by 550 thousands Ha. However, when intensification occurs, pastures 
would release an additional 100 thousand Ha of land. Sugar and ethanol prices would 
increase by 4%and 35%, respectively.  
2.3. Prospects for Brazil Biofuel Economy 
Several papers mentioned above included the Brazil agriculture and biofuel economy in 
their analysis while investigating the impacts of biofuel policies in the U.S. on global 
economy.  Land use in agriculture and trade effects have been the main focus of those 
studies. The studies by Nassar et al. (2009, 2011) and Elobeid et al.(2011) also analyzed the 
potential for livestock intensification in response to a potential increase in foreign demand 
for biofuels and prospects for conversion of pastures to crop production, in particular 
sugarcane. While being more comprehensive than the previous studies in terms of 
pathways to land use changes two important issues are left out in the latter studies. First, 
the transportation infrastructure is not included in the analysis when determining regional 
livestock intensification and land use changes. This issue is important since the distances 
between prospective supply regions and metropolitan areas consuming transportation 
fuels are enormous, therefore intensification and transportation issues are inseparable. 
Second, expansion of sugarcane acreage and increased supply of ethanol may not 
necessarily be directed to foreign markets. Depending on the price effects, Brazil fuel 
consumers can easily change their fuel consumption patterns given the composition of the 
vehicle fleet structure and flexibility in fuel choice. No published study to date has looked at 
these issues in a simultaneous framework. Some papers have studied the changes in the 
Brazilian transportation fleet structure with a focus on the economic effects of the 
introduction of flex-fuel vehicles (e.g. Pacini & Silveira, 2011; Schmitt, Szklo, & Schaeffer, 
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2011; de Freitas & Kaneko, 2011a, 2011b). Schmitt, Szklo, and Schaeffer (2011) simulate 
the impact on fuel demand, GHG emissions and land use of improving technology of flex-
fuel cars to increase fuel efficiency (in km per liter) along with minimum high vehicle 
energy standards policies. For the simulation, they use a mechanical engineering model 
(ADVISOR) that estimates the changes in the demand of gasoline and ethanol based on the 
energy efficiency of the vehicle type, and given this information they calculate the 
implications for GHG emissions in the fuel sector and the land use for sugarcane. The 
authors find a significant reduction in all three variables relative to the baseline scenario, 
which only has a small voluntary vehicle labeling program with little commitment from 
automakers. de Freitas and Kaneko (2011b) use an Error Correction Model to estimate the 
ethanol demand after introduction of flex-fuel vehicles in Brazil. The authors argue that 
price and income elasticities in their study determine the change in drivers’ behavior and 
their preference for E100 given the flexibility to choose fuel.  Pacini and Silveira (2011) 
conduct a descriptive opportunity cost analysis for the evolution of consumption and prices 
of Brazilian ethanol. The authors conclude that world ethanol supply (including those from 
Brazil and the U.S.) would need to increase significantly above the projected levels to 
satisfy the domestic and international future mandates; otherwise consumers would have 
to return to the fuel use with high gasoline content. The concern of domestic demand for 
biofuels is complicated further by the government policies, in particular the blending 
mandate and tax rates, which affect consumers’ driving behavior, amount of fuel 
consumption, and fuel choice.  
The issues mentioned above are the main motivations of the present study. Below I 
present a closer look at 1) the livestock sector in Brazil and potential for intensification, 2) 
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transportation infrastructure and potential impacts on sugarcane expansion and ethanol 
production, 3) pricing the transportation fuels and impacts on fuel consumption.  
2.3.1. Livestock Intensification in Brazil 
Biofuel production will likely lead to an increase in global crop prices and a higher crop and 
pasture land competition, which would imply an expansion of the agricultural frontier over 
the native vegetation and forested lands (which is termed as the Indirect Land Use Change 
effect, or ILUC). Several studies considered the land conversion through deforestation and 
savannah conversion as the most likely alternative (e.g. Searchinger et al., 2008). Another 
alternative pathway to creation of additional crop lands is the livestock intensification 
through feeding the animals in the finishing stage (semi-intensive system). 
Brazil has a vast amount of agricultural land most of which is used for beef cattle 
production using an extensive grazing system. The country is the largest exporter of beef, it 
has the world’s largest commercial beef cattle herd and it is the fourth biggest world per 
capita beef consumer (AgraFNP, 2008a). It has been argued that at a reasonable investment 
cost it is economically feasible to convert a substantial portion of those lands into cropland 
and expand the current sugarcane plantation to meet the increased demand for ethanol 
including both the domestic and export demand. Removal of the U.S. trade policies would 
further intensify the conversion process. Yet, only the works by Nassar et al. (2009, 2011) 
and Elobeid et al.(2011) have explored the potential for intensification in the livestock 
production practices in Brazil and impacts of this on the growth of the biofuel sector and 
agricultural lands use. These authors rely on BLUM for their simulations. Their model 
starts from the total land available, including croplands, pastures and forests, and then 
estimates the increase in crop area and deforested area. The resulting difference between 
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these two areas corresponds to the pasture area change. BLUM uses historical pasture 
stocking rates to allow cattle intensification as a means to release land for cropland 
expansion.  
To analyze the potential land use changes in Brazil and simulate the sector properly 
in the economic model it is necessary to understand the beef-cattle production systems. 
Brazil’s pasturelands cover approximately 171 million Ha, of which 91.5 million Ha are 
planted pastures, 57 million Ha are native pastures, 9.8 million Ha are pastures planted but 
in degraded condition (hereafter pasture degraded), and the rest is fodder crops and area 
planted with forest species (IBGE, 2006). Approximately 80 percent of this area is used by 
the beef-cattle herd, which ranges between 137 (IBGE, 2006) and 165 million heads (IBGE, 
2011a). This implies a stocking rate between 1 and 1.2 heads per Ha, which could be 
increased significantly by providing supplemental feed rations to the animals. 
More than 40 percent of the cattle ranches raise their animals for complete cycle from 
weaning to fattening; whereas the remaining ranches are devoted to one or two of the 
weaning, post-weaning, and fattening stages (IBGE, 2006). Weaning ranches sell their 
calves to post-weaning and fattening ranches. For simplification purposes, the model 
restricts ranching activities to three categories: complete cycle, weaning and finishing 
(post-weaning and fattening together), which represent more than 81 percent of the beef-
cattle production activities in Brazil (Martins et al., 2005). Each of these ranching systems 
is associated with a different cattle stocking rate, therefore a transition from one system to 
the other has implications on the pasture land use. Thus, simulating the amount of land that 
can be released through livestock intensification requires incorporating these three 
options as alternative production systems. 
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Brazil currently allocates 97 percent of the beef-cattle grazing pasture lands to an 
extensive livestock system (IBGE, 2006) under which animals spend their life entirely in 
the pasture areas with minimal use of feed supplements (such as silage, corn grain, and 
soymeal). This lowers the annual beef cost and makes the industry economically very 
competitive in the world beef market.  
On the other hand, currently only about 3 percent of the beef cattle herd is subject to 
semi-intensification or intensification, this small proportion is in part because these 
systems have a short history in Brazil (Martins et al., 2005; IBGE, 2006; AgraFNP, 2008a).  
In the early nineties, when the Brazilian beef sector was facing economic problems and a 
large technological gap, the sector went through mergers and acquisitions and investment 
in new development strategies, involving technological development and human resources 
to leverage the sector's competitiveness. At the same time, the domestic and international 
demand for Brazilian beef was increasing by the larger income per capita of Brazilians and 
the effects caused by the mad cow and foot and mouth disease in the world, allowing the 
Brazilian beef to enter to new markets. One of the main challenges was to improve the 
productivity not only through feedlots (confinement of the animals for 3 months during the 
fattening stage) but also the use of improved grass varieties and provision of feed 
supplements and mineral salts, which is called a ‘semi-intensive’ system (Tavares and 
Prado, 2011). According to AgraFNP (2008a) in 1993 about 355 thousand heads were 
under a semi-intensive system, mainly in the central-west, south, and south east regions 
and the states of Tocantis and Bahia. Until 2000 the number of heads under this system 
increased significantly in all these regions achieving 2.5 million heads. During the period 
2001-2006 the size of this herd remained almost unchanhged, but after 2007 increased 
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again reaching 2.8 million heads in 2008 with a high participation of the central-west 
region and the state of Tocantis. In this dissertation I will explore only the semi-intensive 
system alternative. 
2.3.2. Ethanol Transportation through Pipelines 
The large distances and the inefficiency of the current infrastructure for ethanol 
transportation is a cost disadvantages of the sugarcane industry. Hence, the sugarcane 
industry and PETROBRAS are currently building an ethanol transport pipeline and are 
planning to develop two more in the future to transport the ethanol produced in the 
Central-West and South-East Regions to four seaports (and intermediate stations) in the 
states of Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo and Parana. Although, technology for ethanol pipelines 
carries some uncertainty due to the stress corrosion cracking (SCC) of steel and the risk is 
reduced when the pipeline is new and exclusive for ethanol, when an inhibitor is added and 
when oxygen is removed (Sridhar et al., 2010).  
The pipeline under construction, which will be 1,150 km long and ready to operate in 
2015 (César, 2011), begins in the region of Senator Canedo in Goias, through Uberaba (MG), 
and the cities of Sao Paulo, Ribeirao Preto, Paulinia and Guararema in the state of Sao 
Paulo. From there, it will go to the Port Sao Sebastiao, on the northern coast of Sao Paulo 
state, and the Terminal Ilha D’Agua, in Rio de Janeiro. PETROBRAS plans to build a second 
pipeline between Nova Olimpia, in Mato Grosso, and the port of Paranagua in the state of 
Parana including five intermediate stations and BRENCO company also plans the 
construction of a third pipeline between Alto Taquari, in the state of Mato Grosso, and the 
port of Santos in Sao Paulo state, including six intermediate stations. Figure 2.3 depicts the 
path of the three pipelines projects. It is estimated that when these pipelines are ready to 
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operate, the domestic transportation cost of ethanol for exports could decrease by fifty 
percent (Scandiffio, 2010). Hence, they may address the transportation disadvantages and 
offer economic benefits for Brazilian ethanol industry. 
2.3.3. Fuel Pricing Mechanisms in Brazil 
During the four years prior to 2011 the ethanol-blending mandate was set at 25 
percent, but in October 2011 the government reduced it to 20 percent (Portal Brasil, 
2011a) observing a greater demand than the amount supplied (figure 2.4). The imbalance 
was a result of the low domestic price of gasoline relative to international prices (figure 
2.1), an increase in the international sugar prices (figure 2.2). The latter increased the 
sugar production and exports while declining sugarcane ethanol production (figures 2.4 
and 2.5). Additionally, according to MAPA (2010) and CONAB (2011a) the Total 
Recoverable Sugar (TRS) in sugarcane dropped by more than 10 percent and the sugarcane 
yield by more than 5 percent during the period 2007-2010 (see figure 2.6). Consequently, 
although historically Brazil has been a net biofuel exporter, the country has had to import 
some corn ethanol from the U.S. in the past two years to procure the ethanol required for 
gasohol consumed by the light duty vehicle fleet (figure 2.7). In addition to the blending 
rate reduction,  the federal government reduced the CIDE tax on gasoline from R$0.23 to 
R$0.18 to mitigate the price effect of the larger gasoline content into the gasohol since price 
of gasoline is significantly higher than ethanol after taxation (recall that ethanol is 
exempted from CIDE tax, table 2.1). Finally, PETROBRAS has virtually fixed the refinery 
price of gasoline during the last six years at R$1.05 (figure 2.1), aiming to reduce the 
impacts of price volatility in the global oil markets on Brazilian fuel consumers 
(PETROBRAS, 2011). 
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2.4. Contribution of the Dissertation 
This dissertation contributes to the related literature by developing a simultaneous 
framework that incorporates the interactions between food, feed and fuel sectors for 
analyzing the impacts of policy and technological changes on the biofuel economy and 
subsequent land use changes in Brazil and the U.S. A highly debated issue in the biofuels 
literature is the effect of large-scale biofuel production on global food/feed commodity 
prices. To capture those effects, a multi-market price endogenous economic simulation 
model is developed to determine the market equilibrium in response to biofuel policies 
considering a highly disaggregated regional supply response behavior coupled with 
consumer behavior within each economy and trade linkages between the two countries as 
well as with the rest of the world.  The supply response of producers is modeled at the 
mesoregion7 level in Brazil and at the Crop Reporting Districts (CRD) level in the U.S. In 
addition to the domestic demands and supplies in these two countries, the model also 
includes an explicit ‘Rest of the World’ component which incorporates aggregate supply 
and demand functions for food/feed grains and oilseeds. Because of their major supplier 
and importer roles in grains, oilseeds, and biofuel markets the model considers Argentina 
and China separately. The Rest of the World component of the model aggregates all other 
countries into one market with an explicit demand function and an explicit supply function 
for tradable products. The Argentina agricultural sector component is regionally 
disaggregated at province level and supply and demands for crops/commodities are 
modeled in a similar way to the Brazil and the U.S. components. In the fuel sector 
                                                        
7 Mesoregions are geographic units defined by the IBGE (2011c) as ‘subdivisions grouping by the social 
process as determinant, the natural setting as conditioning, and the communication and place network as an 
element of space articulation’. 
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component, following Chen et al. (2011), the model considers separate gasoline supply 
curves for the U.S., Brazil, China, and the Rest of the World. The main motivation is to 
capture the effects of biofuel policies on transportation fuel markets, and thus the demand 
for biofuels, through an explicitly specified driving demand behavior of consumers and the 
technological relationship between fuel consumption and miles/kilometers generation and 
substitution possibilities between alternative fuels. The choice of the fuel mix depends on 
the fuel economy, namely the price of each fuel type and miles/kilometers generated per 
unit amount of that fuel.  
This study differs from the previous studies which addressed the issues described 
above in several ways. First, it introduces a model that simulates the beef-cattle sector and 
livestock intensification in Brazil to predict the land use changes in response to alternative 
biofuel policies both in Brazil and the U.S. The simulation aims to explore alternative 
intensification pathways for releasing new lands to expand the cropland and sugarcane 
plantation. The underlying hypothesis is that by transitioning to a more intensive system, 
average livestock productivity would increase, less grazing would take place, and hence 
less land would be required for livestock production. However, there would be trade-offs. 
Besides the increased operating costs, fixed costs of conversion, and cost of feed, some 
additional cropland has to be allocated to feed crops production, particularly corn and 
soybeans, to feed the animals under the new semi-intensive system. 
Secondly, this dissertation contributes to the literature by including a fuel 
transportation component in the Brazil model. This module is needed due to the size of the 
country and long distances when delivering biofuel from production regions and 
transportation of gasoline from refineries to consumption locations and export locations. A 
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special consideration is given to the three pipelines projects that are recently launched 
which will transport ethanol from the Central-West and South-East Regions to four 
seaports (and intermediates stations) in the states of Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo and Parana. 
It is hypothesized that when these pipelines are built, the domestic transportation cost of 
ethanol domestically consumed or exports could decrease significantly (Scandiffio, 2010), 
making sugarcane ethanol more competitive with gasoline. 
Finally, this dissertation includes a fuel market mechanism that reflects the Brazilian 
fuel policies and pricing system. The government policy in Brazil aims to maintain the 
gasoline price at an almost fixed level and adjusts tax rates and blending requirements for 
alternative fuels until a desirable and feasible consumption pattern is achieved. Unlike a 
profit maximizing competitive producer, as in the U.S. component of the model, gasoline is 
supplied at a fixed price (by PETROBRAS) while ethanol price is determined completely by 
market forces. The amount of fuel consumption and fuel choice are determined in the 
model by consideration of taxes, blending mandates, consumers’ driving behavior and this 
two-handed supply structure. This phenomenon is unique to Brazil, thus requires a 
different treatment in the model when simulating the fuel market equilibrium.  Addressing 
these issues in a unified framework is the third main contribution of this dissertation.  
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2.5. Figures 
Figure 2.1. Wholesale Gasoline and Hydrous Ethanol Prices. 
 
Source: EIA(2012), ANP(2012) and CEPEA/ESALQ/USP (2012). International prices were 
converted from U.S. Dollars to Brazilian Reais (R$) at the exchange rates of respective 
years. 
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Figure 2.2. Hydrous Ethanol and Sugar Prices in Brazil. 2007-2010 
 
Source: CEPEA/ESALQ/USP (2012) 
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Figure 2.3. Sugarcane Ethanol Pipelines Projects in Brazil 
 
Source: Mapped by the author with information from EPE (2008),  Scandiffio (2010), and 
CentroSul (2009) 
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Figure 2.4. Ethanol Production, Exports, and Domestic Demand in Brazil. 2007-2010 
 
Source: EIA (2012) and MDIC (2012) 
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Figure 2.5. Sugar Production, Exports, and Domestic Demand in Brazil. 2007-2010 
 
Source: EIA (2012) and MDIC (2012) 
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Figure 2.6. Sugarcane Yield and Total Recoverable Sugar Yield in Brazil. 2007-2010 
 
Source: MAPA (2010) and CONAB (2011a) 
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Figure 2.7. Brazil and U.S. Ethanol Exports by Destination 
 
Source: EIA (2012) and MDIC (2012) 
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2.6. Tables 
Table 2.1. Fuel Tax Rates in Brazil 
State Gasoline Ethanol 
CIDE: R$19 R$0 
PIS/PASEP: 5.08% 1.50% 
CONFIS: 23.44% 6.90% 
ICMS:     
AC 25.0% 25.0% 
AL 27.0% 27.0% 
AP 25.0% 25.0% 
AM 25.0% 25.0% 
BA 27.0% 19.0% 
CE 27.0% 25.0% 
DF 25.0% 25.0% 
ES 27.0% 27.0% 
GO 27.0% 29.0% 
MA 27.0% 25.0% 
MT 25.0% 25.0% 
MS 25.0% 25.0% 
MG 25.0% 25.0% 
PA 28.0% 26.0% 
PB 27.0% 25.0% 
PR 28.0% 18.0% 
PE 27.0% 25.0% 
PI 25.0% 25.0% 
RJ 30.0% 24.0% 
RN 25.0% 25.0% 
RS 25.0% 25.0% 
RO 25.0% 25.0% 
RR 25.0% 25.0% 
SC 25.0% 25.0% 
SP 25.0% 12.0% 
SE 25.0% 25.0% 
TO 25.0% 25.0% 
Sources: Cenofisco(2012) and Congresso Nacional do Brasil(1998) 
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CHAPTER 3: Methodology 
I developed a spatial price endogenous partial equilibrium model to address the research 
issues stated at the outset. The model simulates the biofuel economy, trade policy, and the 
biofuel policies in Brazil and the U.S. employing the well-known social surplus 
maximization approach. This methodology has been used extensively in agricultural policy 
analysis and international trade. Samuelson(1952) was the first to develop a geometric 
expression of the problem and converting it to mathematical programming in order to 
determine the equilibrium levels of production, consumption, and prices for two regions 
and the equilibrium flows between regions in the context of partial equilibrium model 
among spatially separated markets. Takayama and Judge (1971; 1964) extended and 
formalized these concepts further by determining all those as endogenous variables using a 
quadratic programming model. McCarl and Spreen (1980) and Martin (1981) provided a 
more rigorous treatment of the microeconomic foundations of the quadratic programming 
model and the embodied theoretical aggregation processes. The model developed here 
follows the same principles applied to the biofuel economy and agricultural sector of the 
U.S. and Brazil with a highly detailed regional representation while other important players 
in these markets are represented in an aggregate fashion. A detailed description of the 
model and its mathematical representation are presented below. 
3.1. Description of the Economic Simulation Model 
The simulation model is essentially an optimization model that maximizes the social-
surplus derived from production and consumption of a set of products subject to material 
balance equations, resource availability, and other constraints related to technical 
limitations. The social surplus (quasi-welfare), objective  function of the model, is 
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represented by the sum of producers' and consumers' surpluses, including the agricultural 
and fuel markets in the U.S., Brazil, Argentina8, China, and the ROW. The objective function 
aggregates the consumer surpluses derived from consumption of agricultural commodities 
in all these countries, fuel consumption in China and the ROW and Vehicle Kilometers 
Traveled (VKT) in Brazil and the U.S. In the Brazil component, each of the 27 Brazilian 
states is assigned a VKT demand function for the three vehicle types, namely conventional 
vehicles (CV), flex-fuel vehicles:(FFV), ethanol-dedicated vehicles (EDV). Each state receives 
ethanol and gasoline from the ethanol producing mesoregions, gasoline refineries or 
import port in the least expensive way (in the aggregate).  Additionally, the model 
considers transportation of exported ethanol from the mesoregions in which they are 
produced to the nearest export port. 
As in similar models presented in the literature, the supply and demand functions are 
all assumed to be linear and separable. The supply response in the U.S., Brazil, and 
Argentina agricultural sectors is modeled explicitly by using Leontief (fixed input-output) 
production functions. These assumptions imply an additive quadratic utility function that 
represents the sum of producers’ and consumers’ surplus in the five global regions. 
For the gasoline module, an upward sloping supply function is assumed for gasoline 
in the U.S., ROW, and China components while a perfectly elastic supply function is 
assumed in the case of Brazil reflecting the constant pricing policy for pure gasoline at the 
refinery level. Therefore, the model captures the effect of biofuel policies on gasoline prices 
through a feedback effect and thus on the demand for biofuels.  
                                                        
8 The model does not include a fuel sector for Argentina. 
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The total cost of producing agricultural commodities in each region is expressed as a 
linear function of the areas planted assuming fixed production costs for individual crops. 
The conventional fuel supply in each country and commodity export demands/import 
supplies are incorporated by using linear functions, where the total cost of trade includes 
the relevant trade margins (i.e. transportation and other costs). When modeling the ethanol 
trade between the U.S. and Brazil trade distortions, including taxes and tariffs, are taken 
into account. Likewise, ethanol import through the CBI countries is included as a source of 
ethanol supply to the U.S. market. The objective function also includes the U.S. fuel blending 
subsidies (tax credits on blended fuels) and revenues from co-products, such as Distiller's 
Dried Grains with Solubles (DDGS) produced from corn during conversion to ethanol9. In 
recent years this byproduct has become a major revenue item for ethanol processers 
through sales to feed manufacturers and livestock farms as well as exports to the rest of the 
world.  
The agricultural supply side of the model is regionally disaggregated at mesoregion 
level in the Brazil component, at Crop reporting District (CRD) level in the U.S. component, 
and at province level in the Argentina component. In the three regionally disaggregated 
components, the model includes major annual crops/commodities produced using 
commonly practiced intra-year and inter-year crop rotation activities. The land allocated to 
all crops and pastures is constrained by the total agricultural land availability in each 
country and in each region. The comparative advantage between crop and livestock 
activities in each region is modeled explicitly based on the national and world prices, costs 
                                                        
9 Sugarcane processing in Brazil also has a major co-product, namely the electricity co-generation through 
burning ‘bagasse’, the residual of sugarcane after crushing and extracting the juice. However, this byproduct 
is not considered in the model because only less than 10% of the mills sell electricity surplus to the market.  
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of production, processing costs, costs of transportation, and regional yields. Additionally, 
the U.S. component includes advanced biofuel production from corn stover, wheat straw, 
and from two perennial grasses, namely miscanthus and switchgrass. The two perennial 
energy crops are assumed to be produced on regular crop lands or unused lands and 
marginal lands. In the Leontief production functions used for crop production land is 
considered as the only primary input and crop yields are assumed as the output. Land 
availability is limited at the base year values, while the availability of all other inputs (e.g. 
fertilizers, chemicals, seed, credit, labor, machinery services) is assumed to be unlimited at 
constant prices observed in the base year.  
A difficulty that is often encountered when working with programming models of this 
kind is that optimum solutions generated by the model may involve extreme specialization 
in crop production where each region allocates all the land available in that region to a few 
crops (or even a single). Such extreme corner solutions are not realistic representations of 
the actually observed supply responses. This difficulty is addressed here by considering the 
‘crop mix’ approach (McCarl, 1982; Önal & McCarl, 1991) where the feasible solutions, i.e. 
the land allocation in each region, are restricted to a convex combination of the historically 
observed crop patterns in that region. In order to allow some flexibility beyond the 
historical mixes the model also incorporates ‘synthetic crop mixes’ which are generated by 
use of systematic hypothetical variations in crop prices and supply response elasticities 
(Chen and Onal, 2012). 
 In the Brazil beef-cattle component of the model, three pastureland categories are 
considered: ‘planted in good conditions’, ‘planted degraded’ and ‘native’ pastures. Each 
type of pasture can hold any of the three beef-cattle ranching activities: complete cycle, 
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weaning and finishing. Semi-intensification systems are restricted to be implemented only 
on ‘planted pastures in good conditions’. The model assumes that regional representative 
producers determine the optimal pastureland allocation to each activity, pasture type and 
livestock production system based on the beef-cattle costs in the region, including the cost 
of planting improved seed varieties and feeding the animals. A demand for feed is 
generated implicitly depending on the intensification level. The model considers the trade-
off between stocking rates and corresponding feed costs. 
The optimal output levels based on the land allocations at regional level are 
aggregated to determine the national supply of agricultural commodities that can be 
consumed either in the domestic market as food, feed, or exported, all of which are driven 
by downward-sloping linear demand functions. Some crops, specifically corn, biomass 
crops, and sugarcane are used biofuel feedstock. In the case of U.S. the biofuel feedstock 
demand is linked to the demand for biofuels as mandated by the RFS. In the case of Brazil, 
the use of sugarcane as ethanol feedstock is related to the endogenously determined 
domestic and export demand for ethanol as well as the domestic and export demands for 
sugar. Besides primary commodity demands, the model includes four processed 
commodities: soymeal and soy oil from soybean, sugar from sugarcane and sugar beets, 
and beef from cattle grazing in pasture lands in Brazil. 
Because of the size of the country and long distances between biofuel and fuel 
production regions and consumption/export locations, and ethanol transportation 
component is included in the Brazil component. Specifically, the model considers the 
distances and means of transportation with minimum costs (trucking vs. pipeline) from all 
mesoregions that are potential ethanol producers (or have gasoline refineries) to major 
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domestic consumption areas and export ports. A special consideration is given to three 
pipelines projects that are recently launched and will transport ethanol from the Central-
West and South-East Regions to four seaports and intermediates stations in the states of 
Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo and Parana. It is estimated that when these pipelines are built, the 
domestic transportation cost of ethanol for exports could decrease by fifty percent 
(Scandiffio, 2010). In the export component, although the international ethanol trade will 
be most likely from Brazil to the U.S., China, and the ROW, the model allows ethanol trade 
in either direction between the U.S. and Brazil. The recent trends in ethanol trade between 
these two countries justify this approach. 
The model allows sugarcane expansion only on the pasturelands within Agro-
Ecological Zoning for Sugarcane (ZAE-CANA) that are highly and moderately suitable for 
sugarcane production. The ZAE-CANA (Manzatto et al., 2009) aims to control the expansion 
process by defining the most suitable areas for sugarcane production considering physical, 
biological, socioeconomic and institutional-regulatory conditions (Zacamoto, 2009). As a 
result, the legislation restricts the sugarcane production in more than eighty percent of the 
Brazilian agricultural lands, including Amazonia, Pantanal and other sensible eco-systems.  
3.2. Algebraic Equations of the Model 
The algebraic representation of the model10 is given below together with the notation used.  
The lower case symbols denote exogenous parameters while the upper case symbols 
represent endogenously determined variables. The subscrits indicate countries and regions 
while superscripts are used for the type of crop/fuel/commodity. Tables 3.1-3.3 list all the 
symbols, sets, parameters and variables referred in the model equations below.  
                                                        
10 See appendix A for an extension of the Brazilian case including the derivation of fuel and sugarcane prices 
and appendix B for the GAMS Code for the Model 
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The objective function represents the sum of producers' and consumers' surpluses 
expressed as follows: 
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The first line of equation (3.1) represents the area under the demand curves f for VKT 
in Brazil and the U.S. for each vehicle type vt (first integral) and for agricultural 
commodities z(CD)in all countries (second integral) less the area under the supply 
functions for agricultural commodities z(CS) that can be imported from the world (third 
integral). Here the set vt is vehicle type including conventional vehicles (CV), flex-fuel 
vehicles (FFV) and pure ethanol dedicated vehicles (EDV); set z is used for products for 
which a demand function is assumed, containing three subsets: subset i  includes all crop 
commodities (Corn, Soybean, , Wheat, Corn Silage, Alfalfa, Barley, Beans, Cassava, Cotton, 
Oats, Peanut, Rice, Sorghum), subset j includes processed commodities (Sugar, Soymeal, 
Soy oil) and a subset with of a single commodity beef; set dom is used for Brazil, the U.S. and 
Argentina; set world is for ROW and China and set cou is the union of all those (thus all five 
regions). The supply and demand f functions are all assumed to be linear and separable. 
The second line includes the internal and external costs of transportation (ccx) related to 
the net exports of agricultural commodities z (          
 ) among all countries. 
Lines three and four are part of the gasoline module. The first and second integrals 
are for the areas under the demand curve for gasoline (GD) for the world and the area 
under the supply curve of gasoline (GS) for all countries. The third term in the third line 
includes all taxes, subsidies, internal transportation costs, and marketing margins (g ) for 
the gasoline consumed (GD) in Brazil, while the fourth line includes the external costs 
associated with the transportation (gcx) of net gasoline exports (GX). 
The fifth and sixth lines represent the ethanol sector in the objective function. The 
first integral is the area under the demand curve for ethanol (ED) for the world. The second 
term represents the cost (ec) of producing ethanol (ES) from feedstock c including the price 
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of the co-product from feedstock c weighted by its co-product factor, where set c is the set 
of biofuel feedstocks including sugarcane, corn, and cellulosic biomass. The third term 
includes all taxes, subsidies, internal transportation costs, and marketing margins (  ) for 
the ethanol demand (ED) in each country. The fuel demand in Brazil is disaggregated at 
state level and there is a detailed module for fuel transportation in which two 
transportation options (pipeline and trucking) are included. The sixth line includes the 
external costs of transportation (ecx) associated with ethanol exports (EX) from country 
xcou to country cou. 
The two lines 7-8 are associated with crop production; the first term in line seven 
represents the cost (        
  ) of producing row crops rc in region r on existing croplands 
(CL) and new croplands (NL) in the Brazil component. Here set r is used for the 137 
mesoregions in Brazil, 295 CRDs in the U.S., and 17 provinces in Argentina. The second 
term in the same line is the cost of converting (      
   ) new lands from pasture uses to 
cropland, where the cost depends on the three pasture types (pas), namely ‘pasture planted 
in good condition’, ‘pasture planted degraded’ and ‘native pasture’. The third term in line 
seven is the cost of producing perennial crop pe (       
  ) on croplands and marginal lands 
(ML), where pe denotes the two perennial crops miscanthus and switchgrass. The first term 
in line eight is the cost of converting marginal lands to cropland (        ). The eighth line 
includes also the cost of collecting crop residue cr (i.e. corn stover and wheat straw, the 
costs are denoted by         
  ) for conversion to biomass. The last term in line eight is the 
cost of processing (     
 ) soybean to soymeal and soy oil and sugar beets and sugarcane to 
sugar. 
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The last two lines in equation (3.1) are related to the beef-cattle module in Brazil. The 
first term is the annual cost of raising beef-cattle (         
           
), measured in animal 
units (au), which depends on the total amount of pasture land in each system (sys), activity 
(act), and pasture type (pas). The set denoted by sys includes the extensive and semi-
intensive systems and the set denoted by act contains three ranching activities, namely 
finishing, complete cycle and weaning. The second term represents the transportation 
costs (     
       
           
) of calves (    
       
           
) from weaning ranches in region r to 
finishing ranches in region r’ depending also on the system, activity, and pasture type. 
The maximization of (3.1) is subject to several constraints labeled by 3.2-3.23. 
Consumers in Brazil and the U.S. obtain utility from vehicle kilometer traveled (VKT), which 
is produced from gasohol consumption, i.e. gasoline blended with anhydrous ethanol at 
specified blending rates. While ethanol-gasoline blending is limited to 10% in the U.S. and 
20-25% in Brazil, flex fuel vehicles can consume any proportion up to 100% (E100). The 
latter vehicle type is included only in the Brazil component. The total driving distance 
generation (VKT) results from the kilometers that can be driven per liter (kpl) of each fuel 
type and specified differently for each vehicle type; VKT it is assumed to be proportional to 
the amount of fuel consumed by each vehicle category, as shown in equations 3.2-3.4:  
      
         
  (      
         
  )           
(3.2) 
where       
  is a parameter representing energy efficiency (in kilometers per liter of 
gasoline equivalent) for each vehicle type in each country and   is the difference in pure 
energy content of ethanol (ED) with respect to gasoline (GD) (which is 67%). The model 
restricts the consumption of E100 to FFVs and EDVs in Brazil, while the consumption of 
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E85 is restricted to FFVs in the U.S. Gasohol can be consumed by both FFVs and CVs in both 
countries.  
Equation (3.3) represents the minimum blending mandate (     ) for gasohol, which 
is 25% for Brazil (in the base case scenario) and 3.5% in the U.S. Recall that EDVs can 
consume E100 only, so they don’t require this constraint. 
     
           (     
        
  )                        
(3.3) 
Finally, equation (3.4) restricts the use of E85 to only FFVs in the U.S., which contains 
85% anhydrous ethanol and 15% gasoline. 
    
        (    
        
   )       
(3.4) 
Equations (3.5) and (3.6) represent the national gasoline and ethanol balances, 
respectively. Recall that set c is used to distinguish which feedstock is used for the ethanol 
(i.e. sugarcane, corn, or cellulosic biomass). 
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Equations (3.7) and (3.8) express the ethanol supply whose production depends on 
the ethanol yield          
 of the feedstock        
  and on the feedstock yield 
            
 . Cellulosic feedstock includes biomass from perennial crops and crop 
residues. 
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(3.7) 
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(3.8) 
The supplies of two crop residues, corn stover and wheat straw, are restricted to the 
total area planted for corn and wheat. 
Equations (3.9)-(3.11) represent the U.S. biofuel mandates, as implied by the revised 
RFS (excluding the Biomass-based diesel). Specifically, the model requires that 132.5 
billion lt of ethanol must be blended with gasoline, of which 60.5 billion lt must be 
cellulosic biofuel and 75.7 billion lt must be advanced biofuel (excluding Biomass-based 
diesel) which may include sugarcane ethanol imported from Brazil: 
∑    
  
  
            
    (3.9) 
    
                                 
(3.10) 
           
                               
(3.11) 
Equation (3.12) expresses the agricultural commodity balances. The constraint states 
that consumption commodity z,      
 , feed demand for the livestock sector in 
Brazil       
  
, and net exports           
  cannot exceed the supply of that commodity 
     
 .11  
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(3.12) 
where set fe includes corn and soymeal for animal feed. 
Commodity supply (     
 ) in equation (3.12) is the sum of regional production 
(       
 ) variables which depend on the row crop yields (            
  ) and the amounts of 
                                                        
11
 In the U.S. feed uses of corn and soybean meal are augmented to the total domestic consumption variables since a 
detailed U.S. livestock sector is not included in the model. 
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land allocated to that crop (       
  ). The latter is determined endogenously as shown in 
equation (3.13). The model includes a crop land expansion possibility in Brazil, which is 
represented by      
    where the row crop yield in those new lands is fixed at             
  . 
Row crop production variables on both the existing crop lands and expansion (new) lands  
(rc) determine the supply of crop commodities (i). 
       
  ∑            
          
  
 
 ∑             
         
  
   
                  
(3.13) 
Equation (3.14) represents the production of processed commodities, i.e. soy oil and 
soymeal from soybean and sugar from sugar beets and sugarcane, where the processed 
amount of crop i (      
 ) determines the supply of processed commodity (j) (only for the 
i-j pairs defined in the processed product-crop mapping) . 
     
              
        
                                                         
(3.14) 
where            
  is the conversion rate of crop i to processed commodity j. 
The land use in each region is restricted to the sum of the total cropland available in 
the base year (cla), the total pasture land available in Brazil (pla), and the total marginal 
land available in the U.S. (mla). 
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(3.15) 
As equation 3.15 implies, the perennial grasses (pe) can be grown on marginal lands 
and/or croplands.  However, the model restricts the cropland allocated to perennial 
grasses not to exceed 25% of the total cropland availability in each region in order to 
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prevent extreme specialization in the production of perennial grasses. 
All new land in Brazil that can be used for crop production must come from the 
pasture lands in each region. Pasturelands allocated to beef-cattle production under all 
systems and activities and the converted lands cannot exceed the total amount of pastures 
available in each region (equations 3.16).  
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(3.16) 
The model allows sugarcane expansion in Brazil only on the pasturelands within 
Agro-ecological Zoning for Sugarcane (Zaecanapasture) that are suitable for its expansion 
(equation 3.17). 
      
                                                                                        
(3.17) 
The ‘crop mix’ constraint is represented by equation (3.18). This approach prevents 
unrealistic changes and extreme specialization in land use. The symbol  
  is a non-
negative endogenous variable which represents the weight assigned to the historical crop 
mix observed in region r and year t. Equation (3.19) states that the sum of these weights 
must be less than or equal to 1 (convexity requirement). 
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                (3.19) 
Finally, equations 3.20-3.23 describe the beef-cattle production options in the Brazil 
module. Beef supply  (    
    
) is obtained from the total number of cattle heads in the 
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finishing stage (       
           
)converted to Animal Units (au, 450 kg) and carcass weight 
(cw, approx. 50%) taking into account that not all cattle in this stage are slaughtered in one 
year (sr: slaughtered rate). Heads Cattle finished include cattle received in finishing from 
weaning farms as well as that in complete cycle farms (equation 3.20).  
    
     ∑           
             
        
           
 
 (3.20) 
As cattle production is transformed from extensive to semi-intensive system, feed 
requirements (fr) will increase. The model assumes that feed comes only from soymeal and 
corn (fe). The key parameter here is       
           
 which is the number of animal units that 
can be raised per unit of pasture area in each farm type (equation 3.21) and determines the 
total herd size that each farm can have. This relationship is defined for each system, range 
activity, and type of pasture.  
      
   ∑     
              
             
       
                 
                 
(3.21) 
Equation (3.22) relates the total cattle stock (in heads) in each region to the pasture 
area equivalent. The key parameter here is the pasture area (       
           
) required per 
unit of cattle in the finishing stage, which is defined for each system, range activity, and 
type of pasture. The related information is obtained again from  AgraFNP (2008a) and 
extrapolated to all regions based on the agricultural census (2006).  
      
                   
                   
                                                                    
(3.22) 
where       
           
 includes the heads sent from weaning to finishing ranches. 
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To close the module, equation (3.23) restricts the pasture area in the model by type of 
pasture (planted, degraded, and native) to be less or equal that the total pasture land 
availability observed in the base year in each region (IBGE, 2006). 
∑       
           
       
        
                                                                                
 
(3.23) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
54 
 
3.3. Tables 
Table 3.1. Sets in the Algebraic Equations of the Model.  
Symbol Name 
    Brazil, the U.S. and Argentina (Only agricultural sector) 
    Brazil, the U.S., Argentina, China and ROW 
      China and ROW 
  Regions in Brazil, the U.S. and Argentina 
   States in Brazil 
   Vehicle type 
  Contains subsets i, j and beef 
  Crop commodities 
  Processed commodities 
  Feedstocks for ethanol 
   Row crops 
    Pasture types 
   Perennial crops 
   Crop residues 
    Livestock systems 
    Livestock Activities 
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Table 3.2. Parameters in the Algebraic Equations of the Model.  
Symbol Name 
      
           
 Animal units 
         
           
 Cost of raising beef-cattle 
     
       
           
 Cost of transportation of calves 
         Minimum blending mandate 
      
  External costs of transportation 
         Total cropland observed available 
        
   Cost of collecting crop residues 
   Carcass weight 
    Cost of producing ethanol 
      
  External costs of transportation of exports of ethanol 
      
Tax rates, subsidies, internal transportation costs, and 
marketing margins for the ethanol in Brazil 
         
  Ethanol yield from feedstock c 
  
Difference in pure energy contents of ethanol with 
respect to gasoline 
    
              
 Feed requirements 
       External costs of transportation of net exports of gasoline  
     
Tax rates, subsidies, internal transportation costs, and 
marketing margins for gasoline in Brazil 
      
   Kilometers per liter 
  
  Weight assigned to historical crop mixes 
        Total marginal land available in the U.S. 
         Cost of converting the marginal land to cropland 
      
    Cost of converting the new land to cropland in Brazil 
       
           
 
Convertor from number of cattle heads in the finishing 
stage to pasture area 
       
   Cost of producing perennial crops 
       
    Total pasture land observed available in Brazil 
           
  Conversion rate of crop i to processed commodity j 
        
   Cost of producing row crops 
     
  Cost of processing crops 
            
  Feedstock yield 
            
   Row crop yield 
            
   Row crop yield in new land 
                   RFS advanced ethanol target 
                     RFS cellulosic ethanol target 
           RFS ethanol target 
     Slaughtered rate 
                   
Pasturelands within Agro-ecological Zoning for 
Sugarcane 
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Table 3.3. Variables in the Algebraic Equations of the Model.  
Symbol Name 
    
       
           
 Calves and heifers in Brazil 
     
  Demand of commodities z 
       
  Supply of commodities z 
      
   Land for crop residues 
      
   Cropland for perennial crops 
       
   Cropland 
       
  Crop/commodity supply 
     
 
 Processed commodity supply 
          
  Exports of commodities z 
        Ethanol demand 
     
   Ethanol demand by vehicle type 
     
  Ethanol supply 
          
  Ethanol exports 
      
  
 Animal feed commodities 
       
  Feedstock for ethanol 
        Gasoline demand 
    
   Gasoline demand by vehicle type 
      Gasoline supply 
           Gasoline exports 
       
           
 Total number of cattle heads in the finishing stage 
      
   Marginal land for perennial crops 
      
    Pasture converted to new cropland 
      
   New cropland in Brazil 
      
           
 Pasture land 
      
  Processed crops 
      
   Vehicle Kilometer Traveled 
 
 
 
 
 
57 
 
CHAPTER 4: Data and Model Assumptions 
4.1. Land Availability, Production Costs and Yields  
The model is calibrated and validated using 2007 as the base year. The data inputs include 
the base year domestic and global commodity prices and quantities demanded, historical 
crop mixes (areas planted to individual crops), crop yields, costs of production and 
processing, and cost of transportation. Crop mixes are restricted to the 2003-2009 data. 
Brazil is disaggregated into 137 spatial units where each unit is a mesoregion, the U.S. into 
295 Crop Reporting Districts (CRD), and Argentina into 17 provinces. 
4.1.1. Brazil Data 
4.1.1.1. Row Crops and Processed Commodities 
For Brazil, the model considers sugarcane (a semi-perennial crop) and eight major row 
annual crops: soybeans, corn, wheat, sorghum, cassava, dry-beans, cotton and rice. 
Historical land use and crop yields are obtained from the Agricultural Municipality Survey 
(IBGE, 2011b). In addition, the model uses the pasture areas reported by the Agricultural 
Census (IBGE, 2006).  
Just to highlight the expansion possibility of sugarcane in Brazil, figure 4.1 depicts the 
change in area planted with sugarcane from 2007 to 2010. It increased from 7.0 to 9.1 
million hectares (Ha). Very few regions have decreased the amount of area planted, only in 
the states of Mato Grosso and Bahia whose observed yields are the third highest in the 
country but they didn’t increase significantly during the last four years. On the other hand, 
area planted has increased significantly in the region of expansion(west Sao Paulo, north 
Parana, south Mato Grosso do Sul, southern Goias, and southern Minas Gerais), which 
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account for more than 1.6  million Ha (76%) of the total expansion in the country such as 
Figure 4.1. shows. 
Costs of production of the row crops include variable operating costs (seed and 
treatment, fertilizer, hauling and trucking, drying and storage costs, interest on operating 
cost, limestone, chemical costs, fuel and oil, and hired labor costs), fixed operating costs 
(tractor and machinery, crop insurance, marketing and miscellaneous, stock quota lease, 
irrigation), and capital and overhead costs (machinery and building depreciation, interest 
on investment),. Costs of production are gathered at state level (in some cases at 
municipality level) from different sources as follows: Soybean and second corn from 
AgraFNP (2008a);corn, sorghum, cotton, and dry beans costs from AgraFNP (2008a) and 
CONAB (2011);rice costs from AgraFNP (2008a) and EMBRAPA (2007a);cassava crop 
budgets from AgraFNP (2008a), CONAB (2011), CEPEA(2008), and EMBRAPA 
(2007b);wheat costs from AgraFNP (2008a) and CEPEA(2008).The costs are used to 
construct the costs of production for each mesoregion considering regional yield 
differences. For each mesoregion, the variable operating costs and interest on investment 
are assumed to be yield dependent while the remaining costs are fixed at the respective 
state level. 
Sugarcane costs are as in PECEGE (2008), which vary according to the producing 
regions and whether mill owners get the sugarcane from their own plantation or from an 
independent producer (“fornecedores”).The largest producing region is the traditional 
region with 65% of the total area in 2008/2009 (central and eastern Sao Paulo, Rio de 
Janeiro, and Parana), followed by the region of expansion with 20% of the total area, and 
the Northeast region with 14% (IBGE, 2011b). Table 4.1 presents the representative costs 
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for the three main regions. The costs range between R$3,269 and R$2,869 per Ha, which 
results in costs ranging between R$44 and R$54 per ton depending on the producing 
region’s yield. In the model the price of the land is excluded because it is determined 
endogenously by the shadow price of the land constraint. According to table 4.1, labor costs 
represent between 15% and 23% of the total costs, exceeded only in the traditional region 
by tractor and machinery costs (20%) due to the high use of mechanical operations there. 
It is lowest in the Northeast region, representing only 13%  of the total cost, where high 
manual operations are required due to the slope of fields. Thus, yield dependent costs 
become lower in the traditional region (about R$14) than those in the northeast region 
(about R$25). Figure 4.2 shows the costs of production per Ha in 2007 by mesoregion used 
in the model. It can be observed that the highest costs are in two of the remote 
mesoregions in the region of expansion (i.e. Mato Grosso do Sul) followed by most of the 
mesoregions in the traditional region. 
With respect to ZAE-CANA,  Manzatto et al.(2009) calculate that there are 19 million 
Ha highly suitable and 41 million Ha moderately suitable for sugarcane plantations, of 
which 11 million Ha and 22 million Ha respectively are currently used for livestock 
activities. The main pasture areas suitable for sugarcane are located in the region of 
expansion, which is the area with second highest yields (63-98 ton/Ha) after the state of 
Sao Paulo where the area for expansion is very little. When considering all the ZAE-CANA 
areas (not only pastures) the potential for expansion in the Northeast region is limited by 
the lack of suitable areas. The Northeast region has only 465 thousand Ha highly suitable 
for sugarcane (Manzatto et al., 2009) and harvested 1.2 million Ha of sugarcane in 2009 
(IBGE, 2011a), so farmers in that region have planted on lands of medium and low quality 
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categories, which could explain the low yields and/or high costs in the region. In contrast, 
Sao Paulo harvested 4.7 million Ha in the same year and had 7.3 million Ha available highly 
suitable for sugarcane. This implies that further expansion of sugarcane in the Northeast 
region would have to occur in areas with mediocre suitability, which are less than 3.5 
million hectares. 
In addition to crops, the Brazil component of the model includes sugarcane ethanol, 
beef and three additional agricultural processed goods: Soybean oil and soybean meal from 
soybean, sugar from sugarcane. Once soybean is harvested and crushed, it is converted to 
both meal and oil in a ratio of 78:18, or alternatively it can be exported as an oilseed. The 
soybean processing costs (or the crush margin) are R$75 for Brazil per ton (Goldsmith, 
2008).On the other hand, when sugarcane is processed about 139 kg of Total Recoverable 
Sugar (TRS) per ton can be recovered which in turn produces 0.95 kg of sugar. This 
corresponds to a sugar yield of 135 kg per ton of sugarcane. The sugar processing cost in 
Brazil is R$25 per ton of sugarcane (PECEGE, 2008). 
4.1.1.2. Beef-Cattle sector 
Beef production in the model is the result of converting heads of adult live animals to 
animal units (AU) times the slaughtering rate, expressed in terms of carcass weight. The AU 
carcass weight equivalent is assumed 50% and the slaughtered rate of finished animals is 
70% (AgraFNP, 2008a; IBGE, 2011a)12. Base on the beef-cattle figures in AgraFNP (2008b), 
I calculate the parameters for each type of ranch by system (i.e. extensive and semi-
intensive) and activity (i.e. weaning, finishing, and complete cycle) to convert the heads of 
adult live animals to pasture area required in each region. In the model weaning farms have 
                                                        
12 Slaughtered rate in Brazil is about 24% with respect to the entire beef-cattle herd, but here is 70% because 
it is only with respect the adult animals. 
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to deliver calves and heifers to finishing farms since beef production can come only from 
adult animals. The model includes cattle transportation cost by head per kilometer. This 
cost is based on the information by SIFRECA(2012) for beef-cattle transportation from 
Agua Boa in Mato Grosso to Recife in Pernambuco, which are two of the biggest cattle 
markets in Brazil, and it results in a cost of R$0.028 per head per km. 
As mentioned before, by transitioning to a more intensive system during the finishing 
stage, average livestock productivity would increase. This transition can  be done through 
improved feed rations to adult animals up to an amount of 1.5 ton per AU per year, of 
which 70% corresponds to calories and 30% to proteins – calculated by the author based 
on the reports by Martins et al. (2005) and Lopes and Marques (2006). Currently, the 
amounts of such improved feed rations is negligibly small. For simplification purposes, it is 
assummed that the only source of calories is corn grain and of proteins is soybean meal. 
Likewise, a semi-intensive system can be implemented only on planted pastures in good 
conditions. Ranches that adapt a semi-intensive system can reduce the life-cycle of animals 
to 3 years while under an extensive system animals spend 4 years on the farm. Since this is 
a one-year static model, the land use savings are incorporated by using a 25% reduction in 
the total pastureland per AU. When the model selects a semi-intensive system, there are 
stocking rate gains that release land for crop production activities. It is likely that degraded 
pastures would be the first to recover and convert to cropland. According to AgraFNP 
(2008b), the cost of recovering one hectare of pasture degraded including labor, machinery 
and inputs is about R$1,533. For instance, as approximately 80 percent of the pasture area 
is used by the beef-cattle herd, which ranges between 137 (IBGE, 2006) and 165 million 
heads (IBGE, 2011a), of which 65 percent are 1 year or older (IBGE, 2006), and if the all 
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systems were transformed to semi-intensive, roughly speaking it would imply about 20 
million Ha of pasture land released for crop production. Recall that total pasture area is 
approximate 171 million Ha, of which 80 percent is devoted to beef-cattle production. 
Nevertheless, the economic costs would make all this conversion infeasible. The 
model rather differentiates the costs and stocking rates by system, activity, pasture type 
and region, so that the objective function considers the trade-off between stocking rates 
and cost. The latter variables are based on the costs of production reported by AgraFNP 
(2008a). For instance, the highest stocking rate is in a finishing ranch in Northern Mato 
Grosso with 1.3 AU per Ha using planted pasture and a semi-intensive system and having 
an operating cost (without cattle purchases) of R$126 per AU; on the other hand, the 
highest operating cost (R$156) can be found in a finishing ranch using planted pasture and 
a semi-intensive system in the Northeast region with a productivity of 0.9 AU per Ha, 
whereas the lowest both productivity and operating costs are in the Pantanal region (0.1 
AU per HA and R$54 per AU) using an extensive system on degraded pasture. 
4.1.2. U.S. Data 
4.1.2.1. Row Crops and Processed Commodities. 
The U.S. crops sector includes sugarcane, alfalfa and twelve major row annual crops: corn, 
soybeans, wheat, sugar beets, barley, sorghum, oats, peanuts, cotton, rice and corn silage. 
The source for historical land use and crop yields is U.S. and State Data Quick Stats 1.0. 
(USDA-NASS, 2011). In addition, for the 2022 projections, the model considers cellulosic 
feedstock production from two energy crops and two types of crop residues. 
The costs of production for row crops in the U.S. are obtained from Chen et al. (2011), 
which are based on the crop budgets compiled for each state by state experiment stations. 
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The state-level costs are used to construct the costs of production for each CRD considering 
regional yield differences. For each CRD, the variable operating costs and interest on 
investment are assumed to be yield dependent while the remaining costs are fixed at the 
respective state level. 
In addition to row crops, the U.S. component includes ethanol and three additional 
agricultural processed goods: Soybean oil and soybean meal from soybean and sugar from 
sugarcane and sugar beets. Once soybean is harvested and crushed, it is converted to both 
meal and oil in a ratio of 78:18, or alternatively it can be exported as an oilseed. The 
soybean processing costs (or the crush margin) are $20 per ton (Goldsmith 2008). Sugar 
beets productivity is about 145 Kg of sugar per ton and sugar processing costs is $23.5 per 
ton in the U.S. (Shapouri et al., 2006). 
4.1.2.2. Energy Crops and Crops Residues. 
The two dedicated bioenergy energy crops included in this study are Switchgrass and 
Miscanthus. Switchgrass (Panicum virgatum) is a domestic perennial warm-season grass 
(Mclaughlin and Adamskszos, 2005) while Miscanthus (Miscanthus x giganteus) is a non-
native large perennial grass (American institution for research on Miscanthus 2011). These 
two crops can be planted both on current croplands or marginal lands. The model assumes 
the marginal lands availability in each CRD as those projected by Chen et al. (2011) for 
2022. 
Switchgrass is assumed to have a 10-year life span, taking the first year for 
establishment and the second year for reseeding and replanting activities. Switchgrass 
yields average 8.0 ton per Ha during the first year and 9.44 ton per Ha from the second year 
on. Miscanthus is assumed to have a 15-year life span, the first year is exclusively dedicated 
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to establishment, therefore production starts in the second year with an average of 11.5 ton 
per Ha, and in the following years it increases to 27.2 ton per Ha. Delivered yields of 
switchgrass and miscanthus for one year are assumed as the average yield of their life span. 
For both energy crops, the model considers a low-cost scenario following Chen et al. 
(2011), based on the fertilizer application rate, the plant and harvest loss rate after the first 
year, the second-year yield, and the harvesting cost. The costs during the first year are 
considerably higher since it is dedicated entirely to crop establishment with no harvest. 
Miscanthus production cost in the first year is about $2,966 per Ha and the switchgrass 
cost is $492 per Ha while in the second year are $827 and $458 per Ha, respectively. From 
the third year on Miscanthus cost decreases to $750 per Ha while that of switchgrass 
remains the same. The total operating costs of the energy crops are derived by annualizing 
the average costs that occur throughout their life span.  
Following Chen et al. (2011), the model includes also cellulosic feedstocks from corn 
stover and wheat straw whose yields are obtained based on a 1:1 grain to residue ratio of 
dry matter of crop grain to dry matter of crop residues and 15% moisture content in the 
grain, the model assumes 30%-50% of the residues can be removed from the field. Corn 
stover yield averages 1.82 ton per Ha while wheat straw yield averages 2.0 ton per Ha. For 
the crop residues, the main additional costs are post-harvesting fertilizers and harvesting 
(mowing, bailing, and transport) costs. Corn stover and wheat straw production costs 
average $163.8 and $100 per Ha respectively. 
4.1.3. Argentina Data 
The Argentina component of the model includes three annual row crops: corn, soybean and 
wheat, which in recent years have represented more than 80% of the cropland utilization. 
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Historical land use and crop yields are compiled from the agricultural statistics reported by 
the Argentina Department of Agriculture(MINIAGRI, 2011a) and production costs are 
based on Oreja (2005). In addition to crops, the Argentina agricultural sector model 
includes two additional agricultural processed goods: soybean oil and soybean meal from 
soybean, which is converted to both meal and oil in a ratio of 78:18, or alternatively it can 
be exported as an oilseed. The soybean processing cost (or crush margin) is $20 per ton 
(Goldsmith 2008). 
4.2. Fuel Sector Data 
In the fuel sector module, the U.S. and Brazil component models consider the total amount 
of transportation fuel to generate transportation output (kilometers driven). For the supply 
of gasoline in Brazil, I assume a fixed price for pure gasoline at the refinery, which is R$1.05 
per liter as reported by ANP (2012). This includes the refinery price before taxes, 
marketing margins of the blenders, and transportation costs from the refineries to the 
pump. For the remaining countries/regions, namely, China and the EU13, the model uses an 
upward sloping gasoline supply curve. The U.S. supply price elasticity, 0.25, is based on 
Lasco and Khanna (2010) and for the ROW it is 0.2 following Goodwin, Dargay and Hanly 
(2004). Brazil and China elasticities are assumed as 0.2 and 0.3, respectively. Since the U.S. 
and China are net gasoline importers, the baseline ROW quantity supplied is assumed as 
the amount imported by those two countries less the amount exported by Brazil. 
Ethanol can be produced in the U.S. from corn and cellulosic biomass, and in Brazil 
from sugarcane. Corn ethanol productivity is 405.35 liters of anhydrous ethanol per ton of 
corn, cellulosic ethanol yield from is 330.5 liters per ton of biomass, and sugarcane ethanol 
                                                        
13
 The fuel sector is not modeled for Argentina.  
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yield is 81.6 liters of hydrous ethanol and 78.2 liters of anhydrous ethanol per ton of 
sugarcane. Corn anhydrous ethanol processing cost is approximately $0.2 per liter 
(Ellinger, 2008), for cellulosic ethanol it ranges between $0.4 and $0.54 depending on the 
feedstock (Chen et al., 2011), while sugarcane hydrous and anhydrous ethanol costs are 
R$0.3 and R$0.33, respectively (PECEGE, 2008). In addition to these costs, the model 
considers ethanol subsidies, co-product credits, marketing margins, costs of delivering 
feedstocks to refinery and fuel taxes. Corn ethanol processing also yields byproduct 
revenues from DDGS whose price is fixed based on the endogenous price of corn and using 
the linear relationship estimated by Ellinger (2008). Table 4.2 summarizes the main costs 
of production of ethanol for the three feedstocks and shows that the lowest cost per liter 
corresponds to sugarcane ethanol, followed by corn ethanol (only 6 cents more expansive), 
while cellulosic ethanol would be significantly above (0.66 cents). 
The kilometers demand function is specified for each vehicle type (conventional, flex-
fuel, and ethanol-dedicated) using a price elasticity of kilometers driven (-0.2), the price 
per kilometer and the total kilometers generated in the base year. For Brazil, a demand 
function is specified for each state. The price per VKT is obtained by dividing the total cost 
of fuels consumed by the total kilometers generated. For the U.S., the fuel prices and 
kilometers data by vehicle type are obtained from EIA (2010; 2008). For Brazil, the 
information is obtained from ANFAVEA (2011), DENATRAN(2010) and EPE (2011). The 
ROW demand for ethanol is equivalent to the Brazil exports excluding the exports to the 
U.S.  
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4.3. Agricultural Commodities Demand Data 
With respect to the agricultural commodity demands, the model uses 2006 and 2007 
average prices (adjusted to constant 2007 prices) as the base year prices. The U.S. domestic 
prices are obtained from U.S. and State Data Quick Stats 1.0. (USDA-NASS, 2011) and 
quantities from Production, Supply and Distribution online (USDA-FAS, 2011a). The U.S. 
constant prices use MUV-Index of the World Bank (World Bank, 2011).  For Brazil, the base 
year prices and quantities demanded are obtained from AgraFNP (2008a, 2008b). Brazil 
constant prices use Prices General Index – Internal Availability (IGP-DI) (Banco Central do 
Brasil, 2011). Argentinean crop prices are obtained from Monthly Market Prices in 
Argentinean Ports by the Department of Agriculture (MINIAGRI, 2011b) and quantities 
from Production, Supply and Distribution online (USDA-FAS, 2011a). Argentinean constant 
prices use the Gran Buenos Aires Consumer Price Index (IPC-GBA) (INDEC, 2011). 
The price elasticities of demand used for Brazil and the U.S. are reported in table 4.3 
along with the respective sources in the literature. Price elasticities of demand for 
Argentina are borrowed from FAPRI (2011). Price elasticities of demand and supply for 
China and the ROW are gathered from various sources, including FAPRI (2011), Adams et 
al. (2005), Fortenbery and Park (2008), Bredahl, Meyers, Piggott and Wohlgenant (2002), 
Gao, Wailes, and Cramer(1995) and Collins (1979). 
The base year demand quantities by the ROW correspond to the exports from 
Argentina, Brazil, China and the U.S. The international trade data was mainly gathered from 
AgraFNP ( 2008b; 2008a) and FAS(USDA-FAS, 2011a, 2011b). 
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4.4. Costs of Transportation 
Domestic costs of transportation for the crop/commodities in Brazil are as those reported 
by SIFRECA (2012). Domestic costs of transportation in the U.S. are derived as the 
difference between farm prices and FOB prices, whereas international costs of 
transportation are derived by using the differences between FOB prices at the main ports 
in each country/region. The main ports in the ROW are Rotterdam and Hamburg. The FOB 
prices sources are: Market Prices in Argentinean Ports by the Department of Agriculture 
(MINIAGRI, 2011b), Eurostat by the European Commission (European-Commision, 2011), 
prices reported by AgraFNP (2008b; 2008a), the International Commodity Prices data base 
by FAO (FAO, 2011), the Global Agricultural Trade System (GATS) by Foreign Agricultural 
Service of USDA (USDA-FAS, 2011b), and COMTRADE database of United Nations (United 
Nations, 2011). 
For the ethanol sector, the domestic costs of transportation from refinery to pump in 
the U.S. for corn ethanol is $0.032 and for cellulosic ethanol $0.15per liter(Chen et al., 
2011). For Brazil, each state receives its fuel demand from the least-cost (in the aggregate) 
ethanol producing mesoregions, nearest gasoline refinery, or import ports. The model 
considers transportation of ethanol and gasoline from the mesoregions to the export ports. 
For gasoline transportation cost, the model consider the distance from the thirteen main 
gasoline refineries in Brazil located at the mesoregions of  Metropolitana de Porto Alegre, 
Metropolitana de São Paulo, Campinas, Vale do Paraíba Paulista, Metropolitana do Rio de 
Janeiro, Centro Amazonense, Metropolitana de Fortaleza, Metropolitana de Belo Horizonte, 
Metropolitana de Curitiba, Metropolitana de Salvador and Sudeste Rio-grandense, and a 
cost of pipeline transportation of R$0.588 per thousand liters per kilometer. While cost for 
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ethanol is based on the road distance among the main cities or towns in each mesoregion 
or state and the trucking cost per liter per kilometer of R$0.0001176 based on the 
estimated in SIFRECA (2012). For the ethanol transportation through pipelines, routes and 
distances are based on the reports by EPE (2008),  Scandiffio (2010), and CentroSul(2009). 
The model allows delivering to and withdrawing ethanol from the intermediate access 
points (stations) along the route. The cost of pipeline transportation is R$0.588 per 
thousand liters per kilometer (SIFRECA, 2012). 
Finally, the international average cost of ethanol transportation is $0.16 per liter 
based on Crago et al. (2010), but if Brazilian ethanol is exported through the CBI countries 
to the U.S. then the cost increases by $0.03 plus the dehydration cost ($0.015 per liter). 
4.5. Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Emissions 
GHG emissions in Brazil are calculated for livestock, all crops and fuels based on the above- 
ground CO2 equivalent emissions (CO2e). The CO2e emissions are estimated by aggregating 
the major GHGs emitted, namely carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), and nitrous 
oxide(N2O), using their 100-year global warming potential factors. These are 1 for CO2, 23 
for CH4, and 296 for N2O. GHG emissions are aggregated for all crops assuming 
conventional tillage since the model doesn’t include detailed information on input factors 
(e.g. fertilizer application rates) for all regions and crops in Brazil and Argentina. GHG 
emissions for crops include CO2e generated from input factors, machinery and 
transportation. Most of the emissions factors are as those reported in the Greenhouse 
Gases, Regulated Emissions, and Energy Use in Transportation 1 (GREET 1) by Argonne 
National Laboratory(2011). 
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GHG emissions for ethanol in the U.S. (for both corn ethanol and cellulosic ethanol) 
are borrowed from Chen et al. (2011) and they include emissions from the energy used to 
transport the feedstock to a biorefinery, to convert the feedstock to fuel, and to transport 
the biofuel for final consumption, minus the co-product credits. 
For GHG emissions from sugarcane ethanol in Brazil, I adapt the estimates by Soares, 
Alves, Urquiaga, and Boddey(2009). The total emissions per hectare of sugarcane including 
planting, maintaining, harvesting, and feedstock transportation is 2,722 kg of CO2e, the 
refinery emission during processing is 0.047 kg of CO2e per liter for hydrous ethanol and 
0.049 for anhydrous ethanol, and the average emission from transportation between the 
refinery and the pump is 0.067 ton of CO2e per kilometer per liter. The emission resulting 
from international transportation of ethanol exports is 0.076 kg of CO2e per liter as 
reported by Crago, Khanna, Barton, Giuliani, and Amaral (2010). GHG emissions do not 
include emissions related to indirect land use. For gasoline emissions in Brazil, I separate 
the three components: emissions from well to refinery, estimated (on average) as 360 kg 
per liter, and from pump to wheel, estimated as 2.269 kg of CO2e (Schmitt et al., 2011), and 
from refinery to pump estimated as 0.0037 ton of CO2e per kilometer per liter 
(CEFIC&ECTA, 2011). 
For the beef-cattle sector in Brazil, I use the data collected by Cardoso(2012), which 
are closely related to the beef-cattle systems adapted in the model. An animal unit raised in 
a ranch under the extensive system emits about: 123.7 Kg of CH4 and 0.81 Kg of N2O on 
degraded pasture lands, 107.2 Kg of CH4 and 0.8 Kg of N2O on native pasture lands, and 
101.4 Kg of CH4 and 0.77of Kg N2O on planted pasture lands. An AU under a semi-intensive 
system, on the other hand, can emit 96.1 Kg of CH4 and 0.75 Kg of N2O. The difference 
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between the two systems is related to the nutritional facts and health care such as 
regularity of vaccinations and vet visits. With respect to the pasture type, if they are not 
properly managed they can present a positive emission. A hectare of degraded pasture can 
emit more than 1107 kg of CO2 and one hectare of native pasture can emit more than 109 
kg of CO2, while a hectare of planted pasture can reduce emission by more than 2004 kg of 
CO2. 
4.6. Demand Shifts and Yield projections 
When projecting for 2022, the supply and demand curves and yields are shifted out over 
time according to both a simple moving average of their historical values and projections of 
the USDA-ERS outlook reports (USDA-ERS, 2011a). Annual growth rates for demands and 
yields are reported in tables 4.4and 4.5, respectively. 
The base year and 2022 VKT values in the U.S. for conventional and flex fuel cars are 
set at the levels estimated/projected by Energy Information Administration (EIA 2010). 
For Brazilian states the size of each vehicle category is assumed to increase linearly 
according to the historical trend of the vehicle fleet reported by ANFAVEA (2011) and 
DENATRAN(2010). Table 4.6 shows the 2007 the vehicle fleet structure by state used in the 
model. It is projected that the vehicle numbers will grow at annual rates of -0.03% for CV, 
14.3% for FFV and -14.2% for EVD categories. 
The ROW demand for ethanol is taken from the values in of OECD-FAO (2011), which 
consider among others the EU and Canada mandates and amounts almost 6 billion lt by 
2022. As Araújo and Lu(2010) point out, China could import at least 5 billion lt by 2020 
from Brazil, which is assumed as the demand for ethanol by this country in the 2022 
simulations. 
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The model assumes that that the current unit cost of conversion of feedstock to 
biofuel (    ) declines over time depending on the cumulative ethanol production (   ) 
according to the equation            
 , where    is the cost of the first unit of 
production and b is the experience index. To find the most accurate b value, I use a progress 
ratio (PR) representing the rate at which average cost declines with each doubling of the 
cumulative production (i.e.      ). The model assumes a PR value of 0.9 for sugarcane 
ethanol cost based on the estimates in van den Wall Bake et al. (2009), a PR value of 0.8 for 
corn ethanol cost following Chen and Khanna(2012) and a PR value of 0.95 for cellulosic 
ethanol cost based on the parameter in Chen et al.(2011). 
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4.7. Figures 
Figure 4.1. Change in the Sugarcane Acreage in Brazil, from 2007 to 2010 
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Figure 4.2. Costs of Production for Sugarcane in Brazil in 2007 (R$/Ha) 
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4.8. Tables 
Table 4.1. Sugarcane Production Costs (R$/Ha) in 2007/2008*.  
  Traditional Expansion Northeast 
Variable operating costs       
Seed and treatment       120.0        114.0        118.8  
Fertilizer       132.0        148.7        280.0  
Hauling and trucking       263.3        249.2        100.8  
Interest on Operating inputs         11.8          12.3          18.6  
Fixed operating costs       
Limestone         26.3          32.8          31.3  
Chemical costs       433.7        381.6        260.0  
Fuel, Oil, Tractor & Machinery       658.7        551.8        372.2  
Irrigation             -          185.0        150.0  
Capital and Overhead costs       
Machinery and Building 
depreciation cost       325.0        172.0        156.0  
Interest on investment       181.0        125.0          98.0  
Overhead       356.0        346.0        324.0  
Land Rent       294.0        199.0        172.0  
Labor Costs       
Hired Labor costs       479.0        619.0        806.0  
Total costs    3,280.8     3,136.3     2,887.6  
Source: PECEGE (2008) 
*Costs for mill owners get the sugarcane from their own plantation 
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Table 4.2. Ethanol Production Costs ($/lt) in 2007/2008*.  
Item 
Sugarcane- 
Sao Paulo  
(annualized)** 
Corn- 
Illinois 
Miscanthus- 
Illinois   
(annualized)*** 
Operating costs       
Seed and treatment 60.00 105.67 189.44 
Fertilizer 66.00 253.39 87.66 
Hauling & trucking 131.67   848.14 
Drying & storage   36.76 113.92 
Limestone 13.17 9.88   
Chemical costs 216.83 111.20 1.54 
Fuel, Oil, Tractor& Machinery 329.33 101.31 18.87 
Interest on Operating inputs 5.88 16.76 12.93 
Capital and Overhead costs       
Mach. and Building depr. cost 162.50 71.66   
Interest on investment 90.50 37.07   
Overhead 178.00 61.78   
Labor Costs       
Hired Labor costs 239.50 44.48   
Total costs ($ per Ha) 1,493.38 849.94 1,272.52 
Yield per ha (ton) 73.00 3.81 26.02 
Cost  ($ per Ton) 20.46 223.08 48.91 
Ethanol yield (lt per ton) 81.60 405.35 330.47 
Ethanol proc. cost ($ per liter) 0.15 0.20 0.54 
Co-product ($ per Ton)   -116.25 -10.48 
Ethanol cost ($ per liter) 0.40 0.46 0.66 
Source: PECEGE (2008) and Chen et al. (2011) 
* Land rent and feedstock tranportation are not included. 
**The main co-product is electricty, but in 2007 only 10% of sugarcane mills sold it surplus 
to the market, which is less than 1% of total domestic electricity supply. However, there is a 
potential in the next 10 years of supplying 15 % of total domestic electricity. 
*** Capital, overhead and labor costs are included in the operanting costs. 
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Table 4.3. Price Elasticities of Demand.  
Crop/Commodity U.S. Reference Brazil Reference 
Barley -0.3 ERS (2011) n/a   
Beans n/a   -0.34 Rodrigues  et al. (2007) 
Cassava n/a   -0.1 Rodrigues  et al. (2007) 
Corn -0.37 Marsh (2007) -0.11 FAPRI (2011) 
Cotton -0.18 Adams et al. (2005) -0.5 N/A 
Oats -0.21 Adams et al. (2005) n/a   
Peanut -0.25 Carley et al. (1989) n/a   
Rice -0.11 Gao et al. (1995) -0.1 FAPRI (2011) 
Soybean -0.29 Piggott et al. (2002) -0.16 FAPRI (2011) 
Soy oil -0.18 Piggott et al. (2002) -0.25 FAPRI (2011) 
Soymeal -1.41 Adams et al. (2005) -0.35 FAPRI (2011) 
Sorghum -0.2 Adams et al. (2005) -0.2  N/A 
Sugar -0.36 Adams et al. (2005) -0.08 FAPRI (2011) 
Wheat -0.3 ERS (2011) -0.27 FAPRI (2011) 
Beef n/a   -0.15 FAPRI (2011) 
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Table 4.4. Annual Demand Shifts*  
Commodity U.S. Brazil Argentina ROW China 
Barley 0.4% n/a n/a 0.5% n/a 
Beans n/a 1.3% n/a n/a n/a 
Cassava n/a 0.3% n/a 0.3% n/a 
Corn 0.6% 1.3% 1.2% 1.9% 1.9% 
Cotton 0.0% 0.2% n/a 1.3% 1.3% 
Oats 0.0% n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Peanut 0.0% n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Rice 0.5% 0.1% n/a 2.3% n/a 
Soybean 0.7% 1.3% 0.9% 2.6% 2.6% 
Soyoil 0.5% 3.1% 7.8% 4.5% 4.5% 
Soymeal 0.0% 2.7% 1.7% 1.7% 1.7% 
Sorghum 1.7% 1.6% n/a 1.4% n/a 
Sugar 1.8% 1.8% n/a 3.8% n/a 
Wheat 2.0% 1.0% 1.2% 2.1% n/a 
Beef n/a 0.8% n/a 1.2% n/a 
Alfalfa 0.3% n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Corn Silage 0.3% n/a n/a n/a n/a 
*Projections based on historical values and projections of ERS outlook reports 
(USDA-ERS, 2011a) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
79 
 
Table 4.5. Annual Yield Shifts*  
Crop U.S. Brazil Argentina 
Barley 1.09% n/a n/a 
Beans1 n/a 1.16% n/a 
Beans2 n/a 0.14% n/a 
Beans3 n/a 0.14% n/a 
Cassava n/a 0.52% n/a 
Corn1 1.26% 1.60% 0.86% 
Corn2 n/a 1.60% n/a 
Cotton 0.14% 1.06% n/a 
Oats 0.56% n/a n/a 
Peanut n/a n/a n/a 
Rice 0.39% 1.09% n/a 
Soybean1 1.57% 0.90% 0.05% 
Soybean2 1.57% 0.90% 0.05% 
Sorghum 1.00% 1.45% n/a 
Sugar beets 1.09% n/a n/a 
Sugarcane 0.49% 1.64% n/a 
Wheat 0.95% 4.16% 0.97% 
Alfalfa 0.30% n/a n/a 
Corn Silage 0.30% n/a n/a 
*Projections based on historical values and projections of ERS outlook reports 
(USDA-ERS, 2011a) 
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Table 4.6. Brazil Vehicle Fleet Structure in 2007* (1000 vehicles) 
State CV EDV FFV 
AC 21.8 3.9 5.8 
AL 98.5 19.6 24.1 
AP 21.9 0.9 8.9 
AM 122.5 19.8 34.6 
BA 508.6 101.4 124.2 
CE 312.9 65.6 85.5 
DF 447.2 56.7 161.8 
ES 306.9 43.0 101.5 
GO 543.1 108.3 132.6 
MA 105.4 21.0 25.7 
MT 179.6 35.8 43.9 
MS 208.2 50.6 50.7 
MG 1,888.1 366.3 471.2 
PA 155.6 10.8 58.2 
PB 147.5 29.4 36.0 
PR 1,412.3 426.1 371.2 
PE 386.1 82.5 128.6 
PI 81.8 11.8 24.5 
RJ 1,408.7 218.4 743.6 
RN 101.7 40.9 84.2 
RS 1,695.0 133.9 363.4 
RO 62.6 12.5 15.3 
RR 16.9 1.4 6.1 
SC 968.6 147.3 282.3 
SP 6,163.4 1,358.0 2,311.3 
SE 105.3 10.2 23.8 
TO 58.4 11.6 14.3 
Total 17,528.6 3,387.7 5,733.1 
* Source: Author calculations with information  
of ANFAVEA (2011) and DENATRAN(2010) 
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CHAPTER 5: Meeting the Ethanol Mandates and Biofuels Trade with the U.S.: 
Implications for Land Use, Welfare and Environment 
In this chapter, I analyze two biofuel trade policy scenarios and use the model described in 
Chapter 3 to determine the implications of those scenarios with particular emphasis on the 
U.S.-Brazil bilateral trade, GHG emissions and welfare of producers and consumers both in 
Brazil and the U.S. Prior to the policy scenario analyses the model is validated to ensure 
that it has reasonably satisfactory simulation performance. This is done in the next section. 
The subsequent sections present the empirical simulation results obtained from the model 
under different scenarios. 
5.1. Model Validation 
The baseline scenario reflects the 2007 policy conditions for the purpose of model 
validation. Since the actual ethanol consumption in the U.S. in 2007 exceeded the RFS 
mandate for that year, the mandate constraints are relaxed in the model. The ethanol 
import tariffs and blender subsidies implemented in 2007 remain in place. 
Validation results for Brazil are reported in table 5.1. The land use and crop prices 
determined by the model are within acceptable ranges. The model generated pasture areas 
(table 5.1 and figure 5.2) and beef production and prices also show very good fit, thus 
highlighting the good simulation performance of the model. Figures 5.1-5.4 illustrate the 
land use results for sugarcane, ‘pastures planted in good condition’, corn and soybean. The 
maps show a very small deviation in the regional distribution of cropland allocation and 
highlight the concentration of sugarcane in the traditional region, the relevance of Mato 
Grosso and the ‘Deforestation Arch’ (i.e. southern Maranhao, Western Tocantins, southern 
Pará, northern Mato Grosso, eastern Rondônia) for soybean cultivation, the coverage of 
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pasture in the entire country as well as the uniform distribution of corn across Brazil. The 
fuel prices and consumption values are also within a small deviation range around the 
observed values.   
Table 5.2 summarizes the baseline market equilibrium solution for the U.S. The 
simulation results for land use and crop prices in the U.S. are also usually within acceptable 
margins of error. The ethanol imported from Brazil (1.9 billion lt) is almost equal to 7% of 
the U.S. consumption, which is the cap for the CBI countries that process hydrous ethanol 
imported from Brazil and re-exported to the U.S. 
Finally, table 5.3 presents the model results for Argentina. Land allocation and crop 
prices show a close fit to the observed values for the three crops. 
These small deviations notwithstanding, the model appears to reasonably replicate 
the base-year market equilibrium conditions in all countries. Thus, I proceed with the 
scenario analysis. 
5.2. Effect of Biofuel Policies in 2022 
The model simulates two trade and biofuel policy scenarios stated for year 2022 (the last 
year of the policy period for which the RFS targets have been stated) to analyze their 
implications on land allocation, international trade, food and fuel prices, GHG emissions, 
and economic surplus accruing to producers and consumers. 
For Brazil, in the base line solution the model considers the maximum blending 
mandate, namely the proportion of anhydrous ethanol blended into gasoline must be 25%, 
the tax rates applied to gasoline and ethanol both at federal and state levels, and the 
regulated refinery price of gasoline (i.e. R$1.05). In the U.S. component, the biofuel 
blending mandates, tax credit for gasoline blenders, the cellulosic ethanol subsidy, and the 
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import barriers, namely the tariff rate per unit and ad valorem tax, are maintained at 2009 
levels assuming that they will continue as dictated by the RFS. Increasing imports by the 
ROW and China are due to the mandates imposed in Europe and China.  
In the policy analysis, I consider the case without any biofuel policy in the U.S. and 
ethanol imports from ROW and China are set at its historical levels, which is referred to as 
the ‘Business-As-Usual’ (BAU) scenario from here on. I compare this 2022 baseline with 
two alternative policies. The first alternative scenario considers the U.S. biofuel policies 
that prevailed in 2011, namely the RFS mandates, import barriers and the subsidies, and 
the ethanol imports from the ROW and China as in the BAU case. The second scenario 
removes the U.S. biofuel tax incentives and includes only the mandates while maintaining 
the imports from the ROW and China. Results are summarized in tables 5.4-5.8 and a brief 
discussion of the major findings is below. 
5.2.1. The Benchmark - BAU Scenario 
The first column in tables 5.4-5.8 reports the results for this scenario. For Brazil, the total 
cropland would increase by 6.5 million Ha relative to the 2007 cropland use, which would 
come mainly from converting pasture areas to cropland (table 5.4). As a consequence, beef 
production would decrease by 3.5% and intensification rate (the number of cattle finished 
in a semi-intensive system relative to the total herd size) would change from 1.6% in the 
validation run to 11.4%. Beef supply reduction is followed by a significant beef price 
escalation. As expected, corn and soybean areas would expand significantly to supply feed 
supplements to the livestock sector and to export to the international markets. Similarly, 
sugarcane production would increase by 82% to meet the bigger domestic and export 
demand for both ethanol and sugar. As a result of the crop/commodity production changes, 
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prices of corn, soybean, and sugar would increase significantly (table 5.4). In the fuel 
sector, ethanol production would be doubled with respect to the 2007 level, of which 95% 
would be consumed domestically. The gasohol price would remain virtually unchanged, 
while the pure hydrous ethanol (E100) price would decrease slightly. The price of unit 
distance traveled for flex fuel vehicles (FFV) and conventional vehicles (CV) would 
decrease some and the total VKT would be more than doubled (table 5.7). The main reason 
for the discrepancy between the changes in fuel and VKT prices is due to the fixed price of 
gasoline, which now moves along a perfectly elastic supply curve. 
Under the BAU scenario, production of major crops in the U.S. and prices of soybean, 
wheat and corn would increase significantly mainly due to the high level of exports to 
China. However, there would be small changes in their acreage as a consequence of the 
yield increase assumption. In the fuel sector, corn ethanol would increase from its 2007 
level of 24.7 to 31.5 billion lt, cellulosic ethanol would not be produced despite the 
assumption of low cost and high productivity of cellulosic biomass, and there would be no 
ethanol import from Brazil (table 5.8). Consequently, domestic consumption becomes 
slightly higher than that observed in 2007. As a result, the U.S. ethanol demand would be 
slightly higher than the minimum oxygenator blending requirement (which is assumed to 
be 3.5% of the total fuel consumption). On the fuel consumers side, VKT by both 
conventional and flex vehicle categories would go up by more than 25% and similarly, 
gasohol and E85 prices would increase by 5% in 2022 compared to the 2007 levels (table 
5.8). 
For Argentina, the total cropland would increase by 2.6% with respect to the cropland 
in 2007, mainly due to the increase in corn acreage. Corn, soybean and wheat exports 
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would increase to some extent while soybean products would remain almost at their base 
year levels. Thus, similar to the U.S. case, corn, soybean and wheat prices would increase 
significantly (table 5.6). The low price elasticities explain why the price changes are so high 
although the decreases in the consumed quantities in domestic markets are relatively 
small. 
5.2.2. Scenario-1: U.S. Mandates Plus Import Barriers and Biofuel Subsidies  
The second scenario includes the U.S. tariffs on imported biofuel and blender tax credits 
(subsidies) on conventional (corn) ethanol and cellulosic ethanol, the RFS mandates and 
the increasing import due to the mandates in the ROW and China.  The subsidy incentives 
and tariffs in the U.S. have been removed recently, but their potential impacts are 
unknown. The purpose of the present analysis is to shed some light on the implications of 
these policy changes and provide insight to policy makers. This policy scenario is called 
hereafter as the ‘all-inclusive policy’. The empirical results under this scenario are 
presented in the second column in tables 5.4-5.8. A brief discussion of the major findings is 
below. 
The total cropland use in Brazil would increase by 8.4%, with a 19% and 13% 
rebound of corn and sugarcane areas, respectively, relative to the BAU scenario. The 
pasture area would be reduced to some extent and beef production would go down slightly 
(2.7%), although significant (12%) intensification would take place (table 5.4). Corn 
production would increase significantly (from 62 to 75 million ton) as a result of filling the 
international market demand which was previously supplied by the U.S. The price effect on 
corn and beef would be substantial, while sugar and soybean prices would increase 
somewhat compared to the BAU levels.  In the fuel sector, sugarcane ethanol production 
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would be about 57 billion lt, 24% more than the BAU level, most of which is consumed 
domestically (72%) and the rest is exported to the U.S. (9.4 billion lt), China (2.8 billion lt) 
and the ROW (3.4 billion lt). The gasohol price would increase marginally while E100 price 
would drop slightly. The VKT prices paid by CV and EDV owners would remain about same 
level as the BAU, whereas the VKT paid by FFV’s would go up by 1.3%. The total VKT would 
remain about the same level as in the BAU (table 5.7). Thus the impacts of these changes 
Brazilian fuel consumers would be negligibly small. 
In the U.S., the total ethanol use would just meet the total mandated amount. 
Cellulosic ethanol would be the main type of biofuel, 74.8 billion lt, considerably above the 
‘advanced’ ethanol mandate and representing 57% of the U.S ethanol market. However, 
corn ethanol would also increase to 53.2 billion lt (69%) relative to the BAU case and part 
of it (5 billion lt) would be exported to China and the ROW. However, the U.S. would also 
import some sugarcane ethanol to meet the total domestic consumption, which is 7% of the 
total consumption (the maximum quota for the CBI countries) and fill the rest of the 
advanced biofuel mandate (table 5.8). This finding is consistent with the current trends in 
international ethanol trade. There would be a significant reduction in the price of VKT, 
gasohol, and E85 while the total VKT would increase by 1.4% with respect to the BAU 
scenario (table 5.8).  
5.2.2.1. Progress Ratio Analysis 
The dominating share of cellulosic ethanol in the above results is driven largely by the 
‘progress ratio’ (PR) parameter, which was set as 0.95 in the analysis. This assumption 
represents an average efficiency increase observed in newly introduced industries, which 
is assumed to hold for cellulosic ethanol processing also.  A sensitivity analysis is carried 
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out to estimate the impacts of a slightly larger PR parameter, namely 0.99 instead of 0.95, 
which means that the cost of processing cellulosic ethanol would decline at a slower rate. 
The results of the model after this parameter change are displayed in table 5.9. In this case, 
production of cellulosic ethanol would be just enough to meet the U.S. mandate and would 
decrease from 74.8 to 60.5 billion lt.  The rest of the ‘advanced mandate’ would be met by 
sugarcane ethanol imported from Brazil, and corn ethanol would meet the rest of the total 
RFS mandate. The U.S. would not export any ethanol. In the agricultural sector, corn 
acreage would increase by 1.4% while soybean and wheat acreage values would drop by 
more than 5% each. Miscanthus area would be 9.3 million Ha, while switchgrass would be 
planted on just 0.7 million Ha. Ethanol production would utilize significantly more corn and 
therefore reduce the exports of corn considerably. This leads to a large increase in the price 
of corn compared to the BAU scenario (table 5.5). These results indicate the important role 
of protectionist biofuel trade policies in the U.S., which were needed during the infancy of 
the U.S. corn ethanol industry.  
The small change in the U.S. corn acreage (1.4% increase), in spite of a switch from 
energy crops to corn as biofuel feedstocks, is unexpected. This perplexing result is due to 
the supply increase in another major supplier country, namely Argentina. As mentioned 
above the increased U.S. demand for corn as biofuel feedstock is met by an almost equal 
amount of reduction in the exports.  Consequently, corn production in Argentina would 
increase significantly to meet the increasing export demand in global markets (table 5.6), 
which in turn would have a substantial impact on the domestic price of corn in Argentina 
(26% increase). This indirect effect demonstrates why it is necessary to incorporate 
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Argentina as a major corn grains supplier when analyzing the global impacts of biofuel 
policies in the U.S.  
5.2.3. Scenario-2: Mandates-Only 
The third column in tables 5.4-5.8 presents the results of considering only the RFS 
mandates without tariffs, taxes, and subsidies, and increasing imports due to the mandates 
in the ROW and China. In the following I present an analysis of this policy alternative, 
which is referred to as mandates-only scenario, relative to the all-inclusive policy scenario 
discussed above.  
Under this scenario, the total sugarcane area and production in Brazil would expand 
further by about 20%, while pastureland and cropland would decline by 2 million Ha. The 
main reason for the expanding sugarcane production is the demand for sugarcane ethanol 
in the U.S., which becomes a more economical fuel alternative to cellulosic ethanol. This 
explains the importance of implementing the import tariff and tax policies in the U.S. when 
the RFS mandates were imposed and the domestic ethanol industry was exposed to foreign 
competition, particularly to the mature biofuel industry in Brazil. To create the additional 
land for sugarcane production the livestock intensification would further increase by 16% 
(table 5.4). In the fuel sector, sugarcane ethanol production would go up from 56 billion lt 
under the ‘all-inclusive policy’ to 75.5 billion lt, of which 25.3 billion lt is exported to the U.S. 
market including 9.2 billion lt through the CBI countries (table 5.7). The E100 price in 
Brazil would increase slightly though, only by 2%, while gasohol price would remain the 
same. Hence, the total VKT and VKT’s by all vehicle categories would remain virtually 
unchanged (table 5.7). 
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On the U.S. side, although corn and cellulosic ethanol production decrease (by 12% 
and 19%, respectively) relative to the ‘all-inclusive policy’ scenario, most of the domestic 
ethanol demand would still be supplied domestically (81%). Again cellulosic ethanol would 
be the main source of biofuel with an annual production of 60.5 billion lt, which is 
equivalent to the cellulosic mandate14. Imported sugarcane ethanol – 25.2 billion lt, three 
times higher than the imports under the ‘all-inclusive’ scenario – would fill the remaining 
‘advanced biofuel’ mandate of the RFS and also substitute a portion of the conventional 
ethanol. There would not be significant changes in the prices of VKT and fuel (table 5.8). In 
the agricultural sector, traditional crops would change insignificantly, while aggregated 
energy crops area would decline significantly (-28%). Ethanol production would utilize less 
corn, thus corn exports would increase by 11% (table 5.5) compared to the all-inclusive 
scenario and the price of corn would go down considerably (-8.5%). 
5.2.4. Land use in Brazil under alternative biofuel policies 
This section presents the land use allocation in Brazil under the BAU and the land use 
change under the two policy scenarios described above. Figure 5.5 shows the regional land 
allocation for sugarcane in each of the three cases. The higher the sugarcane ethanol 
production, the more land is dedicated to sugarcane in San Jose do Rio Preto mesoregion in 
northwestern Sao Paulo, Triangulo Mineiro/Alto Paranaiba, northwestern and 
south/southeastern mesoregions in Minas Gerais, central and southern regions in Goias, 
and southeastern region in Mato Grosso do Sul. Likewise, some regions in the states of 
Mato Grosso, Maranhao and Bahia show potential as a second expansion region. The 
                                                        
14
 Note, however, that the same progress ratio parameter (PR=0.95) is used in the analysis here. The sensitivity 
analysis presented earlier indicates that these results could change substantially if a slower improvement in cost 
efficiency was assumed. 
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sugarcane expansion regions are determined based on the combined effect of the truck 
transportation costs, favoring the regions closest to the export ports, and the regions with 
relatively higher sugarcane yields.  Specifically, under the BAU, sugarcane production 
would increase significantly in the region of expansion (western Sao Paulo, northern 
Parana, southern Mato Grosso do Sul, southern Goias, and southern Minas Gerais) as it 
actually happened in year 2010. When the entire set of U.S. biofuel policies is included in 
the analysis, sugarcane area would increase slightly only in the traditional region (central 
and eastern Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Parana). Under the ‘mandates-only’ scenario, 
most of the sugarcane expansion relative to the BAU would occur in Southwestern Mato 
Grosso do Sul and Southern Goias. Some mesoregions in the Northeast would also start 
planting sugarcane.  This is an expected result because of the increasing amount of exports 
mainly due to removed incentives to domestic ethanol producers in the U.S. 
Figure 5.6 shows the results for corn area under the three scenarios.  Under the ‘all-
inclusive policy’ scenario, Mato Grosso do Sul and Parana would increase their corn 
production significantly. When only the mandates are considered, northern Mato Grosso 
and western Mato Grosso do Sul would decrease their production relative to BAU case and 
most of the regions would have a slight increase except for eastern Mato Grosso do Sul 
which would expand its corn production significantly.  
Soybean acreage results are displayed in figure 5.7 under various scenarios. The 
regional distribution confirms the relevance of the Deforestation Arch for the expansion of 
soybean acreage and explains how sugarcane would have to compete for cropland in the 
region of expansion. The Deforestation Arch is the main region where the agricultural 
frontier advances toward the rainforest and the highest rates of deforestation in the 
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Amazon are observed. It includes an area of 50 million Ha from eastern and southern Pará 
westward, passing through Mato Grosso, Rondonia and Acre. Under both policy scenarios, 
soybean would further expand over in this region. 
Pastureland allocation in Brazil is reported in figure 5.8. The increased demand for 
cropland would exert pressure on the beef-cattle sector not only in the Deforestation Arch 
but also in the Pantanal region, which is the largest Brazilian wetland known for its high 
environmental value and ecosystem services. Both policy scenarios would lead to a pasture 
land reduction in northern Mato Grosso, Western Pará, southeastern Mato Grosso do Sul 
and southern Goias due to the conversion of pasture lands to sugarcane plantation. 
Figure 5.9 shows the spatial distribution of the areas under livestock intensification 
(green dots) and the new cropland. Under the BAU scenario, most of the new cropland 
would be developed in the region of expansion and the Deforestation Arch, followed by 
some new areas in the state of Parana. The beef-cattle intensification process would 
concentrate highly in the states of Tocantins, Maranhao, Goias and Rio de Janeiro. Under 
the ‘all-inclusive policy’ scenario, all regions would convert some of their pasture lands to 
crop production. Intensification would expand in the Northeastern region also including 
the states of Piaui, Bahia and Maranhao. When sugarcane production increases as a result 
of the relaxed U.S. biofuel trade policies, more new cropland would come from the 
Deforestation Arch, southeastern Mato Grosso do Sul and southern Goias.  
Under the ‘mandates-only’ and ‘all-inclusive policy’ scenarios, the additional ethanol 
production (11 and 30 billion lt, respectively) would require additional 1.2 and 3.4 million 
Ha of new sugarcane area, which would come from other crops but more importantly from 
pasture uses of land. The average rate of expansion would be 115 Ha per million liters of 
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ethanol. Nassar et al. (2009) find a very similar intensification, namely 111 Ha/million 
liters, while Elobeid et al. (2011) find a much lower change, 53.1 Ha/million liters, due to a 
smaller shock to the ethanol production. 
5.2.5. Environmental Effects 
When all of the U.S. biofuel policies are included in the model, the total GHG emissions (in 
CO2e) by the U.S., Brazil, and Argentina would reduce by 0.23 billion metric tons (which 
corresponds to an 11% reduction) relative to the BAU (first panel of table 5.10). Much of 
the reduction is actually achieved by the U.S., by almost 0.25 billion metric tons, while 
Brazil and Argentina increase their total emissions. The significant reduction is due to the 
substitution of gasoline by ethanol in the U.S. More specifically, consumption of gasoline 
would decrease by 60 billion lt, while the demand for ethanol would increase by 100 billion 
lt with respect to the BAU case.  Under the ‘mandates-only’ scenario, there would be 2% less 
reduction in the total GHG emissions (i.e. 9% overall reduction) relative to the ‘all-inclusive 
policy’ scenario due to the increased use of gasohol (instead of E100) by the Brazilian 
vehicle fleet and the significant reduction in cellulosic ethanol production in the U.S. The 
latter was the main emissions saver under the all-inclusive scenario. 
5.2.6. Economic Surplus Effects 
The quasi-welfare effects of the policy scenarios considered here are reported in table 5.10. 
Under the ‘all-inclusive policy’ scenario, Brazilian gasoline and ethanol producers would 
have an income gain by 5.8% relative to the BAU benchmark while fuel consumers’ welfare 
would remain the same. On the U.S. side, fuel producers would be significantly better off 
with respect to the BAU scenario due to the incentives received. Similarly, fuel consumers 
would be slightly better off due to the increase in VKT (table 5.8). Similar results would 
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hold for fuel consumers and producers in both countries under the ‘mandates-only’ 
scenario, except that the U.S. fuel producers would reduce their incomes due to the lack of 
incentives to produce ethanol at a similar level observed in the ‘all-inclusive policy’ 
scenario. 
On the agriculture side, producers in both countries would obtain large gains with 
respect to the BAU case under the all-inclusive policy scenario. Agricultural producers in the 
U.S. would gain highest benefits particularly due to the high price of corn. The share of 
cellulosic biomass producers in the increased producers’ net income would be substantial, 
about $17 billion (10% of the total agricultural producers’ surplus). On the other hand, 
both American and Brazilians food consumers would face substantial losses mainly due to 
the high price of corn and other crop products. Conversely, under the mandates-only 
scenario, the price of corn would drop (by 8.5%) relative to the all-inclusive policy scenario 
(table 5.5), hence the gains accruing to U.S. agricultural producers would decline by 9%, 
while consumers would be better off. 
Finally, the Brazilian government would have increased tax revenues under both 
policy scenarios ($0.5 and $0.2 billion respectively). The U.S. government would make 
positive gains under the mandates-only scenario, but when the subsidies and tariffs are in 
place the situation is reversed since the financial incentives provided to fuel blenders 
exceed the returns from import tariffs, thus causing a net revenue loss for the government. 
In summary, as the last panel of table 5.10 shows, both the U.S. and Brazilian total 
economic surplus would increase at varying rates under the two policy scenarios, but the 
highest gains would occur to Brazil’s social economic surplus under the current biofuel 
policy (i.e. the mandates-only case). 
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The reported results are consistent with intuition. Implementing the entire set of U.S. 
biofuel policies reduces the amount of U.S. corn in the world market because a significant 
portion of the corn supply is diverted to domestic ethanol production in order to meet the 
RFS total ethanol mandate. This result supports the theoretical argument made by de 
Gorter and Just (2008), where it was demonstrated that the U.S. ethanol producers would 
benefit most from a mandate combined with a tariff and subsidies, while keeping the 
mandate but removing the accompanying policies provides enormous benefits to fuel and 
agricultural producers in the ethanol exporting country. In the present analysis, by 
comparing the model baseline with the 2022 scenarios, I also demonstrate that an 
increased ethanol supply and increased sugarcane production could be effectively 
facilitated by intensifying the livestock production systems in Brazil. The model results 
show that a transition towards a semi-intensive livestock system would release the land 
required to increase both corn and sugarcane production, while diminishing the negative 
effect on Brazil’s share in the world beef market that could occur without intensification 
(table 5.4). 
5.2.7. Sensitivity Analysis  
5.2.7.1. Corn and Sugarcane Yields 
From 2005 to 2007, sugarcane yields increased annually by about 3% in Brazil. Likewise 
from 2006 to 2009, corn yields went up yearly by 8% in Brazil, by 3% in the U.S., and by 
9% in Argentina. All these growth rates are twice or more than those assumed for the 
projections in the previous sections. The high growth in yields can be explained by various 
reasons such as favorable weather conditions, higher intensification in the crop sectors of 
Brazil and Argentina, and improved technology (mechanization and more intensive use of 
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agricultural inputs such as high-yielding seed varieties, fertilizers and other chemicals). 
Additionally, yield correlations among corn in the U.S., corn and sugarcane in Brazil, and 
corn in Argentina are positive and close to 1 (specific correlations coefficients are 0.78 
between U.S. corn and Brazil corn, 0.88 between U.S. corn and Brazil sugarcane, and 0.82 
between U.S corn and Argentina corn). 
To assess the sensitivity of the model results to corn and sugarcane yields, I simulate 
five cases changing the annual growth of the crop yields in the three countries. In two of 
those cases I consider a lower annual growth in crop yields, specifically the yields increase 
only by 50% and 25% of the historical rates, while in the other three cases I increase the 
yields by 25%, 50% and 100%. According to the signs of the correlation coefficients, yield 
changes should move in the same direction, hence, the case with yields changing in 
different directions simultaneously is not simulated. Table 5.11 reports the model results 
for the key variables of interest for the mandates-only scenario. 
In general, the results show that the land allocated to sugarcane in Brazil would 
decrease (from 15 to 10 Million Ha) when the annual growth in crop yields is increased, 
and simultaneously the pasture area would increase considerably (by almost 4 Million Ha). 
The corn area would be virtually unchanged when the corn yields are increased, therefore 
the three countries would produce significantly more corn. As a result, the U.S. would use 
more corn for ethanol while Brazil and Argentina would increase their supply to the 
international market. Corn ethanol would fill more of the conventional ethanol mandate in 
the U.S. as yields are increased. In the extreme case when the annual growth in corn yield is 
doubled, the U.S. would export 6.5 billion lt of ethanol to China and the ROW. As a result of 
the higher corn and sugarcane production and lower corn and sugar prices there would be 
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a reduction in the U.S. economic surplus with respect to the BAU scenario, while Brazil 
would continue to increase its surplus (but at a lower rate, 2.1% vs. 0.3%). 
5.2.7.2. Ethanol Processing Efficiency 
According to Mueller (2010) and Rausch (2012) corn ethanol efficiency can be improved in 
the dry grind process by converting all starch into ethanol or in the wet process by 
adopting fractionation processes. In the previous sections, the conversion parameter for 
corn ethanol was assumed to be 405.35 lt per ton. According to the above authors the 
conversion efficiency can be increased up to 424.86 lt/ton, which corresponds to an 
increase by 5%. 
In this section, I consider two alternative conversion rates and compare them to the 
benchmark case (no change in ethanol productivity): the first case assumes a 5% increase 
only in the corn ethanol productivity while no increase is assumed for sugarcane and 
cellulosic ethanol; the second case assumes a 5% efficiency increase for both corn and 
sugarcane ethanol and no change for cellulosic ethanol. Results for both the BAU and 
mandates-only scenarios are reported in table 5.12. 
Under the case when only corn ethanol efficiency is increased by 5%, the U.S. would 
produce more corn ethanol (4.5 billion lt) with respect to the benchmark case although the 
amount of corn converted to ethanol is reduced by 3 and 2 million tons under the BAU and 
mandates-only respectively. Some of the U.S. corn ethanol would be exported (2.1 billion lt) 
to the ROW under the BAU scenario. Consequently, Brazil would reduce its ethanol exports 
to the U.S. as well as to the ROW. When the sugarcane productivity is also increased by 5%, 
both the U.S. and Brazil would produce more ethanol for domestic consumption without 
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distorting the corn market compared to the benchmark case, and the U.S. would import less 
ethanol from Brazil. 
5.2.7.3. Gasoline price in Brazil 
In the previous sections, the model assumed a fixed price of gasoline at the refinery level in 
Brazil (specifically R$1.05 per liter ~US$ 0.525/lt) which simulates the actual price policy 
implemented by the Brazil government. On average, the price of gasoline in 2007 (the base 
year) was about 8% below the world price. The relative prices were different in other years 
depending on the oil prices in the global markets. For instance, the Brazil gasoline price 
was 2% and 16% lower in 2008 and 2011 and 18% and 5% higher in 2009 and 2010, 
respectively. Although Brazil is a small participant in the international gasoline and oil 
market (Brazil’s net oil exports reached a maximum of 8.7 billion lt in 2009, equivalent to 
7.7% of the total domestic oil production), a change in this fixed price may affect the 
domestic markets of gasoline and ethanol. 
In this section, I simulate a case in which the price of gasoline at the refinery gate in 
Brazil is not regulated, rather it is determined by the market. In a second case, I again 
consider a fixed price, but this time 10% above the baseline price. I evaluate the effects of 
these alternative pricing policies on some key variables of the model relative to the 
benchmark case (where the gasoline price was fixed at $0.525/lt). Table 5.13 reports the 
results for the three cases (i.e. free market, benchmark, fixed price increased by 10%) 
under the BAU and mandates-only scenarios. 
Under the free market case and BAU scenario, the endogenous market price of 
gasoline in Brazil ($0.515/lt) would be the same as the world price and very close to the 
regulated price in the benchmark solution. When mandates-only scenario is considered, 
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however, the free market price of gasoline would drop to $0.505 per lt and the price of 
anhydrous ethanol received by ethanol producers would increase from $0.38 to $0.42 per 
lt; hence, the final price of gasohol would not change with respect to BAU. 
If I compare both cases benchmark and free market under BAU scenario, Brazil 
ethanol production would drop by 3.1 million lt and drivers would consume less E100 and 
more gasohol; similarly, under mandates-only scenario, the country would reduce ethanol 
production by 1.1 million lt. 
Under the case where the controlled gasoline price was increased by 10%, Brazil 
would produce significantly more ethanol relative to the benchmark and free market cases, 
mainly because of the increased domestic consumption by FFVs which would use hydrous 
ethanol as a substitute to the more expensive gasohol. Prices of both gasohol and E100 
would be higher compared to benchmark and free market cases. Under BAU scenario, the 
U.S. would export 2.1 billion liter to ROW and China and would consume more gasoline 
than in the benchmark and free market cases, which would increase GHG emissions. 
5.3. Ethanol transportation alternatives in Brazil 
The mandates-only scenario will be most likely the near future environmental policy in the 
U.S. If the mandates remain without protectionist policies this will further open up the U.S. 
biofuel market to foreign biofuel competition, particularly Brazilian sugarcane ethanol, as I 
showed in the previous section. This is so because imported Brazilian ethanol could fill 
15.15 billion lt of the U.S. advanced mandate and compete by the conventional ethanol 
share, as well as the Europe and Asia markets. A demand increase in these markets would 
encourage Brazil to expand the sugarcane area and ethanol production beyond the current 
(traditional and part of the expansion) production regions. However, the large 
99 
 
transportation distances and inefficiency of the current infrastructure would be cost 
disadvantages and may hamper the development of the sugarcane industry further in those 
regions. With this in mind and to reduce the transportation costs, the sugarcane industry 
and PETROBRAS are currently building an ethanol transport pipeline and are planning to 
develop two more in the future to transport the ethanol produced in the Central-West and 
South-East Regions to four seaports (and intermediate stations) in the states of Rio de 
Janeiro, Sao Paulo and Parana. It is estimated that when these pipelines are ready to 
operate, the domestic transportation cost of ethanol for exports could decrease by fifty 
percent (Scandiffio, 2010).  
To address the issues above and evaluate the impacts of the pipelines on regional 
land use and expansion possibility in Brazil, a transportation component is added to the 
model. In this component I consider alternative means of transportation, this is trucking vs. 
pipeline combined with partial trucking, to transport the ethanol from all mesoregions that 
are potential ethanol producers to major domestic consumption areas and export ports 
assuming that the pipeline under construction and the other two projected pipelines will 
be operational by 2022. Following Scandiffio (2010), the cost of transportation by pipeline 
is assumed to be half of the cost by truck transportation. Here, I use the model to analyze 
the impacts of the all-inclusive and mandates-only scenarios described earlier. Tables 5.11-
5.14 report the results and a brief discussion of them is below. 
5.3.1. Ethanol Production and Transportation  
Under the all-inclusive scenario, the pipelines would change dramatically the ethanol 
market with respect to the scenario without the pipelines,. In this case the sugarcane 
ethanol production would be 74.7 billion lt, 20 billion lt (32%) higher (tables 5.7 and 5.14), 
100 
 
of which 34.5 billion lt would be exported to the U.S. The sugarcane ethanol imported from 
Brazil would meet the advanced biofuel component of the RFS mandates and replace part 
of the U.S. cellulosic ethanol production which previously served this purpose. 
Consequently, the U.S. biofuels sector would shrink and both corn and cellulosic ethanol 
production capacity would be reduced by 10 and 9 billion lt, respectively (tables 5.8 and 
5.15). This demonstrates the competitiveness gained by sugarcane ethanol due to the 
pipelines vis-a-vis cellulosic and corn ethanol. It is also interesting to note that the U.S. 
would increase its ethanol exports to the ROW and China from 5 billion lt to 11.3 billion lt 
under the all-inclusive scenario because the import of sugarcane ethanol from Brazil would 
meet the ‘advanced’ biofuel demand, but the existing corn ethanol production capacity has 
the potential to produce more corn ethanol and export it to those countries. 
Under the mandates-only scenario , however, Brazil’s sugarcane ethanol production and 
international trade with the rest of the world would increase slightly. Specifically, 
introduction of the pipelines would lead to an increase in the ethanol production by about 
1.7 billion lt (2.3%) with respect to the scenario without the pipelines and Brazil’s ethanol 
exports would go up by 1.4 billion liter. These results show that unless the market 
distortions (taxes and subsidies) are removed, the U.S. biofuel mandates would have a 
positive effect on Brazil ethanol industry but this factor alone is very small and may not 
necessarily justify the development of these pipelines. 
5.3.2. Land Use Changes 
Significant land use changes would occur under the all-inclusive policy scenario when 
pipelines are included. The sugarcane area would further expand by 2 million Ha (20%) 
relative to the scenario without pipelines (tables 5.4 and 5.16) and half of it would come 
101 
 
from the pasture area.  Figure 5.10 shows the regional land allocation to sugarcane under 
the two policy scenarios with and without the pipelines. Southwest of Mato Grosso do Sul 
and Southern Goias are the regions most influenced by pipelines because of their high 
sugarcane yields and proximity to the pipelines. Consequently, the land allocated to corn 
and soybean production would be slightly reduced in these regions and production of these 
crops would be moved to other less productive regions. As a result, corn exports would 
drop significantly (from 18 to 10 million ton) relative to the no-pipeline scenario (tables 
5.4 and 5.16). Almost all livestock producing regions would convert some of their pastures 
to cropland, unlike in the no-pipeline scenario where some regions would not do such 
conversion. More beef-cattle intensification would occur in the region of expansion, mainly 
in the eastern Mato Grosso do Sul (figures 5.9 and 5.11). On the other hand, due to the 
small changes in the ethanol market under mandates-only scenario, land use changes are 
minimal as well. 
5.3.3. Economic Surplus and Environmental Effects of Pipelines 
Table 5.18 reports the economic surplus effects of the three pipeline projects. When the 
subsidies and tariffs are imposed (i.e. all-inclusive policy), consumers in the U.S. side would 
be better off, due to the increased consumption of cheaper sugarcane ethanol imported 
from Brazil, but domestic producers’ gains would go down compared to the ‘no-pipelines’ 
scenario. The reasons for this are two-fold: first, the price of corn would be lower than in 
the no-pipeline case, and second there will be a significant decline in the domestic ethanol 
production because of the cost advantage for Brazilian sugarcane ethanol. Particularly 
cellulosic ethanol production would go down, as the imported sugarcane ethanol meets the 
advanced biofuel mandate, which reduces the biomass producers’ net income. As a whole, 
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the aggregate economic surplus in the U.S. would be reduced by -0.58% compared to the 
no-pipeline case (tables 5.10 and 5.18). However, the situation would be different in Brazil 
where the economic surplus would be larger when the pipelines are in place (1.5%) than 
when they are not. Under the mandates-only scenario, economic gains in the U.S. would 
remain virtually unchanged, while that from Brazil would increase 1.65% further with 
respect to BAU.  
When all of the U.S. biofuel policies are included in the model, the total GHG emissions 
(in CO2e) would increase relative to the ‘no-pipeline’ scenario due to the reduction of 
cellulosic ethanol production in the U.S., but when mandates-only scenario is considered 
total GHG emissions decrease slightly due to cellulosic ethanol is not affected and 
consumption of sugarcane ethanol increase at some extent in the U.S. (tables 5.10 and 
5.18). 
This finding suggests that the development of these pipelines is not justified based on 
the projections of expansion in the U.S. market, which will be limited (unless RFS 
requirements are modified and the share of advanced biofuels mandate in the total 
mandated amount is increased at the expense of cellulosic biofuels). However, the pipelines 
can still be justifiable if expansion in ethanol demand occurs in other markets, such as 
Europe and China. 
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5.4. Figures 
Figure 5.1. Sugarcane Acreage in Brazil, 2007 
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Figure 5.2. Planted-in Good Condition Pastures in Brazil, 2007 
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Figure 5.3. Corn Acreage in Brazil, 2007 
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Figure 5.4. Soybean Acreage in Brazil, 2007 
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Figure 5.5. Simulated Sugarcane Acreage in Brazil, 2022 
Δ: absolute change relative to BAU 
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Figure 5.6. Simulated Corn Acreage in Brazil, 2022 
Δ: absolute change relative to BAU 
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Figure 5.7. Simulated Soybean Acreage in Brazil, 2022  
Δ: absolute change relative to BAU 
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Figure 5.8. Simulated Total Pasture Area in Brazil, 2022 
Δ: absolute change relative to BAU 
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Figure 5.9. Simulated New Croplands and Beef-cattle Intensification, 2022 
Green dots: beef cattle intensification – Colored regions: pasture lands converted to crop lands 
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Figure 5.10. Simulated Sugarcane Expansion with Pipelines, 2022 
 No Pipelines Pipelines 
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Figure 5.11. Simulated New Croplands and Intensified Pastures with Pipelines, 2022 
 No Pipelines Pipelines 
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5.5. Tables 
Table 5.1. Model Validation, Brazil 2007 
 
Observed Model Difference (%) 
Land Use (Million Ha) 
Total Land 173.15 166.97 -3.57 
Corn 13.92 11.27 -19.07 
Soybeans 20.52 22.69 10.57 
Pasture 127.00 124.43 -2.03 
Sugarcane 6.95 6.25 -10.00 
Commodity Prices ($/Metric Ton) 
Corn 142.25 158.74 11.59 
Soybeans 307.80 346.18 12.47 
Sugar 420.45 374.35 -10.96 
Beef 2,179.25 2,107.91 -3.27 
Fuel Sector 
Gas Prices ($/lt) 1.20 1.14 -4.49 
Ethanol Prices ($/lt) 0.64 0.75 17.39 
Gas Consumption (billion lt) 19.18 16.87 -12.06 
Ethanol Consumption (billion lt) 16.59 18.65 12.41 
Ethanol Exports (billion lt) 3.53 3.96 12.20 
Km Consumption (billion Kms) 353.00 344.60 -2.38 
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Table 5.2. Model Validation, U.S. 2007 
 
Observed Model Difference (%) 
Land Use (Million Ha) 
Total Land 122.54 120.93 -1.31 
Corn 37.31 36.43 -2.36 
Soybeans 25.92 27.02 4.24 
Wheat 23.04 22.64 -1.73 
Cotton 4.02 4.70 17.08 
Commodity Prices ($/Metric Ton) 
Corn 155.10 158.46 2.17 
Soybeans 328.90 370.38 12.61 
Wheat 214.50 247.07 15.19 
Fuel Sector 
Gas Prices ($/lt) 0.72 0.77 7.02 
Ethanol Prices ($/lt) 0.61 0.59 -3.47 
Gas Consumption (billion lt) 494.78 507.03 2.48 
Ethanol Consumption (billion lt) 26.68 26.60 -0.31 
Sugarcane Ethanol Imports (billion lt) 1.77 1.88 6.28 
Km Consumption (billion Kms) 4,697.52 4,594.09 -2.20 
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Table 5.3. Model Validation, Argentina 2007 
 
Observed Model Difference (%) 
Land Use (Million Ha) 
Total Land 19.64 18.69 -4.81 
Corn 3.58 2.78 -22.39 
Soybeans 16.14 15.29 -5.30 
Wheat 5.68 5.36 -5.58 
Commodity Prices ($/Metric Ton) 
Corn 158.80 149.25 -6.02 
Soybeans 305.10 353.38 15.82 
Wheat 226.40 258.19 14.04 
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Table 5.4. Effects of Alternative Policy Scenarios on Brazil Agriculture, 2022 
  BAU 
Mandates &  
U.S. Policies 
Mandates 
Land Use (Million Ha) 
Total cropland            49.05           53.19             54.06  
Corn            11.76           13.97             13.32  
Soybeans            26.33           26.56             26.10  
Sugarcane              9.01           10.26             12.46  
Pasture         120.03         116.65          115.65  
Intensification rate (%)            11.45           11.94             13.87  
Crop/Commodity Production (Million Metric Ton) 
Corn            61.85           75.32             71.49  
Soybeans            79.74           80.40             78.90  
Sugarcane         909.20      1,041.88       1,278.26  
Sugar            47.90           47.76             47.63  
Beef              8.00              7.78               7.79  
Soybean Oil              6.01              6.31               6.03  
Soybean Meal            26.03           27.34             26.11  
Crop/Commodity Exports (Million Metric Ton) 
Corn              2.68           18.12             11.96  
Soybeans            43.02           42.06             42.12  
Sugar            32.90           32.78             32.67  
Beef              2.42              2.37               2.37  
Soybean Oil              1.09              1.28               1.14  
Soybean Meal              6.26              7.93               6.08  
Crop/Commodity Prices ($/Metric Ton) 
Corn         175.94         233.63          214.17  
Soybeans         462.79         496.66          495.91  
Sugar         392.94         403.60          409.41  
Beef    11,380.45    13,535.27     13,487.39  
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Table 5.5. Effects of Alternative Policy Scenarios on U.S. Agriculture, 2022 
  BAU 
Mandates &  
U.S. Policies 
Mandates 
Land Use (Million Ha) 
Total cropland         121.30         119.64          122.41  
Corn            35.85           36.10             36.32  
Soybeans            28.33           26.72             27.28  
Wheat            23.23           21.89             22.45  
Stover              0.00           23.91             23.26  
Straw              0.00           14.96             15.17  
Miscanthus              0.55              9.36               6.20  
Switchgrass              0.00              0.71               1.06  
Crop/Commodity Production (Million Metric Ton) 
Corn         374.53         378.45          379.82  
Soybeans            94.47           89.20             90.88  
Wheat            62.71           60.03             61.35  
Soybean Oil              7.92              7.14               7.44  
Soybean Meal            34.31           30.92             32.23  
Crop/Commodity Exports (Million Metric Ton) 
Corn         102.57           78.47             87.22  
Soybeans            48.02           47.18             47.17  
Wheat            29.93           28.22             29.11  
Soybean Oil              0.88              0.67               0.81  
Soybean Meal            11.37              9.38             11.29  
Crop/Commodity Prices ($/Metric Ton) 
Corn         175.84         233.47          213.74  
Soybeans         487.74         521.55          520.86  
Wheat         354.89         378.93          368.34  
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Table 5.6. Effects of Alternative Policy Scenarios on Argentina Agriculture, 2022 
  BAU 
Mandates &  
U.S. Policies 
Mandates 
Land Use (Million Ha) 
Total cropland            19.18           19.17             19.17  
Corn              2.97              2.98               2.97  
Soybeans            15.47           15.43             15.44  
Wheat              5.52              5.51               5.51  
Crop/Commodity Production (Million Metric Ton) 
Corn            18.40           20.32             20.03  
Soybeans              8.07              7.26               7.53  
Wheat            10.33           13.08             12.51  
Soybean Oil              6.81              6.68               6.71  
Soybean Meal            29.52           28.95             29.06  
Crop/Commodity Exports (Million Metric Ton) 
Corn            10.33           13.08             12.51  
Soybeans            43.95           43.19             43.31  
Wheat              1.55              1.51               1.52  
Soybean Oil              4.00              3.95               3.97  
Soybean Meal            28.76           28.21             28.31  
Crop/Commodity Prices ($/Metric Ton) 
Corn         166.64         224.25          204.53  
Soybeans         477.64         507.64          505.57  
Wheat         365.99         390.00          379.43  
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Table 5.7. Effect of Alternative Policy Scenarios on Brazil’s Sector, 2022 
  BAU 
Mandates &  
U.S. Policies 
Mandates 
Prices ($/Km or $/lt) 
Km CV          0.08           0.08           0.08  
Km FFV          0.07           0.07           0.08  
Km EDV          0.10           0.10           0.10  
Sugarcane ethanol producer          0.39           0.41           0.42  
Gasohol          1.15           1.16           1.16  
E100          0.74           0.73           0.75  
Production & Exports (billion lt) 
Production Sugarcane Ethanol        45.71         56.63         75.52  
Exports Brazilian Ethanol          2.08         15.71         36.54  
Exports Brazilian Ethanol thru CBI          0.00           9.27           9.21  
Consumption (billion lt or billion Kms) 
Km      714.80       714.59       714.09  
Gasohol        23.89         26.30         27.82  
E100        37.66         34.18         31.94  
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Table 5.8. Effects of Alternative Policy Scenarios on U.S. Fuel Sector, 2022 
  BAU 
Mandates &  
US Policies 
Mandates 
Prices ($/Km or $/lt) 
Km CV          0.07           0.07           0.07  
Km FFV          0.06           0.06           0.06  
Corn ethanol producer          0.54           0.68           0.63  
Cellulosic ethanol producer               -             0.85           0.76  
Gasohol          0.81           0.73           0.73  
E85          0.59           0.53           0.53  
Production, Exports & Imports (billion lt) 
Production Corn Ethanol        31.51         53.22         46.68  
Production Cellulosic Ethanol          0.00         74.87         60.57  
Imports Brazilian Ethanol          0.00           9.42         25.25  
Exports U.S. Ethanol          0.00           5.02           0.01  
Consumption (billion lt or billion Kms) 
Km   5,784.48    5,866.03    5,865.99  
Gasoline      489.07       429.06       429.05  
Ethanol        31.51       132.49       132.49  
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Table 5.9. Sensitivity Analysis on Cellulosic Ethanol Progress Ratio (PR) in the U.S. 
  PR = 0.95 PR = 0.99 
Production, Exports & Imports (billion lt) 
Production Corn Ethanol        53.22         57.22  
Production Cellulosic Ethanol        74.87         60.58  
Imports Brazilian Ethanol          9.42         15.21  
Exports U.S. Ethanol          5.02           0.52  
Consumption (billion lt or billion Kms) 
Km   5,866.03    5,866.01  
Gasoline      429.06       429.06  
Ethanol      132.49       132.49  
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Table 5.10. Effect of Alternative Policy Scenarios on Economic Surplus, 2022  
 
Mandates & U.S. Policies 
(Relative to BAU) 
Only Mandates 
(Relative to ‘all-inclusive’) 
GHG Emissions (Change in Million Metric Tons CO2-eq) 
Brazil 14.39 [5.57] 6.66 [2.44] 
U.S. -246.79 [-13.78] 27.17 [1.76] 
Total (Including Arg.) -232.08 [-11.24] 33.79 [1.84] 
Fuel Producers (Change in $ billion) 
Brazil 1.47 [5.8] 1.56 [5.83] 
U.S. 13.75 [6.04] -40.49 [-16.77] 
Fuel Consumers (Change in $ billion) 
Brazil -0.20 [-0.02] -0.70 [-0.08] 
U.S. 15.50 [0.79] -0.02 [0] 
Agricultural Producers (Change in $ billion) 
Brazil 28.83 [17.54] 7.74 [4.01] 
U.S. 34.19 [25.12] -16.56 [-9.72] 
Agricultural Consumers (Change in $ billion) 
Brazil -16.21 [-4.63] 1.05 [0.31] 
U.S. -22.59 [-12.24] 8.68 [5.36] 
Government Revenue (Change in $ billion) 
Brazil 0.54 [2.72] 0.18 [0.88] 
U.S. -40.81 [<100] 48.41 [>100] 
Total Welfare (Change in $ billion) 
Brazil 14.44 [0.99] 9.84 [0.67] 
U.S. 0.05 [0.00] 0.01 [0.00] 
[ ] % changes   
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Table 5.11. Sensitivity Analysis on Corn and Sugarcane Yields 
Percent change in Annual 
yield growth 
-50 -25 0 25 50 100 
Land Use (Million Ha) 
Corn US       36.2        36.3        36.3        36.3        36.2        36.0  
Corn BR+ARG       16.3        16.2        16.3        16.4        16.1        15.6  
Sugarcane BR       15.1        13.8        12.5        11.7        11.0           9.9  
Pasture BR     113.7      114.7      115.7      115.9      116.7      117.6  
Corn Production (Million Metric Ton) 
Corn US     344.8      361.9      379.8      397.2      415.6      452.7  
Corn BR+ARG       84.0        87.4        91.5        95.7        97.9      101.8  
Corn Exports (Million Metric Ton) 
Corn US       91.3        89.8        87.2        85.3        85.4        88.3  
Corn BR+ARG       18.0        20.9        24.5        27.5        29.3        29.5  
Crop/Commodity Prices ($/Metric Ton) 
Corn US     237.7      223.4      213.7      203.9      184.9      154.8  
Sugar BR     444.4      423.4      409.4      396.4      383.7      358.6  
Beef BR   14,597    14,003    13,487    13,262    12,875    11,687  
Ethanol Production & Trade (billion lt) 
Corn Eth US       35.1        40.1        46.7        52.7        56.7        65.2  
Cel Eth US       60.6        60.6        60.6        60.6        60.6        60.6  
Imports Eth by US       36.8        31.9        25.2        19.2        15.2        15.2  
Exports U.S. Eth          0.0           0.0           0.0           0.0           0.0           6.5  
Sugarcane Eth BR       83.8        80.3        75.5        74.6        74.4        75.2  
Exports Brazil Eth       48.1        43.1        36.5        30.5        26.5        20.0  
Fuel Consumption (billion lt) 
Gasoline US     429.1      429.1      429.1      429.1      429.1      427.9  
Ethanol US     132.5      132.5      132.5      132.5      132.5      134.5  
Gasohol BR       30.4        29.3        27.8        23.6        20.5        14.4  
E100 BR       28.0        29.7        31.9        38.1        42.6        51.5  
Fuel Prices ($/lt) 
Corn Eth Prod. US       0.69        0.66        0.63        0.61        0.56        0.49  
Cel Eth Prod. US       0.76        0.76        0.76        0.76        0.71        0.76  
Gasoline US       0.73        0.73        0.73        0.73        0.73        0.73  
Eth Prod. BR       0.48        0.45        0.42        0.40        0.38        0.33  
Gasohol BR       1.18        1.17        1.16        1.15        1.14        1.13  
E100 BR       0.79        0.76        0.75        0.74        0.73        0.71  
Change (%) in Total Economic Surplus Effect w.r.t BAU 
Brazil 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.3 0.9 0.3 
U.S. 0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.6 -1.1 
Change (%) GHG Emissions (Million Metric Tons CO2-eq) w.r.t BAU 
Total -10.9 -10.6 -9.6 -9.3 -9.0 -8.1 
 
125 
 
Table 5.12. Sensitivity Analysis on Corn and Sugarcane Ethanol Productivity 
Percent Change Ethanol productivity: 
Corn 0.0 5.0 5.0 
Sugarcane 0.0 0.0 5.0 
 
BAU Mandates BAU Mandates BAU Mandates 
Land Use (Million Ha) 
Corn US 35.9 36.3 36.0 36.3 36.0 36.4 
Corn BR+ARG 14.7 16.3 14.8 16.5 14.8 16.3 
Sugarcane BR 9.0 12.5 8.8 12.0 8.9 12.1 
Pasture BR 120.0 115.7 120.1 115.7 120.1 115.8 
Corn Production (Million Metric Ton) 
Corn US 374.5 379.8 375.8 380.1 375.8 380.2 
Corn BR+ARG 80.2 91.5 81.9 92.8 81.9 91.7 
Corn Exports (Million Metric Ton) 
Corn US 102.6 87.2 99.5 85.3 99.6 87.3 
Corn BR+ARG 13.0 24.5 15.6 25.8 15.5 24.4 
Crop/Commodity Prices ($/Metric Ton) 
Corn US 175.8 213.7 181.0 220.2 180.6 213.5 
Sugar BR 392.9 409.4 389.9 408.1 392.4 407.2 
Beef BR 11,380 13,487 11,530 13,492 11,534 13,302 
Ethanol Production & Trade (billion lt) 
Corn Eth US 31.5 46.7 35.9 51.2 35.8 49.1 
Cel Eth US 0.0 60.6 0.0 60.6 0.0 60.6 
Imports Eth by US 0.0 25.2 0.0 20.8 0.0 22.9 
Exports U.S. Eth 0.0 0.0 2.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Sugarcane Eth BR 45.7 75.5 44.0 71.6 46.9 76.2 
Exports Brazil Eth 2.1 36.5 0.0 32.0 2.1 34.1 
Fuel Consumption (billion lt) 
Gasoline US 489.1 429.1 487.7 429.1 486.5 429.1 
Ethanol US 31.5 132.5 33.8 132.5 35.8 132.5 
Gasohol BR 23.9 27.8 23.6 27.4 23.0 25.3 
E100 BR 37.7 31.9 38.1 32.6 39.0 35.6 
Fuel Prices ($/lt) 
Corn Eth Prod. US 0.54 0.63 0.53 0.62 0.53 0.61 
Cel Eth Prod. US - 0.76 - 0.76 - 0.76 
Gasoline US 0.81 0.73 0.81 0.73 0.81 0.73 
Eth Prod. BR 0.39 0.42 0.38 0.42 0.38 0.41 
Gasohol BR 1.15 1.16 1.15 1.16 1.15 1.15 
E100 BR 0.74 0.75 0.73 0.74 0.73 0.74 
Change (%) Total Economic Surplus Effect (B$)  w.r.t BAU 
Brazil 
 
1.66 
 
1.52 
 
1.35 
U.S. 
 
0.00 
 
0.03 
 
-0.10 
Change (%) GHG Emissions (Million Metric Tons CO2-eq) w.r.t BAU 
Total 
 
-9.60 
 
-9.49 
 
-9.54 
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Table 5.13. Sensitivity Analysis on Gasoline Price in Brazil 
  
Free Market 
Fixed Price 
Δ in Gas Price 0.0% (Benchmark) 10.0% 
Gas Price @ 
 refinery BR 
0.515 0.505 0.525 0.578 
  BAU Mandates BAU Mandates BAU Mandates 
Land Use (Million Ha) 
Corn US           35.8            36.3            35.9            36.3            35.9            36.3  
Corn BR+ARG           14.7            16.3            14.7            16.3            14.8            16.3  
Sugarcane BR             8.7            12.3              9.0            12.5              9.2            13.3  
Pasture BR        120.3         115.7         120.0         115.7         119.9         115.0  
Corn Production (Million Metric Ton) 
Corn US        374.5         379.4         374.5         379.8         374.6         380.1  
Corn BR+ARG           80.2            91.6            80.2            91.5            80.6            91.4  
Corn Exports (Million Metric Ton) 
Corn US        102.2            87.4         102.6            87.2         102.4            87.2  
Corn BR+ARG           13.4            24.3            13.0            24.5            13.2            24.4  
Crop/Commodity Prices ($/Metric Ton) 
Corn US        175.2         213.4         175.8         213.7         176.2         214.6  
Sugar BR        388.7         408.9         392.9         409.4         394.4         410.7  
Beef BR   11,345.0    13,454.6    11,380.4    13,487.4    11,392.2    13,790.6  
Ethanol Production & Trade (billion lt) 
Corn Eth US           31.5            46.4            31.5            46.7            31.7            47.0  
Cel Eth US             0.0            60.6              0.0            60.6              0.0            60.6  
Imports Eth by US             0.0            25.6              0.0            25.2              0.0            25.0  
Exports U.S. Eth             0.0              0.0              0.0              0.0              2.1              0.0  
Sugarcane Eth BR           42.6            74.4            45.7            75.5            47.4            83.2  
Exports Brazil Eth             2.1            36.9              2.1            36.5              0.0            36.3  
Fuel Consumption (billion lt) 
Gasoline US        489.3         429.1         489.1         429.1         490.2         429.1  
Ethanol US           31.5         132.5            31.5         132.5            29.6         132.5  
Gasohol BR           26.5            29.1            23.9            27.8            20.7            21.1  
E100 BR           33.9            30.2            37.7            31.9            42.3            41.6  
Fuel Prices ($/lt) 
Corn Eth Prod. US           0.54            0.63            0.54            0.63            0.54            0.63  
Cel Eth Prod. US               -              0.75                -              0.76                -              0.76  
Gasoline US           0.81            0.73            0.81            0.73            0.81            0.73  
Eth Prod. BR           0.38            0.42            0.39            0.42            0.39            0.43  
Gasohol BR           1.15            1.15            1.15            1.16            1.19            1.19  
E100 BR           0.72            0.74            0.74            0.75            0.75            0.78  
%Δ Total Economic Surplus Effect (B$)  w.r.t BAU 
Brazil 
 
1.43% 
 
1.66% 
 
1.47% 
U.S.   -0.06%   0.00%   0.01% 
%Δ GHG Emissions (Million Metric Tons CO2-eq) w.r.t BAU 
Total   -9.79%   -9.60%   -10.15% 
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Table 5.14. Effects of Pipelines on Brazil’s Fuel Sector, 2022 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  BAU 
Mandates &  
U.S. Policies 
Mandates 
Prices ($/Km or $/lt) 
Km CV          0.08           0.08           0.08  
Km FFV          0.07           0.08           0.08  
Km EDV          0.10           0.10           0.10  
Sugarcane ethanol producer          0.39           0.42           0.42  
Gasohol          1.15           1.16           1.16  
E100          0.74           0.74           0.74  
Production & Exports (billion lt) 
Production Sugarcane Ethanol        46.66         74.68         77.26  
Exports Brazilian Ethanol          2.08         34.55         37.93  
Exports Brazilian Ethanol thru CBI          0.00           9.17           9.21  
Consumption (billion lt or billion Kms) 
Km      714.88       714.28       714.09  
Gasohol        23.09         26.91         27.52  
E100        38.80         33.28         32.38  
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Table 5.15. Effects of pipelines on the U.S. Fuel Sector, 2022 
  BAU 
Mandates &  
U.S. Policies 
Mandates 
Prices ($/Km or $/lt) 
Km CV          0.07           0.07           0.07  
Km FFV          0.06           0.06           0.06  
Corn ethanol producer          0.54           0.62           0.62  
Cellulosic ethanol producer               -             0.79           0.76  
Gasohol          0.81           0.73           0.73  
E85          0.59           0.53           0.53  
Production, Exports & Imports (billion lt) 
Production Corn Ethanol        31.46         43.82         45.30  
Production Cellulosic Ethanol          0.00         65.45         60.57  
Imports Brazilian Ethanol          0.00         34.53         26.64  
Exports U.S. Ethanol          0.00         11.30           0.01  
Consumption (billion lt or billion Kms) 
Km   5,784.44    5,866.02    5,865.98  
Gasoline      489.10       429.05       429.05  
Ethanol        31.46       132.51       132.49  
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Table 5.16. Effects of pipelines on Brazil Agriculture, 2022 
  BAU 
Mandates &  
U.S. Policies 
Mandates 
Land Use (Million Ha) 
Total cropland            49.16           54.05             54.14  
Corn            11.76           13.26             13.23  
Soybeans            26.35           26.13             26.10  
Sugarcane              9.10           12.35             12.65  
Pasture         119.92         115.64          115.55  
Intensification rate (%)            11.67           14.30             13.93  
Crop/Commodity Production (Million Metric Ton) 
Corn            61.85           70.80             70.95  
Soybeans            79.78           78.97             78.89  
Sugarcane         920.51      1,266.74       1,299.17  
Sugar            47.90           47.58             47.55  
Beef              8.00              7.79               7.78  
Soybean Oil              6.01              6.04               6.02  
Soybean Meal            26.05           26.18             26.10  
Crop/Commodity Exports (Million Metric Ton) 
Corn              2.47           10.76             11.26  
Soybeans            43.02           42.10             42.12  
Sugar            32.90           32.62             32.59  
Beef              2.42              2.37               2.37  
Soybean Oil              1.09              1.15               1.14  
Soybean Meal              6.22              6.05               6.00  
Crop/Commodity Prices ($/Metric Ton) 
Corn         175.95         208.14          210.39  
Soybeans         462.83         495.54          496.60  
Sugar         393.25         410.36          413.37  
Beef    11,382.79    13,479.40     13,519.15  
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Table 5.17. Effects of Pipelines on U.S. Agriculture, 2022 
  BAU 
Mandates &  
U.S. Policies Mandates 
Land Use (Million Ha) 
Total cropland         121.30         121.50          122.42  
Corn            35.85           36.08             36.27  
Soybeans            28.33           27.27             27.32  
Wheat            23.23           22.29             22.46  
Stover              0.00           23.36             23.24  
Straw              0.00           15.13             15.18  
Miscanthus              0.55              7.34               6.20  
Switchgrass              0.00              0.83               1.05  
Crop/Commodity Production (Million Metric Ton) 
Corn         374.54         377.56          379.32  
Soybeans            94.47           91.01             91.04  
Wheat            62.70           60.96             61.36  
Soybean Oil              7.92              7.45               7.46  
Soybean Meal            34.31           32.29             32.34  
Crop/Commodity Exports (Million Metric Ton) 
Corn         102.69           89.33             88.45  
Soybeans            48.02           47.23             47.20  
Wheat            29.92           28.84             29.12  
Soybean Oil              0.88              0.81               0.82  
Soybean Meal            11.40           11.34             11.38  
Crop/Commodity Prices ($/Metric Ton) 
Corn         175.85         207.66          209.94  
Soybeans         487.78         519.24          519.37  
Wheat         354.92         371.10          368.09  
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Table 5.18. Effect Pipelines on Economic Surplus, 2022 
 
Mandates & U.S. Policies  
(Relative to BAU) 
 
Only Mandates  
(Relative to ‘all-inclusive’) 
 
GHG Emissions (Change in Million Metric Tons CO2-eq) 
Brazil 21.01 [8.21] 1.45 [0.52] 
U.S. -232.48 [-12.98] 11.92 [0.76] 
Total (Including Arg.) -226.97 [-11.01] 13.34 [0.72] 
Fuel Producers (Change in $ billion) 
Brazil 1.75 [6.82] 0.68 [2.47] 
U.S. 4.92 [2.16] -32.81 [-14.1] 
Fuel Consumers (Change in $ billion) 
Brazil -0.74 [-0.08] -0.26 [-0.03] 
U.S. 15.51 [0.79] -0.02 [0] 
Agricultural Producers (Change in $ billion) 
Brazil 34.65 [21.07] 2.67 [1.34] 
U.S. 17.91 [13.15] -1.88 [-1.22] 
Agricultural Consumers (Change in $ billion) 
Brazil -14.75 [-4.21] -0.46 [-0.14] 
U.S. -14.56 [-7.89] 1.44 [0.85] 
Government Revenue (Change in $ billion) 
Brazil 0.75 [3.78] 0.06 [0.29] 
U.S. -38.44 [<100] 45.91 [>100] 
Total Welfare (Change in $ billion) 
Brazil 21.67 [1.48] 2.69 [0.18] 
U.S. -14.67 [-0.58] 12.65 [0.51] 
[ ] % changes 
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CHAPTER 6: An Economic Analysis of the Transportation Fuel Policies in Brazil 
In the past four decades the government of Brazil has implemented a mandate for blending 
anhydrous ethanol derived from sugarcane into gasoline. The blended fuel (gasoline + 
anhydrous ethanol), called gasohol, is consumed by the light-duty vehicle fleet including 
conventional cars (CV) and flex fuel vehicles (FFV). The latter category can also run on any 
blend including 100% hydrous ethanol (E100). Finally, although their share in the vehicle 
fleet has become marginal in recent years ethanol dedicated vehicles (EDV) consume pure 
E100. The gasohol blending ratio was set at 25% between 2007 and 2011. In September 
2011 the rate was reduced to 20% and maintained at that level since then due to the 
shortage of domestically produced ethanol. In addition to the blending rate, a second 
important component of the policy is the fuel tax on transportation fuels applied by the 
state governments and the federal government. Lower federal taxes and states ad-valorem 
taxes are applied to ethanol to make E100 competitive with gasohol (Portal Brasil, 2011b). 
Finally, PETROBRAS, a semi-public and the largest Brazilian oil producer and distributor 
company (Fecombustíveis, 2011), regulates the refinery price of gasoline. Over the past five 
years the refinery price was  virtually fixed aiming to reduce the impacts of price volatility 
in the global oil markets on Brazilian fuel consumers (PETROBRAS, 2011). Thus, gasohol 
and E100 markets directly involve four players: federal and state governments, gasoline 
blenders and distributors, ethanol producers, and fuel consumers. Although most 
passenger cars are still of the conventional type, the share of FFVs in the Brazilian light-
duty vehicle fleet is becoming increasingly larger since 2003 when the automotive industry 
first introduced them into the market. FFVs represented about 75% of the total light-duty 
vehicles sales during the period 2003-2011. 
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The flexibility of consumers in fuel choice makes the fuel pricing policy a complex and 
sensitive issue for all market participants.  For instance, a market driven gasoline price may 
increase PETROBRAS profits from gasoline sold at international market prices as the latter 
have been higher than the domestic prices in the past few years. However, this would 
encourage FFVs to switch to E100 and also reduce the distance driven by CVs, thus 
reducing the consumption of gasohol and its gasoline component. The net effect of the 
policy on returns to PETROBRAS depends on the price change and the resulting shifts in 
demand for fuel by individual vehicle categories, in particular by the FFV category. Clearly, 
this policy would make both gasohol and ethanol consumers worse off because they would 
have to pay a higher price for the fuel and reduce the distance driven. The effect of higher 
gasoline prices on FFV drivers would be uncertain because they can switch to E100, which 
would increase the price of ethanol depending on the marginal cost of producing ethanol 
and magnitude of the demand shift. Whether the cost per unit distance driven will be lower 
than the cost of gasohol depends on the relative price changes.  On the supply side, higher 
ethanol prices and demand shift resulting from liberalized gasoline price would increase 
the net returns to ethanol producers and change the composition of ethanol production, 
namely the share of anhydrous ethanol would be reduced while the share of hydrous 
ethanol production would be higher. An alternative and likely policy is to continue the 
controlled (fixed) domestic gasoline price policy, but make it closer to the international 
price levels yet compatible with the price of ethanol. This policy would reduce PETROBRAS 
profits compared to the price liberalization policy and would make gasohol consumers 
better off, but the effect on E100 consumers would again depend on the price changes 
relative to each other.  Regardless, positive returns are expected to accrue to sugarcane 
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ethanol producers. However, they would face a higher market uncertainty (since ethanol 
market is unregulated).  The impact will be more severe particularly on those mills that 
process sugarcane to ethanol exclusively, which represent nearly one quarter of the total 
mills in Brazil (MAPA, 2012). The rest of the sugarcane mills, which produce both sugar and 
ethanol at a proportion 60:40, can mitigate the price effects and market uncertainty by 
altering their production line (i.e. switching between sugar and ethanol production). 
Finally, being the second largest ethanol producer in the world, Brazil’s fuel policies affect 
not only the domestic market, but also the global biofuel markets including the U.S.  
In this chapter, I use the integrated U.S.-Brazil model described in Chapter 3 to 
address these issues in a simultaneous integrated framework. Specifically,  I analyze the 
impacts of alternative fuel policies mentioned above with particular emphasis on the 
domestic fuel markets considering both producers’ responses (including the supply of 
sugarcane and processing sugarcane to sugar and ethanol) and consumers’ responses (i.e. 
driving demand and fuel choice). I also determine (ex-post) the impacts of those policies on 
land use change, GHG emissions and economic surplus. 
6.1. Policy Scenarios 
I assume a perfectly elastic supply function for pure gasoline at a constant refinery price, 
which is set at the currently implemented price R$1.05 per liter (or $0.525/lt). In the 
model simulations, I consider three different policy scenarios under different blending 
rates varying between 15% and 25%. The first scenario, which will be referred to as the 
benchmark scenario from here on, assumes no policy change with respect to the actual 
2007 policy conditions, that is the gasoline price, tax rates on fuels, and the ethanol 
blending ratio. The foreign demand functions for ethanol (by the U.S., EU, China, and the 
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rest of the world -ROW) are set at their 2007 observed levels. All other scenarios are 
compared against this scenario when evaluating the policy implications. The second 
scenario retains all the fuel taxes at the observed rates but considers a 9% reduction in 
sugarcane yield and a 44% increase in the ROW sugar demand (which reflect the observed 
2010 conditions, see figures 2.1 and 2.3), hereafter referred as sugarcane and sugar shock 
scenario. A third case, it is a policy change scenario, which maintains the assumptions of the 
second scenario, but decreases the tax rate on gasoline by 7.5% compared to the base case 
(which reflects the observed CIDE tax in 2011).  All three scenarios include an advanced 
biofuels mandate of 1.9 billion lt in the U.S. to reflect the 2010 conditions. 
6.2. Effects of Alternative Policies on the Brazil Fuel Sector 
To illustrate the supply of gasoline in Brazil, I depict the base case in figure 6.1. The dashed 
diagonal line represents the supply curve in a competitive market while the horizontal line 
is the supply at the fixed price of R$1.05/lt. The figure shows that as the blending rate is 
reduced, PETROBRAS would increase the domestic gasoline supply at the constant price, 
which implies that the company would incur less losses (equal to the area of the gray 
triangle), but as the figure illustrates revenues (the area between the dashed diagonal line 
and the fixed price supply) would be always higher than those losses. 
The model results show that the smaller the mandated blending rate, the higher the 
price of gasohol since the blend contains a more expensive fuel in its composition, which 
imply less distance driven (VKT), especially by conventional vehicles. Figure 6.2 shows how 
the VKT by each vehicle type would respond to the policy scenarios before (i.e. benchmark) 
and after (i.e. policy change) an exogenous shock to the supply of sugarcane.  The solid line, 
which represents the benchmark case under the current tax policy, shows that the total 
136 
 
VKT would decrease considerably as the blending rate is reduced. For instance, a reduction 
in blend rate from 25% to 20 % (the current situation) reduces the total VKT by about 2 
billion km. Under sugarcane and sugar shock scenario (dotted line), the total VKT would 
shift downward by about 1.2 billion km (0.35%) and decrease further (in parallel to the 
benchmark case) if the blending mandate is reduced. A reduction in the fuel tax rate, on the 
other hand, would make VKT to return to its benchmark level under all the blending rates 
considered (dashed line). The final reduction from a blending rate of 25% to a blending 
rate of 20% is equivalent to one-and-a half day of total driving by all light-duty vehicles. 
The sugarcane and sugar shock would lead to a higher price of ethanol and therefore 
would affect all car categories since ethanol is contained in the fuel used by all of them. 
Figures 6.3-6.5 show the changes in VKT by vehicle type. Figure 6.3 shows that under all 
three scenarios, VKT by CVs would decrease in parallel with the blending mandate rate. 
This is an expected result because reduced blending rate increases the share of gasoline, 
which is a more expensive fuel, and consequently raise the price of gasohol. A shortage in 
the supply of sugarcane, thus sugarcane ethanol (i.e. sugarcane and sugar shock scenario), 
would shift the VKT downward while a gasoline tax reduction (i.e. policy change scenario) 
would shift the demand for driving upward. It is interesting to see that the positive effect of 
the tax reduction on distance driven by CVs exceeds the negative effect of the higher price 
of gasohol resulting under the sugarcane and sugar shock scenario.  These are intuitive and 
expected results. 
The VKT by FFVs and by EDVs do not much respond to the blending mandate rate as 
shown in figures 6.4 and 6.5. However, the VKT by each vehicle type would shift downward 
under the sugarcane and sugar shock scenario. In this case gasohol would become a 
137 
 
competitive fuel relative to E100 in some regions where gasoline transportation cost is low 
and ethanol transportation cost is high.  
While a reduction in the blending mandate rate reduces the VKT by conventional 
vehicles, due to the increased price of gasohol as figure 6.6 shows, its effect on the VKT by 
FFVs is seen to be insignificant because the price of E100 increases only slightly across all 
blending rates. These vehicles, therefore, would switch from gasohol to E100. However, the 
price of sugarcane ethanol would increase considerably under the sugarcane and sugar 
shock scenario.  The reduction in the gasoline tax rate somewhat moderates this effect, but 
still the ethanol price goes up by more than 3% as figure 6.7 depicts (policy change 
scenario). 
The consumption of gasohol by FFVs is relatively low in the benchmark case (figure 
6.8) and most of them run on pure ethanol (81%). However, due to the changes in relative 
prices resulting from the ethanol supply shortage a significant portion (32%) of the FFV 
fuel consumption would switch to gasohol (figure 6.9) and even more (36%) when the tax 
rate is reduced (figure 6.10). 
Since Brazil is the second largest ethanol producer and exporter, any change in its 
supply would impact the global ethanol market. In the benchmark scenario, Brazil would 
keep the dominant position in the international market with about 4 billion lt total export 
(solid line in figure 6.11) whereas the U.S. would have a very small share in ethanol exports 
to the ROW (solid line in figure 6.12). However, as can be expected Brazil’s ethanol exports 
would decline under the sugarcane and sugar shock and policy change scenarios by 1.9 
billion lt (48%), and consequently an almost equal amount would be exported by the U.S. to 
the ROW (the dashed and dotted lines in figures 6.11 and 6.12). Lowering the blending rate 
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would reverse these to some extent because there would be more ethanol available in 
Brazil due to the reduction in the overall domestic VKT and total consumption of ethanol. It 
is important to mention that the ups and downs in the exports of both countries are 
directly correlated to the ethanol production in Brazil. 
As expected, the sugar yield decline and strong sugar demand in the global markets 
would increase the sugarcane area and production, as shown in figures 6.13 and 6.14. 
However, the reduction in gasoline tax rates and therefore the increase in gasohol 
consumption by FFVs as well as the decrease in E100 prices lessen this effect on the 
sugarcane area to some extent. The ups and downs in the total sugarcane area in figure 
6.13 are not reflected uniformly across the sugarcane producing regions, rather the 
production moves from some regions to others depending on the yield differences and 
competition with other crops. The region of expansion would be the main region changing 
the area planted for sugarcane when the blending rate is varied. Some regions in west Sao 
Paulo and Mato Grosso do Sul would reduce the sugarcane area up to 5% when the 
blending rate is reduced to 15%. 
6.3. Environmental Effects of Alternative Fuel Policies 
Although the total VKT is reduced when smaller blending mandates are assumed, the GHG 
emissions in CO2e terms increase, as shown in figure 6.15. This important finding is 
because of the increased share of gasoline in the gasohol consumed by both CVs and FFVs. 
Being as a relatively more polluting fuel, a larger proportion of gasoline in gasohol 
increases the emissions relative to the benchmark case. The GHG emissions also increase 
under the sugarcane and sugar shock scenario and particularly under and policy change 
scenario when a lower tax rate is combined with a lower bending mandate. In this case the 
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higher ethanol price makes gasohol a relatively advantageous fuel which leads to larger 
gasoline consumption and therefore larger GHG emissions. 
6.4. Economic Surplus Effects 
As expected, fuel consumers would be significantly worse off as the ethanol blending rate is 
reduced (figure 6.16). This is due to both the higher price paid for fuel and reduction in the 
total amount of driving. The sugarcane yield reduction and resulting ethanol supply 
shortage (i.e. sugarcane and sugar shock scenario) would exacerbate the fuel consumer’s 
economic surplus loss further (by an additional 1%), while the lower tax rate  (i.e. policy 
change scenario) would lead to a recovery of this loss and even increase the consumers’ 
surplus above the benchmark case. 
In contrast, the sugarcane ethanol industry (sugarcane, sugar and ethanol producers 
combined) would have substantial gains (5%) resulting from the higher prices of both 
sugar and ethanol (figure 6.17). In the aggregate, fuel producers’ economic surplus would 
increase up to 8% under both scenarios. 
Finally, the total tax revenue collected by the Brazilian government would go up since 
gasoline is subject to a higher tax and the amount of gasoline in the total fuel consumption 
increases as the blending mandate is lowered (figure 6.19). Despite the tax cut in the policy 
change scenario, the total tax revenue with the current blending rate (20%) would become 
almost the same as in the benchmark when the blending rate was highest (25%). These 
interesting findings provide valuable insight to policy makers when making similar 
changes or reversing the current policies in the future.  
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6.5. Figures 
Figure 6.1 A Schematic Representation of Brazil Gasoline Supply. 
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Figure 6.2. Total Distance Driven, Brazil 
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Figure 6.3. Distance Driven by Conventional Vehicles, Brazil 
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Figure 6.4. Distance Driven by Flex-fuel Vehicles, Brazil 
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Figure 6.5. Distance driven by ethanol-dedicated vehicles, Brazil 
 
 
 
 
 
145 
 
Figure 6.6. Gasohol prices, Brazil 
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Figure 6.7. E100 Prices, Brazil 
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Figure 6.8. Fuel Consumption by Vehicle Type - Benchmark Scenario  
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Figure 6.9. Fuel Consumption by Vehicle Type - Sugarcane and Sugar Shock Scenario 
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Figure 6.10. Fuel Consumption by Vehicle Type – Policy Change Scenario 
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Figure 6.11. Brazil Ethanol Exports 
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Figure 6.12. U.S. Ethanol Exports 
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Figure 6.13. Sugarcane Planted Area, Brazil 
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Figure 6.14. Ethanol Production, Brazil 
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Figure 6.15. GHG Emissions (CO2-eq), Brazil 
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Figure 6.16. Fuel Consumers’ Economic Surplus, Brazil 
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Figure 6.17. Sugarcane Industry’s Economic Surplus, Brazil 
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Figure 6.18. Fuel Producer’s Economic Surplus, Brazil 
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Figure 6.19. Government Revenues, Brazil 
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Figure 6.20. Total Economic Surplus, Brazil 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
160 
 
CHAPTER 7: Conclusions and Further Research Topics 
7.1 Conclusions 
In this dissertation I presented an analysis of projected agricultural and fuel market 
conditions in the U.S., Brazil, Argentina, China and Rest of the World (ROW) and compared 
a free ethanol trade regime (or business-as-usual –BAU scenario) with alternative policy 
scenarios that incentivize biofuel production. A price endogenous multi-market 
mathematical programming model is used to simulate the effects of those scenarios. The 
model results show that the international mandates and U.S. biofuel policies would 
promote an increase in the Brazil sugarcane ethanol production relative to the BAU 
scenario. Most of the increased ethanol production would be exported to the U.S., China and 
the ROW to meet the biofuel blending mandates. The model results demonstrate that a 
sustainable increase in ethanol production could be facilitated by intensifying the livestock 
production systems in Brazil, which would convert some of the pasture lands to cropland 
required to increase the production of corn, soybean, sugarcane and other crops. Some 
other general findings are as follows: 
1. Strong ethanol demand both in the domestic and international markets will put 
pressure on Brazil’s livestock sector and utilization of pasture lands; however,   
intensification would reduce the adverse effects on Brazil’s beef production and market 
share in global markets that could occur otherwise.  
2. Sugarcane production would increase further in the region of expansion as a result of 
biofuel escalation and more new cropland in Brazil would come from the pastures at 
the Deforestation Arch mainly for the expansion and substitution of the soybean acreage 
displaced from other regions. 
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3. When the U.S. substitutes gasoline with relatively cleaner biofuel, particularly ethanol 
produced from cellulosic biomass and sugarcane ethanol, the total GHG emissions 
would decrease significantly relative to the business-as-usual scenario. Much of this 
reduction would be achieved by the U.S., while Brazil and Argentina increase their total 
emissions due to the expansion of their agricultural sectors and land use changes.  
4. Brazilian fuel sector and agricultural producers would have always high and positive 
gains under the policy scenarios considered here that incentivize world biofuel 
production.   In contrast, both American and Brazilians food consumers would face 
substantial losses mainly due to the increases in global prices of food/feed crops. 
Specific policy scenario results are summarized below: 
i. Implementing the full package of U.S. biofuel policies, including the subsidies, import 
taxes and tariffs that were in place prior to 2012, show that the share of U.S. in world 
corn markets would be reduced compared to the BAU scenario. This is because a 
significant portion of the grain supply is diverted to domestic ethanol production in 
order to meet the RFS total ethanol mandate. Although cellulosic ethanol would be the 
main type of biofuel in the U.S., corn ethanol would increase further and part of it would 
be exported to China and the ROW. Meanwhile, Argentina and Brazil would increase the 
supply of corn significantly to meet the increasing export demand in global markets, 
which was previously supplied by the U.S.  
ii. When the U.S. biofuel incentives are removed but the mandates stay in place, U.S. corn 
and cellulosic ethanol production would decrease as sugarcane ethanol becomes a more 
economical fuel alternative. Thus, Brazil’s ethanol production and exports, particularly 
to the U.S., would increase. This would reduce the corn ethanol production in the U.S., 
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thus lower the domestic demand and the price of corn, which would therefore lead to 
increased corn exports by the U.S.  
iii. Cellulosic ethanol production is highly sensitive to the progress ratio assumption (i.e. 
reduction in processing cost due to learning-by-doing). If the cost of processing 
cellulosic ethanol declines at a slightly slower rate than the one assumed in the model, 
producing the amount dictated by the RFS mandate can be possible only at the expense 
of substantial subsidies or social economic losses.  
iv. Pasture and sugarcane areas in Brazil would remain virtually unchanged relative to the 
BAU scenario when the annual growth rates assumed for corn and sugarcane yields are 
increased. Likewise, corn area would not change and the three exporting countries 
would produce significantly more corn. As a result, the U.S. would use more corn for 
ethanol while Brazil and Argentina would increase their supply to the international 
market. 
v. When sugarcane and corn ethanol processing efficiencies are increased, both the U.S. 
and Brazil would produce more ethanol for domestic consumption without distorting 
the corn market, and the U.S. would import less ethanol from Brazil relative to the 
scenarios with the current processing efficiency. 
vi. If the price of gasoline is determined by market conditions in Brazil, rather than being 
regulated at the refinery gate, the endogenous market price would be slightly lower, the 
ethanol production would be reduced at some extent and drivers would consume less 
E100 and more gasohol. 
vii. Brazil could further increase its competitiveness in the world ethanol market by 
developing alternative ethanol transportation infrastructure, specifically the three 
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pipelines projects to transport ethanol produced from inland producing regions to four 
seaports in the southeast. This would reduce the current high cost of ethanol 
transportation. However, in order this new infrastructure to be justifiable expansion in 
ethanol demand should occur in the international markets besides the U.S. market 
where the imports from Brazil would have reached its economic limit without the 
pipelines. 
viii. The model results highlight how the fuel policy in Brazil is a sensitive issue given the 
Brazilian fuel consumers’ flexibility to switch between gasohol to E100. Based on the 
empirical results, I conclude that decreasing the ethanol blending rate harms 
consumers’ welfare (measured by consumers’ surplus) and a shortage of ethanol supply 
increases their losses further since ethanol is included in the fuel used by all vehicle 
types. However, reducing the gasoline tax rates would compensate those losses and 
even make Brazilian drivers better off regardless of the blending rate.  
ix. A sugar yield decline and a stronger sugar demand in global markets would increase the 
sugarcane area and production in Brazil, reduce the ethanol exports, and consequently 
an almost equal amount of ethanol would be exported by the U.S. to the ROW. However, 
a reduction in the gasoline tax rates, which leads to an increase in gasohol consumption 
by flex-fuel vehicles as well as a decrease in E100 prices, lessen these effects to some 
extent. 
x. Although the total distance driven by Brazilian drivers is reduced when smaller 
blending mandates are imposed, the GHG emissions in CO2e terms increase. This 
important finding is because of the increased share of gasoline in the gasohol 
consumption. Being as a relatively more polluting fuel, a larger proportion of gasoline in 
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gasohol increases the emissions relative to the benchmark case. Likewise, a relative 
higher price of E100 makes gasohol a relatively advantageous fuel that leads to larger 
gasoline consumption and therefore larger GHG emissions. 
xi. When Brazilians consume more gasohol, the total tax revenue collected by the Brazilian 
government would go up since gasoline is subject to a higher taxation rate and the 
amount of gasoline in the total fuel consumption increases when the blending rate is 
reduced. Thus, despite a gasoline tax cut, the total tax revenue could be almost the same 
as when the blending rates are high. 
The policy analysis presented in this dissertation identifies various key linkages 
between land use, GHG emissions, and interactions between agricultural commodity and 
transportation fuel markets. The empirical findings summarized above may provide 
valuable insight to the policy makers, agricultural producers, and the ethanol industry both 
in the U.S. and Brazil regarding the multi-market dimensions of the biofuel economy.  
7.2 Further Research Topics 
The model developed in this dissertation may have several extensions. The first extension 
will be adding a biodiesel and other biofuels component, particularly drop-in biofuels 
derived from cellulosic biomass, to the model. The latter is important both for the U.S. and 
Brazil modules since soybean oil and other vegetable oils are produced in large quantities 
in these countries and the potential for producing cellulosic biomass as potential biofuel 
feedstock is huge. Crop residues in particular, such as corn stover, sugarcane residues and 
bagasse, are also of particular importance. These are considered as more environmentally 
friendly options because of their favorable implications on land use changes and GHG 
emissions. The biodiesel sector, which is growing and being considered as a serious option 
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in Brazil, has a vast potential because of the increasing domestic and foreign demand. A 
domestic biodiesel blending mandate has already been introduced, which is currently 5%  
(ANP, 2012b). Thus, one of the immediate next steps is to include heavy-duty vehicles in 
the model, which currently represent about 10% of the all vehicle fleet (DENATRAN, 2010) 
and consume more than 38 billion lt of diesel (BEN, 2010).  
In this dissertation, I only assessed one alternative means of transportation in Brazil, 
namely the pipelines for delivering ethanol to major consumption areas. However, Brazil 
has developed or planned to develop their railroad and waterways systems to transport 
ethanol. Brazil has more than 42 and 30 thousand kilometers of railroads and waterways 
(Scandiffio, 2010). One of the most important projects for ethanol delivery would be the 
integration of a waterway in the Central-west region to a pipeline in the Southeast. The 
waterway is 1250 kilometers long and goes through the rivers Tiete and Parana in the 
states of Mato Grosso do Sul, Parana and Sao Paulo and ends in the town of Conchas in Sao 
Paulo, where it will connect to a pipeline to take the ethanol to the Sao Sebastiao seaport. 
An important railroad project would connect Mairinque in West Sao Paulo to Santos 
seaport, including a pipeline in the last part  (Scandiffio, 2010). Thus, it would be 
interesting to analyze the effect of these new projects. 
Another important addition to the model would be to include a more detailed sugar 
module. The current version does not consider the domestic sugar demand at state level 
(the domestic demand for sugar represents about 35% of the total production), thus the 
model does not consider specific transportation costs for delivering sugar (which has to be 
by trucks or rail) from inland regions to major consumption areas and export ports.  
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Determining the optimal means of sugar transportation and sugarcane mills location would 
be a useful feature when analyzing the expansion of the sugarcane industry. 
Sugarcane has an intra-year supply problem, namely for four months during the year 
there is no sugarcane production and most of mills stop producing sugar and ethanol. This 
makes the ethanol price to increase significantly. The alternatives to cope with this 
problem can be two-fold: 1) production of first-generation ethanol from corn, sorghum or 
other available feedstocks, and 2) production of second-generation ethanol from biomass, 
primarily from stover, sugarcane residues and bagasse during the ‘idle’ months. The first 
alternative was initiated last year at Campos do Julio in West Mato Grosso with a 
production of 3.5 million liters of corn ethanol in a flex-mill which can produce ethanol 
from both sugarcane and grains (Valim and Ondei, 2012). This alternative has been also 
analyzed by Goldsmith et al. (2009) who consider various options that would make flex-
mills an economically and financially viable. Such options may lead to a year-round 
operation (just stopping for a month for maintenance) by expanding the feedstock portfolio 
through procurement, that is if a particular feedstock is not produced by the mill it can be 
bought in the market when the price is favorable. To assess the potential of these 
alternatives in Brazil will be a challenging yet interesting policy analysis issue. 
The model includes a relatively small part of the agricultural sector in Argentina; 
hence, it would be useful to extend this component of the model by including at least three 
more important crops (namely, sunflower, oats and sorghum) and the livestock sector. 
Argentina has the world’s fourth largest beef-cattle herd and is the world’s fourth and fifth 
largest beef cattle producer and exporter (AgraFNP, 2008a). Therefore, future analyses 
may consider intensification in the Argentina livestock sector and integrating crop and 
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livestock sectors in a unified framework as done in the Brazil module. Finally, Argentina 
also has its own biofuel mandates although they are not fully implemented yet. These can 
be incorporated in the model and land use implications can be analyzed in a similar way.  
Similar price endogenous models following the social surplus maximization approach 
has been developed for the agricultural and biofuel sectors for some other countries (e.g. 
Khanna, Önal, Crago, and Mino (2012) for India, Chakravorty and Hubert (2012) for the 
European Union).  A challenging research direction would be integrating all these models 
in one simultaneous framework. 
Finally, coupling this type of partial equilibrium models with economy-wide models, 
such as CGE models and input-output models, considering the feedbacks between these 
models would be an interesting line of research. The partial equilibrium approach can 
handle a variety of important spatial and temporal details that may not be easy to 
incorporate in economy-wide models (particularly CGE models) due to computational 
difficulties. On the other hand, economy-wide models offer the advantage of assessing 
economic impacts of biofuels on other sectors. Combining these approaches in an iterative 
or sequential procedure where the two models provide feedbacks to each other would be a 
good way for eliminating the deficiencies and benefiting from the strengths each approach. 
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Appendix A: Endogenous Prices for Sugarcane and Fuel in Brazil 
In this appendix, I show the derivation of prices of VKT, sugar, sugarcane, gasohol and E100 
for the Brazilian side of the model. For simplification purposes, assume a close economy 
with not regional disaggregation, two goods for consumption (VKT and sugar), one 
agricultural product (i.e. sugarcane), three processed agricultural products (sugar, hydrous 
and anhydrous ethanol) and gasoline. Notation follows that in chapter 3. The objective 
function is represented by the sum of Brazilian producers' and consumers' surpluses as 
follows: 
          
∑∫ (           )    
     
   
  ∫ (        )   
 
 
 
   ̅       ∑    
  
                  ∑      
  
    ∑      
  
 
                       
 (A.1) 
The first line of equation (A.1) represents the area under the linear demand curves 
for vehicle kilometer traveled (VKT) in Brazil for each vehicle type vt (first integral) and for 
sugar (S) (second integral). Where set vt is CV, FFV and EDV. The first term in the second 
line is the supply curve for gasoline  ̅   , recall that the refinery gasoline price is fixed in 
Brazil; the second term  includes all tax rates, subsidies, internal transportation costs, and 
marketing margins ( ) for the gasoline demand (GD); the third and fourth terms represent 
the cost (c) of producing anhydrous (   ) and hydrous (   ) ethanol from sugarcane; and 
the fifth and sixth terms include all tax rates, subsidies, internal transportation costs, and 
marketing margins ( ) for the anhydrous (   )  and hydrous ethanol (   ) demand. The 
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terms in lines 3 are associated to sugarcane and sugar production; the first term represents 
the cost per Ha ( ) of producing sugarcane (CANE) on cropland CL for sugarcane and the 
second term is the cost per ton of processing (  ) sugarcane to sugar. 
The problem above is subject to several constraints. Consumers obtain utility from 
VKT, which is produced from gasohol consumption (i.e. blending gasoline and anhydrous 
ethanol) by CV, from blended gasohol and E100 in any proportion by FFV, and from E100 
consumption by EDV. The total kilometers generated (VKT) results from the kilometers per 
liter of each vehicle type and the fuel amount consumed (equations A.2).  
           (                         )       
(A.2) 
Where     is the parameter for energy efficiency in kilometers per liter of gasoline 
equivalent for each vehicle type in each country.    and   correspond to the difference in 
pure energy contents of hydrous and anhydrous ethanol (ED) with respect to gasoline (GD). 
The model restricts the consumption of E100 to FFVs and EDVs and the consumption of 
gasohol to FFVs and CVs.  
Equation (A.3) represents the blending rate (     ) for gasohol, which was 25% in 
2007. Recall that EDVs cars only consume E100, so they don’t require this constraint. 
            (           )                   
(A.3) 
Equations (A.4), (A.5) and (A.6) represent national gasoline, ethanol (anhydrous and 
hydrous) and sugar clearing market conditions. 
∑    
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(A.4) 
∑      
  
     
(A.5) 
∑      
  
     
(A.6) 
           
(A.7) 
Where    is the sugar yield per ton of sugarcane and       is the amount of 
sugarcane used for sugar production. Equations (A.8) and (A.9) express the anhydrous and 
hydrous ethanol supply whose production depends on their own yield ( ) and the amount 
of sugarcane (CANE) used by each. 
             
(A.8) 
             
(A.9) 
Equation (A2.10) shows total sugarcane production, which depends on its yield per 
hectare (     ) and total land devoted to this crop (      ). 
                                
 (A.10) 
Finally, modeled cropland must be restricted to the sum of the total cropland 
observed available, but since this simplified version is only considering sugarcane, this 
restriction would be redundant here.  
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This constrained maximization problem can be solved by first forming the Lagrangian 
( ) from equations (A2.1)-(A2.10): 
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(A.11) 
Second, setting the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker first order conditions (obtained by taking 
the partial derivative of   with respect to each of the choice variables (uppercase) and each 
of the Lagrangian multipliers (  with       ), and then setting each of these partials 
equal to zero): 
  
      
                   
  
(A.12) 
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(A.28) 
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(A.41) 
  
    
                                    
(A.42) 
Finally, we need   
    for i = 6, 7, 8, 9; otherwise   
  is unrestricted.Where * denotes 
optimal Lagrangian multiplier and optimal variables. Given that functions in the objective 
function are concave, all constraints are linear and constraints (A.4)-(A.7) are convex, we 
can assume optimal interior solutions. Thus, from equations (A.12)-(A.13) Lagrangian 
multipliers   
     
 and    
 represent price of          for CV, FFV and EDV respectively. 
Lagrangian multipliers   
  in equation (A.15) represent price of sugar per ton, which is 
equivalent to solve conditions (A.25)-(A.26) as follows: 
     
     
    
  
     
(A.43) 
Likewise, sugarcane price per ton can be found from equation (A.25) as: 
     
     
      
(A.44) 
Although ‘sugarcane for ethanol’ is not explicitly in the objective function, it could be 
shown that shadow price    
  (i.e. price of sugarcane) is same as    
  and    
 .Prices of fuels 
are derived in this last part. Setting equation (A.16) equal to (A.17), I obtain the gasoline 
price for the consumer (LHS of equation A.45): 
 ̅       
          
  
(A.45) 
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Same result is obtained using equation (A.16) and (A.18). In the same way, consumer 
price of anhydrous ethanol (LHS of equation A.45) can be found from conditions (A.19) and 
(A.21): 
       
        
             
  
       
     
 
(A.46) 
Equally, it can be found from equations (A.19) and (A.22). On the other hand 
consumer price of hydrous ethanol (LHS of equation A.47) comes by setting equation 
(A.20) and either equation (A.23) or (A.24), using the latter: 
       
        
            
(A.47) 
Nevertheless, in the real world consumer observes rather gasohol and E100 prices 
(Recall that in the model consumers choose VKT). The later price is equivalent to consumer 
hydrous price, i.e. LHS of equation (A.47). The former price is a weighted average of 
gasoline and anhydrous prices by multiplying equations (A.45) by (       ) and (A.46) 
by       and adding them up: 
(       )( ̅    )       (       
    )
 (       )(  
          )       (   
             
  
       
     
) 
(A.48) 
LHS in (A.48) is gasohol price (        ) and by simplifying the right hand side it 
becomes: 
           
       (        (    )) 
(A.49) 
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Finally, it has to be verified that price of VKT is right by showing, for instance, that 
price of VKT by CV,        , is equal to   
 .  
Proof.  
Let the price of VKT by CV,        , as 
        
                     
      
 
(A.50) 
Where     is the optimal consumer price of gasoline (see equation A.45),       is the 
optimal amount of gasoline consumed by CVs,     is the consumer price of anhydrous 
ethanol,         is the optimal amount of anhydrous ethanol consumed by CVs. 
Substituting      and     by RHS in equations (A.45) and (A.46) respectively, VKT by RHS 
of equation (A.27) and         by RHS of equation (A.30): 
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(A.51) 
Simplifying,  
        
(   
     
       
)   
             
           (   
     
       
)
   
  
(A.52) 
  
Thus, it has been demonstrated that VKT prices are corrected defined in equations 
(A.12)-(A.14) and therefore fuel prices in equations (A.45)-(A.49) are also well defined. 
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Appendix B: GAMS Code for the Model 
POSITIVE VARIABLE 
 DEMAND(COU,COM)   Demand for COM in country  COU 
 SUPPLY(COU,COM)   Supply of COM in country  COU 
 TOPROCESS(COU,PRODUC) Amount to nonethanol processing 
 TOMARKET(COU,PRODUC) Amount to market directly 
*=========================== Ag. Land Use ======================; 
 FEED(COU,COM) COM for livestock feed 
 CROPLAND(REG,PRODUC) Cropland by crop by region 
 CROPLAND1(REG,ROT) Cropland only for primary crops 
 CROPLAND2(REG,CROP) Cropland for double crops 
 NEWLAND(P_TYPE,REG,ROT) New cropland from pasture planted 
 CONVERTED(P_TYPE,REG)  Land converted from  pasture to cropland 
 LAMBDA(REG,YR) Weight for historical crop mixes primary crops 
 LAMBDA2(REG,YR) Weight for historical crop mixes double crops 
*====================== Ethanol Production =====================; 
 SC_forSugar(REG) Sugarcane feedstock for sugar 
 SC_forAnhydrous(REG) Sugarcane feedstock for anh eth 
 SC_forHydrous(REG) Sugarcane feedstock for hyd eth 
 USSugarCane_forsugar Sugarcane feedstock for sugar in US 
 Corn_FORETHANOL  Corn feedstock for anh eth 
 SUPPLY_REG_BR_SUGAR(REG) Regional supply of sugar in BR 
 STOVER_AREA(REG) Corn Stover acreage 
 STOVER_ETH(REG)  Eth from corn Stover 
 STRAW_AREA(REG)  Wheat Straw acreage 
 STRAW_ETH(REG)   Eth from wheat straw 
 MIS_AREA_ON_CROP(REG) Miscanthus area over cropland 
 MIS_AREA_ON_MARG(REG) Miscanthus area over marginal land 
 MIS_ETH(REG)   Eth from Miscanthus 
 SWG_AREA_ON_CROP(REG)  Switchgrass area over cropland 
 SWG_AREA_ON_MARG(REG)  Switchgrass area over marginal land 
 SWG_ETH(REG)   Eth from switchgrass 
 CEL_ETH_SUP    Supply cel eth in gallons 
 STOVER_BIOMASS(REG) Stover feedstock 
 STRAW_BIOMASS(REG)  Straw feedstock 
 MIS_BIOMASS(REG)    Miscanthus feedstock 
 SWG_BIOMASS(REG)    Switchgrass feedstock 
*===================== Miles & fuel Market =====================; 
 BR_SUPPLYAnh Supply of anh eth in BR 
 BR_SUPPLYHyd Supply of hyd eth in BR 
 BR_Hyd_DEL_REG(REG,STATE) Hyd eth deliver from reg 2 sta in BR 
 BR_SUPPLYHyd_REG(REG) Hyd eth supply by region in BR in BR 
 BR_Anh_DEL_REG(REG,STATE) Anh eth deliver from reg 2 sta in BR 
 BR_SUPPLYAnh_REG(REG) Anh eth supply by region in BR 
 BR_Hyd_USE(STATE,VT_BR)  Hyd eth demand in BR 
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 BR_Anh_USE(STATE,VT_BR)  Anh eth demand in BR 
 BR_GAS_USE(STATE,VT_BR)  Gas demand in BR 
 BR_GAS_SUP(REG) Gas supply in BR 
 BR_GAS_DEL(REG,STATE) Gas delivered from reg 2 sta in BR 
 BR_GAS_IMP_2STA(PORTS,STATE) Gas import from ports 2 sta in BR 
 BR_GAS_2PORT(REG,PORTS) Gas delivered from reg 2 ports in BR 
 BR_GAS_SUP_TOT  Gas supply in BR 
 BR_GAS_EXP(PORTS) Gas exports by seaport in BR 
 BR_GAS_IMP(PORTS) Gas imports by seaport in BR 
 BR_GAS_EXP_TOT Gas exports in BR 
 BR_GAS_IMP_TOT Gas imports in BR 
 BR_KM(STATE,VT_BR) Km consumption by VT by sta in BR 
 US_SUPPLYETH Supply of anh eth in US 
 US_SUPPLYcornETH Total supply of corn eth in US 
 US_ETH_USE(VT) Eth demand in US by VT 
 US_GAS_USE(VT) Gas demand in US by VT 
 US_GAS_SUP Gas supply in US 
 US_GAS_IMP Gas imports in US 
 US_MILES(VT) Miles consumption by VT in US 
 ROW_ETH_DEM Eth demand in ROW 
 ROW_GAS_DEM Gas demand in ROW 
 ROW_GAS_SUP Gas supply in ROW 
 CHI_GAS_SUP Gas supply in CHI 
 CHI_GAS_IMP Gas imports in CHI 
 CHI_ETH_DEM Eth demand in CHI 
 CHI_GAS_DEM GAS demand in CHI 
*================================= Trade =======================; 
 ETHEXPORT_CBI_REG(REG,ports) Hyd eth del reg2ports 4 CBI in BR 
 ETHEXPORT_CBI_PORT(ports) Hyd eth exp ports thru CBI in BR 
 ETHEXPORT_2STA(PORTS,STATE) Eth imported in BR 
 ETHEXPORT_REG(REG,ports) Anh eth delivered from reg 2 ports 
 ETHEXPORT_PORT(ports,COU) Anh eth exp ports from BR to COU 
 ETHEXPORT_CBI Eth from Brazil thru CBI countries 
 ETHEXPORT(COU,COUNTRIES) Eth exports from COU 2 COUNTRIES 
 EXPORT(COU,COUNTRIES,COM)  EXPORT of COM from COU to COUNTRIES 
 TOTALEXPORT(COU,COM) Total exports of COM from COU to others 
*==================== Beef Cattle Variables in BR ==============; 
*Pasture area by pasture type, activity, system, and region 
 PASTURE_AREA(P_TYPE,ACT,SYS,REG) Pasture Area 
*Shipment from Weaning farms to Finishing farms (Heads) 
 Bship(P_TYPE,ACT,SYS,REG,REGP) Calves shipped 
 
EQUATIONS 
 SURPLUS Objective function 
*============================== Brazil km ======================; 
 BR_KMEQ(STATE,VT_BR) VKT production function in BR 
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 BR_Anh_SHARE(STATE,VT_BR) Blending mandate in BR 
*=========================== US miles ==========================; 
 US_MILESEQ(VT) VMT production function in US 
 US_MAX_ETH_SHARE(VT) Blending max in US 
 US_MIN_ETH_SHARE(VT) Blending min mandate in US 
*====================== Gasoline balance =======================; 
 US_GAS_BAL Gas balance in US 
 BR_GAS_BAL Gas balance in BR 
 CHI_GAS_BAL Gas balance in CHI 
 ROW_GAS_BAL Gas balance in ROW 
 BR_GAS_SUP_EQ Gas Supply in US 
 BR_GAS_EXPEQ(PORTS) Gas exports by seaport in BR 
 BR_GAS_BAL_STA(STATE) Gas balance by state in BR 
 BR_GAS_IMPEQ(PORTS) Gas imports by seaport in BR 
 BR_GAS_BAL_REGEQ(REG_GAS) Gas balance by producing reg in BR 
 BR_GAS_EXP_TOT_EQ Gas exports in BR 
 BR_GAS_IMP_TOT_EQ Gas imports in BR 
*==================== Ethanol Balance ==========================; 
 BR_Anh_BALANCE Anh eth balance in BR 
 BR_hyd_BALANCE Hyd eth balance in BR 
 ROW_ETH_BALANCE Eth balance in ROW 
 CHI_ETH_BALANCE Eth balance in CHI 
 US_ETH_BALANCE Eth balance in US 
*===================== Ethanol Supply ==========================; 
 US_TOTAL_ETH Eth supply in US 
 US_ETH_CONVERSION Corn eth conversion in US 
 BR_ETH_CONVERSION1 Hyd eth conversion in BR 
 BR_ETH_CONVERSION2 Anh eth conversion in BR 
 BR_ETH_CONVERSION1_REG(REG) Hyd eth conversion by reg in BR 
 BR_ETH_CONVERSION2_REG(REG) Anh eth conversion by reg in BR 
 BR_Hyd_DEL_REGEQ(STATE) Hyd eth demand by sta in BR 
 ETH_HYD_BAL_REGEQ(REG) Hyd eth balance by reg in BR 
 ETHEXPORT_CBI_PORTEQ(ports) Eth exp from ports thru CBI in BR 
 ETHEXPORT_CBIEQ Eth exports thru CBI in BR 
 ETH_IMPEQ Eth imports in BR 
 BR_Anh_DEL_REGEQ(STATE) Hyd eth demand by sta in BR 
 ETH_ANH_BAL_REGEQ(REG)  Anh eth balance by reg in BR 
 ETHEXPORT_PORTEQ(ports) Eth exports by port in BR 
 ETHEXPORT_EQ(COU) Eth exports in BR 
*Mandates 
 ETH_MANDATE RFS total mandate 
 CEL_MANDATE Cellulosic eth mandate 
 ADV_MANDATE Advanced eth mandate 
 SC_ETH_CAP Cap to sugarcane ethanol imports 
*Cellulosic ethanol supply 
 CELL_ETHANOL Cellulosic ethanol in US 
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 STOVER_ETH_SUP(REG) Stover ethanol in US 
 STOVER_BIOMASSEQ(REG) Stover feedstock in US 
 STRAW_ETH_SUP(REG) Straw ethanol in US 
 STRAW_BIOMASSEQ(REG) Straw feedstock in US 
 MIS_ETH_SUP(REG) Miscanthus ethanol in US 
 SWG_ETH_SUP(REG) Switchgrass ethanol in US 
 MIS_BIOMASSEQ(REG) Miscanthus feedstock in US 
 SWG_BIOMASSEQ(REG) Switchgrass feedstock in US 
*======================== Trade  ===============================; 
 EXPORT_ACC(COU,COM) Export accounting constraint 
*=================== Commodity Supply ==========================; 
 PRIM_SUPPLYEQ(COU,COM) Primary commodity supply use balance 
 PROC_SUPPLYEQ(COU,COM) Processed commodity supply use balance 
*====================== Commodity Balance ======================; 
 COMMODITY_BALANCE(COU,COM) Equilibrium condition for commodities 
*================= Crop Balance =================== 
 CROP_BAL(COU,PRODUC) Crop production use balance 
*================ Cattle beef Feed requirements ================; 
 FEED_BR(COM)    Feed for livestock in BR 
*================== Land Use ===================================; 
 LANDAREA(REG) Total land Use constraint 
 HISTAREA1(REG,CROP) Total land use constraint primary crops 
 HISTAREA2(REG,CROP) Total land use constraint double crops 
 CONVEX(REG) Convexity constraint for historical mix weights 
 CONVEX2(REG) Convexity constraint double crops 
 DREST(COU,REG,CROP2) Land restriction for double crops 
 CROPLANDEQ(REG,PRODUC) total land planted 
 LANDAREA1(REG) Land use restrict including marginal lands in US 
 BMALAND(REG) Biomass land use in US 
 BMALAND1(REG) Biomass land use in US 
*================ Pasture Land & Converted land ================; 
* by pasture type: planted, native and degraded 
 PASTLAND(P_TYPE,REG) pasture land use 
 CONVERTLAND(P_TYPE,REG) Converted pasture to cropland 
*=================== Beef Cattle sector Equations ==============; 
*Pasture Area by activity, system and region 
 EQPAST_AREA(P_TYPE,ACT,SYS,REG) Pasture Area 
 AZSCarea_pasture(REG) Agro-Ecolog. Zoning Sugarcane on Pasture; 
*===============================================================; 
*==================BEGIN OBJECTIVE FUNCTION=====================; 
*===============================================================; 
SURPLUS.. WELF =e= 
*Miles & Fuel market 
  SUM(VT, (US_Alpha_MILES(VT) +0.5*US_Beta_MILES(VT)*US_MILES(VT))*US_MILES(VT)) 
 + SUM((STATE,VT_BR), (BR_Alpha_KM(STATE,VT_BR)   
 + 0.5*BR_Beta_KM(STATE,VT_BR)*BR_KM(STATE,VT_BR)) *BR_KM(STATE,VT_BR)) 
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 + (ROW_Alpha_ETHDEMAND 
             + 0.5*ROW_Beta_ETHDEMAND*ROW_ETH_DEM)*ROW_ETH_DEM 
 + (ROW_Alpha_GASDEMAND 
 +0.5*ROW_Beta_GASDEMAND*ROW_GAS_DEM)*ROW_GAS_DEM 
 + (CHI_Alpha_ETHDEMAND + 0.5*CHI_Beta_ETHDEMAND*CHI_ETH_DEM)*CHI_ETH_DEM 
 + (CHI_Alpha_GASDEMAND  + 0.5*CHI_Beta_GASDEMAND*CHI_GAS_DEM)*CHI_GAS_DEM 
 - (US_Alpha_GASSUPPLY  + 0.5*Us_Beta_GASSUPPLY*US_GAS_SUP)*US_GAS_SUP 
 - (ROW_Alpha_GASSUPPLY  + 0.5*ROW_Beta_GASSUPPLY*ROW_GAS_SUP)*ROW_GAS_SUP 
 - (CHI_Alpha_GASSUPPLY + 0.5*CHI_Beta_GASSUPPLY*CHI_GAS_SUP)*CHI_GAS_SUP 
 - gas_ship("US")*GaltoLit*US_GAS_IMP 
 - gas_ship("CHI")*GaltoLit*CHI_GAS_IMP 
 - gas_ship("BR")*GaltoLit*BR_GAS_IMP_TOT 
 - gas_ship("BR")*BR_GAS_EXP_TOT 
 - (MIS_ETH_PROC_COST + CellEthRet + Cel_mkt_margin + fuel_tax_US 
    - CELL_COPRO - Cel_subsidy + Cel_EthTranport) 
                            *SUM(REG$CORR("US",REG),MIS_ETH(REG)) 
 - (SWG_ETH_PROC_COST + CellEthRet + Cel_mkt_margin + fuel_tax_US 
    - CELL_COPRO - Cel_subsidy + Cel_EthTranport) 
                            *SUM(REG$CORR("US",REG),SWG_ETH(REG)) 
 - (Stover_ETH_PROC_Cost + CellEthRet + Cel_mkt_margin 
    + fuel_tax_US - CELL_COPRO - Cel_subsidy + Cel_EthTranport) 
                         *SUM(REG$CORR("US",REG),Stover_ETH(REG)) 
 - (Straw_ETH_PROC_Cost + CellEthRet + Cel_mkt_margin 
    + fuel_tax_US - CELL_COPRO - Cel_subsidy + Cel_EthTranport) 
                          *SUM(REG$CORR("US",REG),Straw_ETH(REG)) 
 -SUM(COU$(ORD(COU)=1),(Corn_Anhydrous_cost + EthRet(COU) 
  + mkt_margin_US + fuel_tax_US + EthTranport(COU) 
          - coproduct_credit(COU))*(1/GaltoLit)*US_SUPPLYcornETH) 
 + SUM(COU$(ORD(COU)=1),subsidy(COU)*((1/GaltoLit)* 
          (ETHEXPORT("BR","US") + ETHEXPORT_CBI + US_SUPPLYETH))) 
 -SUM(COU$(ORD(COU) ne 3),( (tariff(COU) 
      + ad_valorem(COU))*(1/GaltoLit))*SUM(COUNTRIES$ 
      (ORD(COUNTRIES) NE ORD(COU) and ORD(COUNTRIES) LE 2), 
                                       ETHEXPORT(COUNTRIES,COU))) 
 - SUM(COU$(ORD(COU) ne 3),SUM(COUNTRIES$ 
      (ORD(COUNTRIES) NE ORD(COU) and ORD(COUNTRIES) LE 2), 
                   eth_ship(COUNTRIES)*ETHEXPORT(COUNTRIES,COU))) 
 - ((SC_Anhydrous_cost-SC_Hydrous_cost)*(1/exchange_2007) 
                                     + eth_ship_CBI*ETHEXPORT_CBI 
 +  price_ddgs*coproduct_factor("US")*Corn_FORETHANOL 
 - SUM(COU$(ORD(COU)=2),(SC_Anhydrous_cost 
      - subsidy(COU) + EthTranport(COU) - coproduct_credit(COU)) 
                                 *(1/exchange_2007)*BR_SUPPLYAnh) 
 - SUM(COU$(ORD(COU)=2),(SC_Hydrous_cost 
      - subsidy(COU) + EthTranport(COU) - coproduct_credit(COU)) 
                                 *(1/exchange_2007)*BR_SUPPLYHyd) 
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 - BR_GAS_refinery_price*BR_GAS_SUP_TOT 
 - SUM(STATE,(BR_Fed_tax(STATE) + (BR_CIDE + 
      BR_ICSM(STATE))*taxchange("blend") + (BR_Freight_gas + 
      BR_market_mg_gas(STATE))*(1-BRmin_eth))*(1/exchange_2007)* 
            SUM(VT_BR$(ord(VT_BR) le 2),BR_GAS_USE(STATE,VT_BR))) 
 - SUM(STATE,(ETH_tax_fed_BR(STATE)*0.5 + (BR_Freight_gas 
       + BR_market_mg_gas(STATE))*BRmin_eth)*(1/exchange_2007)* 
            SUM(VT_BR$(ord(VT_BR) le 2),BR_Anh_USE(STATE,VT_BR))) 
 - SUM(STATE,(ETH_tax_fed_BR(STATE) + ETH_tax_sta_BR(STATE) 
     BR_market_mg_eth(STATE) + BR_Freight_gas)*(1/exchange_2007)* 
           SUM(VT_BR$(ord(VT_BR) ge 2), BR_Hyd_USE(STATE,VT_BR))) 
 - SUM((REG,STATE)$CORR("BR",REG), 
     transportationCost2007(REG,STATE)*(1-scenarios("pipelines")) 
      + transportationCost2022(REG,STATE)*scenarios("pipelines")) 
                   *(1/exchange_2007)*BR_Hyd_DEL_REG(REG,STATE) ) 
 - SUM((REG,ports)$CORR("BR",REG), 
(transportationCost2007port(REG,ports)*(1-scenarios("pipelines")) 
  + transportationCost2022port(REG,ports)*scenarios("pipelines")) 
                 *(1/exchange_2007)*ETHEXPORT_CBI_REG(REG,ports)) 
 - SUM((REG,STATE)$CORR("BR",REG), 
    (transportationCost2007(REG,STATE)*(1-scenarios("pipelines")) 
      + transportationCost2022(REG,STATE)*scenarios("pipelines")) 
                   *(1/exchange_2007)*BR_Anh_DEL_REG(REG,STATE) ) 
 - SUM((REG,ports)$CORR("BR",REG), 
(transportationCost2007port(REG,ports)*(1-scenarios("pipelines")) 
  + transportationCost2022port(REG,ports)*scenarios("pipelines")) 
                     *(1/exchange_2007)*ETHEXPORT_REG(REG,ports)) 
 - SUM((ports,STATE)$Distance_port_gas_imp1(ports,STATE), 
Distance_port_gas_imp(ports,STATE)*roadwaycost*(1/exchange_2007)* 
                                    ETHEXPORT_2STA(PORTS,STATE) ) 
 - SUM((REG_GAS,STATE) 
 $(CORR("BR",REG_GAS) and Distance_gas_MRtoState(REG_GAS,STATE)), 
         MRtoState(REG_GAS,STATE)*pipelinecost*(1/exchange_2007)* 
                                       BR_GAS_DEL(REG_GAS,STATE)) 
 - SUM((REG_GAS,ports)$ 
  (CORR("BR",REG_GAS) and Distance_port_gas_2exp(REG_GAS,ports)), 
 Distance_port_gas(REG_GAS,ports)*pipelinecost*(1/exchange_2007)* 
                                     BR_GAS_2PORT(REG_GAS,PORTS)) 
 - SUM((ports,STATE)$Distance_port_gas_imp1(ports,STATE), 
 Distance_port_gas_imp(ports,STATE)*pipelinecost 
 *(1/exchange_2007)*BR_GAS_IMP_2STA(PORTS,STATE)) 
 - Transp_cost('BR','SUGAR')* 
               (SUPPLY('BR','SUGAR') - TOTALEXPORT('BR','SUGAR')) 
*Commodities' market 
 +SUM((DOM,COM)$Cou_Com(DOM,COM),(Alpha(DOM,COM) 
            + 0.5*Beta(DOM,COM)*DEMAND(DOM,COM))*DEMAND(DOM,COM)) 
193 
 
 +SUM((WORLD,COM)$Cou_Com(WORLD,COM),(ROW_Alpha_DEMAND(WORLD,COM) 
              + 0.5*ROW_Beta_DEMAND(WORLD,COM)*DEMAND(WORLD,COM)) 
                                              *DEMAND(WORLD,COM)) 
* Crop & Conversion land costs 
 - SUM((DOM,REG)$CORR(DOM,REG), 
          SUM(PRODUC$Cou_Prod(DOM,PRODUC), 
              SUM(CROP1$CropProd(CROP1,PRODUC), 
                  SUM(ROT$Rotmap(ROT,CROP1), 
                      ShareR(ROT,CROP1)*CostR(REG,ROT)* (CROPLAND1(REG,ROT) 
           + SUM(P_TYPE,NEWLAND(P_TYPE,REG,ROT)$CORR("BR",REG)))) 
     + SUM(CROP2$CouDoubleProduc(DOM,PRODUC,CROP2), 
                     ProdCost(REG,CROP2)*CROPLAND2(REG,CROP2)) )) 
 - SUM(REG$CORR("BR",REG),SUM((P_TYPE,ROT),ConversionCost(P_TYPE) 
                        *NEWLAND(P_TYPE,REG,ROT)$CORR("BR",REG))) 
*biomass crop , stover and straw COLLECTION COSTS 
 - SUM(REG$CORR("US",REG), 
 Stover_Cost(REG)*(STOVER_AREA(REG))  +  Straw_Cost(REG)*(STRAW_AREA(REG)) 
 +  SWG_Cost(REG)*(SWG_AREA_ON_CROP(REG) + SWG_AREA_ON_MARG(REG)) 
 +  MIS_Cost(REG)*(MIS_AREA_ON_CROP(REG) + MIS_AREA_ON_MARG(REG)) 
 +  Marg_land_cost(REG)* (SWG_AREA_ON_MARG(REG) + MIS_AREA_ON_MARG(REG))) 
*Procesing costs; 
 - SUBProcCost*TOPROCESS('US','SUB')  - sugar_cost("US")*USSugarCane_forsugar 
 - sugar_cost("BR")*SUM(REG$CORR("BR",REG),SC_forSugar(REG)) 
 - SUM(DOM,soyproccost(DOM)*TOPROCESS(DOM,"SOY")) 
*ROW; 
 - SUM((WORLD,COM)$COU_COM(World,COM),(ROW_alpha_SUPPLY(WORLD,COM) 
    + 0.5*ROW_beta_SUPPLY(WORLD,COM)*SUPPLY(WORLD,COM))* 
                                               SUPPLY(WORLD,COM)) 
* Transpotation costs; 
 - SUM((COU,COM)$Cou_COM(COU,COM),Transp_cost(COU,COM) 
                                           *TOTALEXPORT(COU,COM)) 
 - SUM((COU,COM)$Cou_COM(COU,COM), SUM(COUNTRIES$((ORD(COUNTRIES) 
              NE ORD(COU))and Cou_COM(COUNTRIES,COM) NE 0), 
     Shipping_cost(COU,COUNTRIES,COM)*EXPORT(COU,COUNTRIES,COM))) 
*Livestock costs; *Costs Cattle by AU 
 - SUM((P_TYPE,ACT,SYS,REG)$CORR("BR",REG),    
CostAU(P_TYPE,ACT,SYS,REG)*PastoAU(P_TYPE,ACT,SYS,REG) 
                               *PASTURE_AREA(P_TYPE,ACT,SYS,REG)) 
* Transportation costs of calves 
  - cost_trans_calves*SUM( (REG,REGP)$CORR("BR",REG), 
      BR_in_Distances(REG,REGP)*(SUM((P_TYPE,ACT,SYS), 
                                Bship(P_TYPE,ACT,SYS,REG,REGP))); 
 
*===============================================================; 
*===================== CONSTRAINT SET ===========================; 
*===============================================================; 
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*======================== Brazil km ===============================; 
BR_KMEQ(STATE,VT_BR).. BR_KM(STATE,VT_BR) =e= KPL(VT_BR)* 
    (0.96*2/3*BR_Hyd_USE(STATE,VT_BR)$(ord(VT_BR) ge 2) 
  + (2/3*BR_Anh_USE(STATE,VT_BR) + BR_GAS_USE(STATE,VT_BR))$(ord(VT_BR) le 2)); 
 
BR_Anh_SHARE(STATE,VT_BR)$(ord(VT_BR) le 2).. 
  BR_Anh_USE(STATE,VT_BR) =e= BRmin_eth*(BR_Anh_USE(STATE,VT_BR) 
                                     + BR_GAS_USE(STATE,VT_BR) ); 
 
*====================== US miles =================================; 
US_MILESEQ(VT).. US_MILES(VT) =e= 
                   MPG(VT)*(2/3*US_ETH_USE(VT) + US_GAS_USE(VT)); 
US_MAX_ETH_SHARE(VT)..  US_ETH_USE(VT) =l= 
              US_Share_Eth(VT)*(US_ETH_USE(VT)+ US_GAS_USE(VT) ); 
 
US_MIN_ETH_SHARE(VT).. US_ETH_USE(VT) =g= 
                      USmin_eth*(US_ETH_USE(VT)+ US_GAS_USE(VT)); 
 
*===================== Gasoline balance ===========================; 
US_GAS_BAL..  SUM(VT,US_GAS_USE(VT)) =l= US_GAS_SUP + US_GAS_IMP; 
 
CHI_GAS_BAL..  CHI_GAS_DEM  =l=   CHI_GAS_SUP + CHI_GAS_IMP; 
 
ROW_GAS_BAL..  ROW_GAS_DEM + CHI_GAS_IMP +  US_GAS_IMP 
  + BR_GAS_IMP_TOT =l= ROW_GAS_SUP + (1/GaltoLit)*BR_GAS_EXP_TOT; 
 
BR_GAS_BAL.. SUM((STATE,VT_BR)$(ord(VT_BR) le 2),                 
BR_GAS_USE(STATE,VT_BR)) + BR_GAS_EXP_TOT =l=  
     BR_GAS_SUP_TOT  +  GaltoLit*BR_GAS_IMP_TOT; 
 
BR_GAS_BAL_STA(STATE).. SUM(VT_BR$(ord(VT_BR) le 2), 
 BR_GAS_USE(STATE,VT_BR)) =l= 
 SUM(REG_GAS$Distance_gas_MRtoState(REG_GAS,STATE), 
                                      BR_GAS_DEL(REG_GAS,STATE)) 
 + SUM(PORTS$Distance_port_gas_imp1(PORTS,STATE), 
                                   BR_GAS_IMP_2STA(PORTS,STATE)); 
 
BR_GAS_BAL_REGEQ(REG_GAS)$CORR("BR",REG_GAS).. 
   SUM(PORTS$Distance_port_gas_2exp(REG_GAS,ports), 
                                     BR_GAS_2PORT(REG_GAS,PORTS)) 
 + SUM(STATE$Distance_gas_MRtoState(REG_GAS,STATE), 
             BR_GAS_DEL(REG_GAS,STATE)) =l=  BR_GAS_SUP(REG_GAS); 
 
BR_GAS_EXPEQ(PORTS)..  BR_GAS_EXP(PORTS) =l= 
 SUM(REG_GAS$Distance_port_gas_2exp(REG_GAS,ports), 
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                                    BR_GAS_2PORT(REG_GAS,PORTS)); 
  
BR_GAS_IMPEQ(PORTS)..  SUM(STATE$Distance_port_gas_imp1(ports,STATE), 
    BR_GAS_IMP_2STA(PORTS,STATE)) =l= GaltoLit*BR_GAS_IMP(PORTS); 
 
BR_GAS_SUP_EQ.. BR_GAS_SUP_TOT =e= SUM(REG_GAS,BR_GAS_SUP(REG_GAS)); 
 
BR_GAS_EXP_TOT_EQ.. SUM(PORTS,BR_GAS_EXP(PORTS)) =l= BR_GAS_EXP_TOT; 
 
BR_GAS_IMP_TOT_EQ.. SUM(PORTS,BR_GAS_IMP(PORTS)) =l=BR_GAS_IMP_TOT; 
 
*===================== Ethanol Balance ========================; 
BR_Anh_BALANCE.. ETHEXPORT("BR","US")  + SUM(WORLD,ETHEXPORT("BR",WORLD)) 
   + SUM((STATE,VT_BR)$(ord(VT_BR) le 2),BR_Anh_USE(STATE,VT_BR)) 
                         =l= ETHEXPORT("US","BR") + BR_SUPPLYAnh; 
 
ETH_IMPEQ..  SUM((PORTS,STATE)$Distance_port_gas_imp1(ports,STATE), 
          ETHEXPORT_2STA(PORTS,STATE)) =l=  ETHEXPORT("US","BR"); 
 
BR_Anh_DEL_REGEQ(STATE).. 
             SUM(VT_BR$(ord(VT_BR) le 2),BR_Anh_USE(STATE,VT_BR)) 
          =l=   SUM(REG$CORR("BR",REG),BR_Anh_DEL_REG(REG,STATE)) 
                        + SUM(PORTS,ETHEXPORT_2STA(PORTS,STATE)); 
 
ETH_ANH_BAL_REGEQ(REG)$CORR("BR",REG).. SUM(ports,ETHEXPORT_REG(REG,ports)) 
+  SUM(STATE,BR_Anh_DEL_REG(REG,STATE)) =e=  BR_SUPPLYAnh_REG(REG); 
 
ETHEXPORT_PORTEQ(ports).. SUM(COU$(ORD(COU) ne 2),  
    ETHEXPORT_PORT(ports,COU)) =l= 
                SUM(REG$CORR("BR",REG),ETHEXPORT_REG(REG,ports)); 
 
ETHEXPORT_EQ(COU)$(ORD(COU) ne 2).. ETHEXPORT("BR",COU) =l= 
                            SUM(ports,ETHEXPORT_PORT(ports,COU)); 
 
BR_Hyd_BALANCE.. ETHEXPORT_CBI + SUM((STATE,VT_BR)$(ord(VT_BR) ge 2), 
                      BR_Hyd_USE(STATE,VT_BR)) =l=  BR_SUPPLYHyd; 
 
BR_Hyd_DEL_REGEQ(STATE)..  
       SUM(VT_BR$(ord(VT_BR) ge 2), BR_Hyd_USE(STATE,VT_BR)) =l= 
               SUM(REG$CORR("BR",REG),BR_Hyd_DEL_REG(REG,STATE)); 
 
ETH_HYD_BAL_REGEQ(REG)$CORR("BR",REG).. 
 SUM(ports,ETHEXPORT_CBI_REG(REG,ports)) + 
 SUM(STATE,BR_Hyd_DEL_REG(REG,STATE)) =e= BR_SUPPLYHyd_REG(REG); 
 
ETHEXPORT_CBI_PORTEQ(ports).. ETHEXPORT_CBI_PORT(ports) =l= 
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            SUM(REG$CORR("BR",REG),ETHEXPORT_CBI_REG(REG,ports)); 
 
ETHEXPORT_CBIEQ.. ETHEXPORT_CBI =l= SUM(ports,ETHEXPORT_CBI_PORT(ports)); 
 
ROW_ETH_BALANCE.. ROW_ETH_DEM =l= 
                   SUM(COU$(ORD(COU) le 2),ETHEXPORT(COU,"ROW")); 
 
CHI_ETH_BALANCE.. CHI_ETH_DEM =l= 
                   SUM(COU$(ORD(COU) le 2),ETHEXPORT(COU,"CHI")); 
 
US_ETH_BALANCE..     SUM(VT,US_ETH_USE(VT)) + (1/GaltoLit)*(ETHEXPORT("US","BR") 
                  + SUM(WORLD,ETHEXPORT("US",WORLD)))  
                    =l= (1/GaltoLit)*(ETHEXPORT("BR","US")+ ETHEXPORT_CBI + US_SUPPLYETH); 
 
*========================= Ethanol Supply ======================; 
US_TOTAL_ETH.. US_SUPPLYETH =e= US_SUPPLYcornETH + GaltoLit*CEL_ETH_SUP; 
 
*Corn & Sugarcane Ethanol 
US_ETH_CONVERSION.. US_SUPPLYcornETH =e= 
                         Conv_Corn_Anhydrous*Corn_FORETHANOL; 
 
BR_ETH_CONVERSION1.. BR_SUPPLYAnh =e= 
               SUM(REG$CORR("BR",REG), BR_SUPPLYAnh_REG(REG)); 
 
BR_ETH_CONVERSION2.. BR_SUPPLYHyd =e= 
                 SUM(REG$CORR("BR",REG),BR_SUPPLYHyd_REG(REG)); 
 
BR_ETH_CONVERSION1_REG(REG)$CORR("BR",REG)..   BR_SUPPLYAnh_REG(REG) 
                     =e= Conv_SC_Anhydrous*SC_forAnhydrous(REG); 
 
BR_ETH_CONVERSION2_REG(REG)$CORR("BR",REG).. 
   BR_SUPPLYHyd_REG(REG) =e= Conv_SC_Hydrous*SC_forHydrous(REG); 
 
*cellulosic ethanol IN GALLONS 
CELL_ETHANOL.. CEL_ETH_SUP =e= SUM(REG$CORR("US",REG), 
 STOVER_ETH(REG) + STRAW_ETH(REG) + MIS_ETH(REG) + SWG_ETH(REG)); 
 
*Cellulosic ethanol supply 
*STOVER 
STOVER_ETH_SUP(REG)$CORR("US",REG).. STOVER_ETH(REG) =l= 
                               BIM_ETH_Yield*STOVER_BIOMASS(REG); 
 
STOVER_BIOMASSEQ(REG)$CORR("US",REG).. STOVER_BIOMASS(REG) =l= 
   Stover_yield(REG)*SurRatR(REG,"Corn1_Corn1")*STOVER_AREA(REG); 
 
*STRAW 
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STRAW_ETH_SUP(REG)$CORR("US",REG).. STRAW_ETH(REG) =l= 
                            BIM_ETH_Yield*STRAW_BIOMASS(REG); 
 
STRAW_BIOMASSEQ(REG)$CORR("US",REG).. STRAW_BIOMASS(REG) =l= 
   STRAW_YIELD(REG)*SurRatR(REG,"Wheat1_Wheat1")*STRAW_AREA(REG); 
 
*MISCANTHUS 
MIS_ETH_SUP(REG)$CORR("US",REG).. MIS_ETH(REG) =l= 
         BIM_ETH_Yield*MIS_BIOMASS(REG)*scenarios("switch2022"); 
 
MIS_BIOMASSEQ(REG)$CORR("US",REG).. MIS_BIOMASS(REG) =e= 
    MIS_yield(REG)*(MIS_AREA_ON_CROP(REG)+MIS_AREA_ON_MARG(REG)); 
 
*SWITCHGRASS 
SWG_ETH_SUP(REG)$CORR("US",REG)..  SWG_ETH(REG) =l= 
          BIM_ETH_Yield*SWG_BIOMASS(REG)*scenarios("switch2022"); 
 
SWG_BIOMASSEQ(REG)$CORR("US",REG).. SWG_BIOMASS(REG) =e= 
    SWG_yield(REG)*(SWG_AREA_ON_CROP(REG)+SWG_AREA_ON_MARG(REG)); 
 
*============================ Mandates =======================; 
ETH_MANDATE..  SUM(VT,US_ETH_USE(VT)) =g= mandate; 
CEL_MANDATE..  CEL_ETH_SUP =g= Cel_Eth_Mandate; 
ADV_MANDATE..  CEL_ETH_SUP + (1/GaltoLit)*(ETHEXPORT("BR","US") 
               + ETHEXPORT_CBI) =g= Adva_mandate; 
SC_ETH_CAP..   (1/GaltoLit)*ETHEXPORT_CBI =l= 
                      share_CBIinUS_Eth*SUM(VT,US_ETH_USE(VT)); 
 
*==================== commodities Trade ======================; 
EXPORT_ACC(COU,COM)$Cou_COM(COU,COM).. TOTALEXPORT(COU,COM) =e= 
 SUM(COUNTRIES$(ORD(COUNTRIES) NE ORD(COU) 
         and Cou_COM(COU,COM) NE 0),  EXPORT(COU,COUNTRIES,COM)); 
 
*===================== Commodity Supply ======================; 
PRIM_SUPPLYEQ(COU,COM)$ 
            (Supplier(COU,COM)*PrimCom(COM) and Ord(COU) le 3).. 
 SUPPLY(COU,COM) =e= SUM(PRODUC$Cou_Prod(COU,PRODUC), 
                     ProdCom(PRODUC,COM)*TOMARKET(COU,PRODUC)); 
 
PROC_SUPPLYEQ(COU,COM)$ 
            (Supplier(COU,COM)*ProcCom(COM) and Ord(COU) le 3).. 
   SUPPLY(COU,COM) =e= SUM(PRODUC$Cou_Prod(COU,PRODUC), 
                      ProdCom(PRODUC,COM)*TOPROCESS(COU,PRODUC)); 
 
*======================= Commodity Balance =====================; 
COMMODITY_BALANCE(COU,COM)$Cou_COM(COU,COM).. 
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    DEMAND(COU,COM)$Cou_COM(COU,COM) 
        + FEED('BR',COM)$(Ord(COU) eq 2 and FeedCom(COM) eq 1) 
   + SUM(COUNTRIES$(ORD(COUNTRIES) NE ORD(COU) 
                               and Cou_COM(COUNTRIES,COM) NE 0), 
                         EXPORT(COU,COUNTRIES,COM)) 
            =l= SUPPLY(COU,COM)$Supplier(COU,COM) + 
                SUM(COUNTRIES$(ORD(COUNTRIES) ne ORD(COU) and 
        Cou_COM(COUNTRIES,COM) NE 0), EXPORT(COUNTRIES,COU,COM)); 
 
*============================ CROP Balance ====================; 
CROP_BAL(COU,PRODUC)$Cou_Prod1(COU,PRODUC).. 
    TOPROCESS(COU,PRODUC)$Proc(PRODUC) 
    + TOMARKET(COU,PRODUC)$DirCons(PRODUC) 
    + Corn_FORETHANOL$(ORD(COU) = 1 and ORD(PRODUC) = 4) 
  =e= SUM(REG$(CORR(COU,REG) and Cou_Prod1(COU,PRODUC)), 
         SUM(CROP1$CropProd(CROP1,PRODUC), 
         SUM(ROT$Rotmap(ROT,CROP1), 
        YieldR(REG,ROT,CROP1)*SurRatR(REG,ROT)*CROPLAND1(REG,ROT) 
    + yieldnew*YieldR(REG,ROT,CROP1)*SurRatR(REG,ROT)* 
      SUM(P_TYPE,NEWLAND(P_TYPE,REG,ROT)$CORR("BR",REG)) 
      + SUM(CROP2$CouDoubleProduc(COU,PRODUC,CROP2), 
       Yield(REG,CROP2)*SurRat(REG,CROP2)*CROPLAND2(REG,CROP2))); 
 
*Balance for brazilian sugar cane 
CROP_BAL1(COU,PRODUC)$(ORD(COU) = 2 and ORD(PRODUC) = 12).. 
      SUM(REG$CORR("BR",REG), 
 SC_forSugar(REG) + SC_forAnhydrous(REG) + SC_forHydrous(REG)) =e= 
 SUM(REG$(CORR(COU,REG) and Cou_Prod(COU,PRODUC)), 
       YieldR(REG,"Sugarcane_Sugarcane","Sugarcane") 
       *SurRatR(REG,"Sugarcane_Sugarcane")* 
                             CROPLAND1(REG,"Sugarcane_Sugarcane") 
     + yieldnew*YieldR(REG,ROT,CROP1)*SurRatR(REG,ROT)* 
      SUM(P_TYPE,  NEWLAND(P_TYPE,REG,"Sugarcane_Sugarcane")$CORR("BR",REG) ); 
 
*==================== Cattle beef Feed requirements ============; 
FEED_BR(COM)$FeedCom(COM).. 
       SUM((P_TYPE,ACT,SYS,REG)$CORR("BR",REG), 
*Feed Corn requirements per AU 
 (FeedCorn(ACT,SYS)*PastoAU(ACT,SYS,REG)* 
                PASTURE_AREA(P_TYPE,ACT,SYS,REG))$(ORD(COM)=4) + 
*Feed Soymeal requirements per AU 
 (FeedSoymeal(ACT,SYS)*PastoAU(ACT,SYS,REG)* 
              PASTURE_AREA(P_TYPE,ACT,SYS,REG))$(ORD(COM)=11)) 
                                              =l= FEED('BR',COM); 
 
*================================ Land Use =====================; 
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LANDAREA(REG).. SUM(ROT,CROPLAND1(REG,ROT) 
             + SUM(P_TYPE,NEWLAND(P_TYPE,REG,ROT)$CORR("BR",REG)) 
             + SUM((P_TYPE,ACT,SYS),PASTURE_AREA(P_TYPE,ACT,SYS,REG))$CORR("BR",REG) 
             + (SWG_AREA_ON_CROP(REG) + MIS_AREA_ON_CROP(REG))$CORR("US",REG)  
          =l= AllLand(REG); 
 
LANDAREA1(REG)$CORR("US",REG).. SUM(ROT,CROPLAND1(REG,ROT)) 
           +  SWG_AREA_ON_CROP(REG) + MIS_AREA_ON_CROP(REG) 
           +  SWG_AREA_ON_MARG(REG) + MIS_AREA_ON_MARG(REG) 
                                =l= AllLand(REG) + Margland(REG); 
 
*Biomass land on crop land 
BMALAND(REG)$CORR("US",REG)..  SWG_AREA_ON_CROP(REG) 
                  + MIS_AREA_ON_CROP(REG)  =l= 0.25*AllLand(REG); 
 
BMALAND1(REG)$CORR("US",REG).. SWG_AREA_ON_MARG(REG) 
                      + MIS_AREA_ON_MARG(REG)  =l= Margland(REG); 
 
*============== Pasture Land & Converted land ==================; 
PASTLAND(P_TYPE,REG)$CORR("BR",REG).. 
 SUM((ACT,SYS),PASTURE_AREA(P_TYPE,ACT,SYS,REG) 
  + CONVERTED(P_TYPE,REG) =l= PrimaryAreaData(REG,P_TYPE,"2007"); 
 
CONVERTLAND(P_TYPE,REG)CORR("BR",REG).. 
      SUM(ROT,NEWLAND(P_TYPE,REG,ROT)) =l= CONVERTED(P_TYPE,REG); 
 
*====== Agro-Ecological Zoning for Sugarcane on Pasture ========; 
AZSCarea_pasture(REG).. SUM(NEWLAND(P_TYPE,REG,"Sugarcane_Sugarcane") 
                                   =l=   AZSP(REG,'ZAE_Pasture'); 
*============== Cropland, Rotations & Second Crops =============; 
CROPLANDEQ(REG,PRODUC)$(ORD(PRODUC) ne 14).. CROPLAND(REG,PRODUC) 
    =e= SUM(CROP1$CropProd(CROP1,PRODUC), 
            SUM(ROT$Rotmap(ROT,CROP1), ShareR(ROT,CROP1)*CROPLAND1(REG,ROT))) 
      + SUM(CROP2$Crop2_Prod(CROP2,PRODUC),CROPLAND2(REG,CROP2)); 
 
HISTAREA1(REG,CROP1).. SUM(ROT$Rotmap(ROT,CROP1), 
        ShareR(ROT,CROP1)*CROPLAND1(REG,ROT)) 
          =e=   SUM(YR1,LAMBDA(REG,YR1)*AreaData(REG,CROP1,YR1)); 
 
HISTAREA2(REG,CROP2).. CROPLAND2(REG,CROP2) =e= 
               SUM(YR1,LAMBDA2(REG,YR1)*AreaData(REG,CROP2,YR1)); 
 
CONVEX(REG).. SUM(YR1,LAMBDA(REG,YR1)) =l= 1; 
 
CONVEX2(REG).. SUM(YR1,LAMBDA2(REG,YR1)) =l= 1; 
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Drest(COU,REG,CROP2)$(CORR(COU,REG) and DoubleCropsCoun(COU,CROP2)).. 
     CROPLAND2(REG,CROP2) =l= SUM(CROP1$DoubleCrops(CROP1,CROP2), 
              SUM(ROT$Rotmap(ROT,CROP1), ShareR(ROT,CROP1)*CROPLAND1(REG,ROT))); 
 
*=============== Land Use/Cattle production ====================; 
*Finishing farms 
EQPAST_AREA(P_TYPE,ACT,SYS,REG)$CORR("BR",REG).. 
 PASTURE_AREA(P_TYPE,ACT,SYS,REG) =e= 
  HeadtoPast(ACT,SYS)*SUM(REGP$CORR("BR",REGP),Bship(P_TYPE,ACT,SYS,REG,REGP)); 
 
*Pasture availability 
PASTLAND(P_TYPE,REG)$CORR("BR",REG).. 
SUM((ACT,SYS),PASTURE_AREA(P_TYPE,ACT,SYS,REG)) =l=  
                                PrimaryAreaData(REG,P_TYPE,"2007"); 
 
*========================= Sugar Quota =========================; 
EXPORT.up("BR","US","SUGAR")=quota; 
 
MODEL BRTRADE /ALL/; 
SOLVE BRTRADE USING QCP MAXIMIZING WELF; 
